Eagle Rise Development, LLC, Troy Scott Wilbur and Alexander Scott Wilbur v. Iowa District Court for Clinton County

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-1331
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1331 Filed October 15, 2025

EAGLE RISE DEVELOPMENTS, LLC, TROY SCOTT WILBUR and ALEXANDER SCOTT WILBUR, Plaintiffs,

vs.

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR CLINTON COUNTY, Defendant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Brian Wright,

Magistrate.

On certiorari, a limited liability company and its member-managers contest

the legality of a magistrate’s contempt order. WRIT ANNULLED IN PART AND

SUSTAINED IN PART.

Billy J. Mallory and Trevor A. Jordison of Mallory Law, Urbandale, for

appellants.

Patrick J. O'Connell and Madison P. Huntzinger of Lynch Dallas, P.C.,

Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ. 2

BADDING, Judge.

Eagle Rise Developments, LLC is the owner of a former middle school

building in Clinton that fell into disrepair after the derecho in August 2020. Two

years later—with the building still in a dilapidated condition—the City of Clinton

initiated municipal infraction proceedings against the company. After a hearing on

the City’s citation, a magistrate ordered the company to pay a $6500 civil penalty,

register the building as a vacant property, and repair the building’s roof. When the

company failed to comply with that order, the City filed a contempt application. The

magistrate found the company and its member-managers—Troy and Alexander

Wilbur—in contempt. The district court summarily denied their appeals from the

magistrate’s order.

Eagle Rise and the Wilburs then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was

granted by our supreme court. They challenge the court’s personal and subject

matter jurisdiction, raising issues with the City’s service of notice. They also raise

due process violations and contend the contempt finding was not supported by

sufficient evidence. We conclude that the court had both personal and subject

matter jurisdiction over Troy Wilbur and Eagle Rise and annul the writ as to them.

We sustain the writ as to Alexander Wilbur and vacate the fine and jail sentence

imposed. All remaining claims were not preserved for our review.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Troy Wilbur and his son, Alexander, formed Eagle Rise Developments, LLC

in 2019. They are the sole member-managers of the company, and Alexander

serves as its registered agent. 3

In January 2020, Eagle Rise bought a former middle school building in

Clinton. Eight months later, a derecho tore through the town, damaging the

building. After receiving complaints from residents about the building’s condition,

the City of Clinton conducted an inspection and notified the company that the

building was in violation of city ordinances. When the company failed to remedy

the violations, the City filed a citation against it in March 2022 for municipal

infractions. See Iowa Code § 364.22(6) (2022) (setting out the procedure for

municipal infractions and providing they shall be tried in the same manner as a

small claim). Following a hearing, a magistrate entered an order in August, finding

that Troy—who appeared at the hearing on Eagle Rise’s behalf—admitted “the

roof in particular continues to be a serious problem and that it must be repaired.”

The court ordered the company to pay a $6500 civil penalty, register the building

as a vacant property, and “completely repair the roof of the building” by

July 1, 2023. The court also warned Eagle Rise that if it “fail[ed] to comply with the

terms and provisions of this order, the City may file a Rule to Show Cause as to

why the Defendant should not be held in Contempt.”

Despite that warning, the company did not comply with any part of the

court’s order. So, near the end of July, the City filed a contempt application against

Eagle Rise. The application and rule to show cause were served on Alexander,

as the company’s registered agent. A contempt hearing was held in November,

after which the magistrate found that “Alexander Wilbur and Troy Wilbur, as

member-managers of Eagle Rise Development[s] LLC have willfully disobeyed the

Court’s August 7, 2022 order in that no payment was made toward the $6500 civil

penalty and that they failed to register the property at issue as a vacant property.” 4

The court sentenced the Wilburs to thirty days in jail, with an opportunity to purge

the contempt by paying the civil penalty and registering the property. Although the

court did not find Eagle Rise in contempt for failing to repair the roof, it left the door

open for “further contempt actions” if the company continued to willfully disobey

the order.

Eagle Rise purged the contempt, but it did not complete the required roof

repairs. As a result, the City filed a second contempt application against the

company in January 2024, alleging that it “very intentionally repaired only the gym

roof and ignored the vast majority of the roof which was ordered to be repaired.”

The rule to show cause ordered Eagle Rise, “by and through its Member-

Managers, Troy Wilbur and Alexander Wilbur, to appear before the Court to show

cause why it should not be held in contempt” at a hearing in March.

