Eakins v. United States

36 F.2d 961, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 450, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 9931, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1778
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 3, 1930
Docket2876
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 36 F.2d 961 (Eakins v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eakins v. United States, 36 F.2d 961, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 450, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 9931, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1778 (E.D.N.Y. 1930).

Opinion

GALSTON, District Judge.

The petitioner brings this action for the recovery of federal income taxes for the years 1917 and 1918, in the total amount of $56,336.33, with interest, on the claim that the money was illegally collected from her.

In her income tax return for the year 1917, the petitioner included, as part of her gross income, salary in the amount of $155,-872.06, received from J. S. & W. R. Eakins, Inc.; for the year 1918 she reported salary in the amount of $129,153.54, received from the same corporation.

An audit of the income and excess profits tax returns of that corporation, made by the Treasury Department, resulted in disallowance of those alleged salary payments, as an expense of doing business. In consequence the corporation was assessed additional taxes in the amount of $57,673.20, with interest of $2,000 for 1917, and $79,462.23, with interest of $3,000 for 1918. Thereupon the petitioner paid these amounts to the corporation to enable the corporation to pay to the government, as it did, the additional taxes thus assessed.

The petitioner contends that in 1917 she and the other officers of the corporation, who were also all of .its stockholders, agreed to distribute the earnings of the company to themselves as salaries in proportion to their stock holdings. However, in view of the imposition of new war and excess profits taxes and the possibility that the United States government might assess additional taxes against the cor *962 poration, the parties undertook to refund to the corporation such sums, in the event that they were not allowed as deductions by the Treasury Department. Subsequently, on May 14,1921, and May 28,1923, written contracts were entered into by these stockholders and officers, wherein it was agreed that, should additional taxes be levied against the corporation for the calendar years 1917, 1918, or 1919, the four stockholders would refund such additional payments to the corporation each in the ratio of his stock holdings.

The petitioner received money whieh she thought was income, and paid taxes on it. Thereafter, by virtue of her contractual obligation, she was compelled to repay the money, and so demands a repayment of the taxes. That position seems to be equitable. On the other hand, the defendant, not content with having received the taxes from the corporation, seeks also to retain the taxes paid by the petitioner. That position does not seem to be equitable. Does the law support the equities involved?

The uneontradieted testimony of the officers .is that petitioner orally agreed, prior to the written contracts of 1921 and 1923, to make restitution to the corporation in the event that additional taxes were assessed against the corporation on account of the dis-allowance of salary as a deduction from its gross income for those years. Now, although the additional taxes were not determined until 1921, nevertheless, under the authorities, they accrued in 1917 and 1918, respectively. United States v. Anderson (United States v. Tale & Towne Mfg. Co.) 269 U. S. 422, 46 S. Ct. 131, 70 L. Ed. 347; American National Company v. U. S., 274 U. S. 99, 47 S. Ct. 520, 71 L. Ed. 946.

Moreover, under the laws of the state of New York, to the extent that distributions to stockholders — and certainly the distribution to the petitioner was a distribution to a stockholder — impairs the capital of the corporation, the corporation has a right to reclaim. In consequence, petitioner took her share of the profit® with the knowledge that she might later be required to return the sum if such distribution impaired its capital. Cottrell v. Albany Card & Paper Mfg. Co., 142 App. Div. 148, 126 N. Y. S. 1070. Thus it follows that the petitioner, though she obtained the legal title to certain funds 'in 1917 and in 1918, with unreserved power to dispose of those funds, nevertheless received them impressed with the obligation to make restitution to the corporation to the extent of additional assessed taxes or impairment of capital resulting from such distribution. The petitioner very properly, and indeed as a matter of necessity, included the moneys thus received in her income tax returns, but, when it became apparent that she had to restore the funds to the corporation, they could no longer be regarded as having been income at any time.

The government really is endeavoring to collect substantially the same tax from two different taxpayers on the same amount of money, although only one of those parties in the last analysis received such money as income or profits. In the hands of the petitioner, as received from the corporation, it had the guise of income, but, when stripped' of that guise, it appears that all the petitioner received was a loan or advance of the use of the money.

In Ford v. Nauts (D. C.) 25 F.(2d) 1015, the eourt said: “The only question, therefore, is whether actually the dividends upon the securities in question were lawfully part of the income of Mr. Ford, the plaintiff, when he returned them as such. This question is, we think, easily answered. The law does not contemplate that that is income of the taxpayer whieh belongs to another, but is appropriated by the individual making the return. That is the case here, and upon these principles we think that judgment on this record should run for the plaintiff.” See, also, Ansco Photo Products v. Clark (D. C.) 34 F. (2d) 568.

It is also contended by the petitioner that distributions made to the petitioner in 1917 and 1918, which were not returned to the corporation in 1924, are taxable to her in the years in whieh they were credited rather than in the years in which they were withdrawn.

The government contends that the payments to the petitioner were for salary, but obviously one must get beyond the term itself. She performed no services for the corporation and earned no salary. Whatever the payments may have been called in the books of the corporation is immaterial. The facts control. It was because the petitioner performed no services and earned nothing that the corporation was disallowed as deductions the moneys paid to the petitioner as salaries. Por the government to contend on the one hand that the corporation should not be allowed the deduction because the payments were not salaries, and on the other hand to insist that what she received should be taxable in the years received because it was salary, is to maintain an utterly inconsistent and contradictory position.

*963 On December 30, 1916, a certain amount of money was placed at the disposal of the petitioner. She could have withdrawn the funds that day or the next day. The amount so credited was, therefore, constructively received by her in 1916, and is taxable income to the petitioner only in the year 1916. Appeal of Brander, 3 B. T. A. 231; Brooks v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 12 B. T. A. 31; Treasury Department Regulations 74, art. 332. The same principle holds true as, to the amount credited on the books of the corporation to the petitioner on December 30, 1918.

Finally there is to be considered the technical objection by the government to the failure to file a claim for refund for the taxes paid for the year 1917.

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36 F.2d 961, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 450, 8 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 9931, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1778, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eakins-v-united-states-nyed-1930.