Eaphram Lincey v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 17, 2017
• Docket: 49A05-1609-CR-2185
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 17 2017, 6:08 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Barbara J. Simmons Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eaphram Lincey, April 17, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1609-CR-2185 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable David Seiter, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff Pro Tempore Trial Court Cause No. 49G10-1507-CM-26403

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1609-CR-2185 | April 17, 2017 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Following a traffic stop, Eaphram Lincey was convicted of driving while

suspended and possession of marijuana. He now appeals, arguing that the

police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. Because the officer

testified that Lincey did not stop at a stop light and a stop sign—both

infractions—the trial court did not err in finding that reasonable suspicion

existed for the traffic stop. We therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Just after midnight on July 26, 2015, Indianapolis Police Department Officer

David Wisneski was patrolling the northside near 38th Street and Arlington

Avenue when he encountered Lincey operating a motorcycle with a female

passenger. The motorcycle was “wobbling” and traveling unusually slow, so

Officer Wisneski decided to slow down and see if there was a problem. Tr. Vol.

II pp. 7, 44. When Lincey made a right turn at a red light without first coming

to a stop, Officer Wisneski decided to follow Lincey. Id. at 8. Officer Wisneski

then saw Lincey make a left turn at a stop sign without coming to a stop or

putting his foot down. Id. at 9, 48, 55-56. At this point, Officer Wisneski

decided to initiate a traffic stop. During the traffic stop, Officer Wisneski

learned that Lincey’s license was suspended. Officer Wisneski also smelled the

odor of alcohol coming from Lincey. Officer Wisneski informed Lincey of

Indiana’s implied-consent law, and Lincey agreed to take a certified breath test

at the station. Before Lincey was transported, he was searched incident to his

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1609-CR-2185 | April 17, 2017 Page 2 of 5 arrest for driving while suspended. During that search, marijuana was found in

his pants pocket. He was then taken to the station, where a warrant had to be

obtained for a blood draw.

[3] Thereafter, the State charged Lincey with Count I: Class A misdemeanor

operating while intoxicated endangering a person; Count II: Class A

misdemeanor driving while suspended; Count III: Class B misdemeanor

possession of marijuana; and Count IV operating a vehicle with an alcohol

concentration equivalent (ACE) to at least .08. Before trial, Lincey moved to

suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the officer did not have

reasonable suspicion to stop him. After a hearing at which Officer Wisneski

testified, the trial court denied the motion. A bench trial was then held. Lincey

renewed his motion to suppress during trial, and Officer Wisneski, Lincey, and

the female passenger testified during the in-trial suppression hearing. The trial

court again denied the motion. The court acknowledged that there was

conflicting testimony regarding whether Lincey stopped at both the stop light

and the stop sign; however, the court believed Officer Wisneski and found that

the traffic stop was valid. Trial resumed, and the trial court acquitted Lincey of

operating while intoxicated and operating with an ACE of at least .081 but

found him guilty of driving while suspended and possession of marijuana.

1 The trial court acquitted Lincey of operating with an ACE of at least .08 because the blood draw was done “outside the three (3) hour window.” Tr. p. 116. And the trial court acquitted Lincey of operating while intoxicated because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lincey was intoxicated. The

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1609-CR-2185 | April 17, 2017 Page 3 of 5 [4] Lincey now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [5] Lincey contends that Officer Wisneski did not have reasonable suspicion to

stop him and therefore the trial court erred in admitting evidence stemming

from the stop. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable

searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV. Our jurisprudence reflects two

types of police encounters that implicate Fourth Amendment protection:

investigatory stops and custodial arrests. State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184

(Ind. 2014). An investigatory stop is generally brief in duration and is

constitutionally permissible so long as the officer “has a reasonable suspicion

supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id.

(quotations omitted). If an officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation,

he has probable cause—and thus also the lesser included reasonable suspicion—

to stop that driver. Id.

[6] Lincey acknowledges that Officer Wisneski stopped him based on the officer’s

belief that Lincey “committed two traffic infractions by not coming to a stop at

a stop light and a stop sign.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11. And Lincey does not

dispute that failing to stop at a stop light and a stop sign are infractions.

However, Lincey argues that the officer’s belief was “mistaken[]” and asks us to

court explained that although Lincey was wobbling and driving slowly, there was evidence of potholes in the road.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1609-CR-2185 | April 17, 2017 Page 4 of 5 credit his own suppression-hearing testimony. Id. Lincey testified at the second

suppression hearing that he in fact stopped at both the red light and the stop

sign, but Officer Wisneski testified otherwise. The trial court believed Officer

Wisneski. In reviewing a trial court’s reasonable-suspicion determination, we

do not reweigh the evidence and consider conflicting evidence most favorably

to the trial court. See Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 2003) (“The

reasonable suspicion inquiry is highly fact-sensitive and is reviewed under a

sufficiency of the evidence standard. Like any matter of sufficiency of the

evidence, the record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that

supports the trial court’s decision. We do not reweigh the evidence and we

consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.”

(quotation omitted)). Because Officer Wisneski testified that Lincey did not

stop at a stop light and a stop sign, thus committing two traffic infractions, the

trial court did not err in finding that reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic

stop.2 We therefore affirm the trial court’s admission of evidence stemming

from that stop.

[7] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.

2 Lincey also challenges the traffic stop under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Although the standards are different, his argument is the same: the trial court should have believed his testimony instead of the officer’s testimony.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1609-CR-2185 | April 17, 2017 Page 5 of 5