That hearing was continued because the City’s process servers were

unsuccessful in personally serving either of the Wilburs. After the sheriff’s office

made an unsuccessful attempt in February at the address listed for Alexander as

the registered agent for the company, the City hired a private process server. The

process server’s notes detailed four attempts at service in February. Six more

attempts were made in March and April. None were successful. Because of those

unsuccessful attempts, the magistrate granted the City’s request to continue the

hearing until July and to serve notice by publication. The day before the hearing,

the City filed an affidavit with proof of publication. The next day, Troy appeared at

the contempt hearing on Eagle Rise’s behalf. Alexander did not appear, although

he was reportedly in the courthouse. 5

At the start of the hearing, Troy objected to proceeding, stating “[w]e were

never notified,” and he “just happened to find out about this court hearing

yesterday.” He also asked to continue the hearing so that his attorney could

attend. The court denied Troy’s objection, noting: “[Y]ou are here today, and as

one of the member managers of Eagle Rise, we will proceed.” And the court

denied the continuance request because no attorney had entered an appearance

for the company or the Wilburs.

With those preliminary matters out of the way, the City offered ten exhibits

into evidence and called two witnesses. Troy made some objections, cross-

examined the City’s witnesses, and testified. After hearing this evidence, the

magistrate again found “that Eagle Rise Developments, LLC, and Troy Wilbur and

Alexander Wilbur, individually” were in contempt for failing to repair the building’s

roof. The court assessed a $100 fine against each of the Wilburs and ordered

them both to serve a thirty-day jail sentence, with fifteen days suspended that could

be “purged if Eagle Rise causes the entire roof, except for the gym roof, to be

repaired in accordance with the specific requirements of the” August 2022 order.

The Wilburs filed notices of appeals from the magistrate’s order, which the

district court summarily denied, ruling: “Defendants have not filed grounds for an

appeal.” Eagle Rise and the Wilburs then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which

our supreme court granted. See Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597, 606

(Iowa 2003) (“Although there is no statutory right to appeal from a contempt order,

the proceeding may, in a proper case, be reviewed by certiorari.” (citation

omitted)). 6

II. Standard of Review

We generally review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law. Spitz

v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 881 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Iowa 2016). But when the action alleges

a violation of a constitutional right, as this one does, our standard of review is de

novo. Id.

III. Analysis

We start with the jurisdictional issues raised by Eagle Rise and the Wilburs

because a “judgment is void when the court lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of

the subject matter.” Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 606 (citation omitted). And a “void

judgment is one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal

effect.” Id. (citation omitted); see also In re Est. of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789

(Iowa 2003) (“A void judgment is subject to a collateral attack.”). Eagle Rise and

the Wilburs argue that the magistrate court did not have personal or subject matter

jurisdiction because they were never personally served with the contempt

application or rule to show cause, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310 does not

allow service by publication for contempt cases, and the publication was defective.

Iowa Code chapter 665 (2024) confers statutory power on the court to hear

and decide contempt cases. See Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 480

N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1992) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s power to

hear and determine cases of the general class to which a particular proceeding

may belong.”); see also Iowa Code § 665.2 (listing acts or omissions punishable

as contempts “by any of the courts of this state, or by any judicial officer, including

judicial magistrates”). Before someone can be punished “for an indirect

contempt—a violation that occurs outside the presence of the court—due process 7

requires the accused be given notice and a reasonable opportunity to explain his

or her conduct.” Workman v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 17-1038, 2018 WL 3302361, at *4

(Iowa Ct. App. July 5, 2018); see also Iowa Code § 665.7; Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297

N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1980), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. Iowa Dist.

Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 708–09 (Iowa 1986). Section 665.7 describes two

procedures for bringing an accused into the court’s presence: personal service of

the order to show cause or by warrant.1 Workman, 2018 WL 3302361, at *4.

Neither was used here.

Instead, the City tried to serve Eagle Rise and the Wilburs with notice of the

contempt proceeding by publication. But the City acknowledges that it failed to

mail a copy of the notice to the parties’ last known addresses as required by Iowa

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.311. The City nevertheless contends that the court had

personal jurisdiction over the parties because Troy appeared at the hearing. We

agree as to Troy and Eagle Rise, but not Alexander.

“Normally a judgment entered against a party without notice is void, as the

court has no personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 607.

But, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction may be waived. “It is

well-settled law when a party appears at trial in person or by counsel with actual

notice of the trial, this is sufficient notice for judgment to be entered against that

1 Section 665.7 states:

Before punishing for contempt, unless the offender is already in the presence of the court, the offender must be served personally with an order to show cause against the punishment, and a reasonable time given the offender therefor; or the offender may be brought before the court forthwith, or on a given day, by warrant, if necessary. 8

party.” Falck, 672 N.W.2d at 792; see also Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Summit

Nutritionals Int’l, Inc., 859 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 2015) (noting personal

jurisdiction can be waived by a party appearing before the court); Criswell v.

Hendrickson, 344 N.W.2d 255, 257 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (finding the district court

had personal jurisdiction over petitioners who appeared at a contempt hearing,

even though the petitioners were not personally served with notice).

At the hearing, Troy stated that he had just learned about the proceeding

the day before. Although he initially contested the City’s service of notice—despite

admitting that he had actual notice of the proceedings—he then tried to show

cause why he and the company should not be held in contempt. He objected to

the City’s evidence, cross-examined witnesses, and testified in the company’s

defense, as well as his own. Cf. McCourt Mfg. v. Rasmussen, No. 09-1483, 2010

WL 3894485, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2020) (“[T]estifying as a witness in a trial

does not constitute an ‘appearance’ for purposes of personal jurisdiction.”).

Because Troy appeared at and participated in the hearing on Eagle Rise’s behalf,2

2 We recognize that generally, “a corporation may not represent itself through

nonlawyer employees, officers, or shareholders.” Hawkeye Bank & Tr. v. Baugh, 463 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1990); see also Greer v. Tailor Maid Serv., LLC, No. 24- 0377, 2024 WL 5153992, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024) (“Limited liability companies must be represented by a licensed attorney in judicial proceedings.”). But see Iowa Code § 631.14(1) (stating that in small claims “actions in which a person other than an individual is a party, that person may be represented by an officer or an employee”). But because neither side raised this issue on appeal, we find that it has been waived. See Compton Corp. v. All Star Feeds, Inc., No. 04- 0003, 2005 WL 1224592, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2005) (“[Plaintiff] did not raise the status of [defendants’] president either before the district court or before our court. Therefore, we deem the matter waived.”); Alexander Techs. Eur., Ltd. v. MacDonald Letter Serv., Inc., No. 05- 2023, 2007 WL 1827472, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 27, 2007) (considering briefs from a nonlawyer when plaintiff did not contest nonlawyer appearing on behalf of a corporation). We have considered 9

we conclude the court had personal jurisdiction for the contempt proceeding

against the company and Troy as one of its member-managers.

In reaching this conclusion, we reject the Wilburs’ related argument that the

court lacked jurisdiction over them because the City’s contempt application failed

to allege they were individually responsible for Eagle Rise’s actions. First, it has

long been held that while a “proceeding for contempt is necessarily personal; that

is to say, the corporation, as such, cannot be imprisoned for contempt,” those

officers “acting in and of it, violating the injunction, may.” First Congregational

Church v. City of Muscatine, 2 Iowa 69, 74 (Iowa 1855). Second, the record shows

that the Wilburs were aware of the court’s August 2022 order and that they could

be held in contempt for violating it. See Sound Storm Enters., Inc. v. Keefe, 209

N.W.2d 560, 569 (Iowa 1973) (finding corporate officers may be punished for

contempt where they are aware of a writ directed to the corporation and they

participate in the proscribed conduct); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Larson, 391

N.W.2d 627, 633 (N.D. 1986) (“It is . . . well-established that an officer or agent of

a corporation may be found in contempt of court if that officer or agent was

responsible for the acts or inaction of the corporation that constituted the

contempt.”). Troy appeared on Eagle Rise’s behalf at the initial municipal infraction

hearing, and both Wilburs appeared in the first contempt proceeding, which

resulted in punishments against them personally for the corporation’s inaction.

The second contempt application outlined those prior proceedings, and the order

to show cause directed both Wilburs to appear at the contempt hearing.

whether this issue implicates subject matter jurisdiction and conclude that it does not. Compton Corp., 2005 WL 1224592, at *1 n.1. 10

That said, while we conclude the court had personal jurisdiction over Troy

and Eagle Rise, it did not have jurisdiction over Alexander because he was not at

the second hearing or properly served with notice. The City seems to concede this

point, as it does not advance any argument in support of finding that the court had

personal jurisdiction over Alexander. We accordingly sustain the writ as to

Alexander and vacate the sanctions imposed by the magistrate against him

personally.

This leaves us with the due process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims

raised by Troy and Eagle Rise. We conclude that error was not preserved on those

claims because they were not raised before the district court or decided by it on

review of the magistrate’s contempt order. “Certiorari actions are not an exception

to the requirement that claims must be first raised in the district court before we

address them.” Huffer v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 23-0885, 2024 WL 4039430, at *1

(Iowa Sept. 4, 2024); see also Sorci v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 671 N.W.2d 482, 489 (Iowa

2003) (“The rule is well established that in certiorari actions we will not review

questions not presented to the so-called inferior tribunal.” (cleaned up)). And the

“rules of error preservation apply with equal force to constitutional issues.” Beaver

v. McAtee, No. 15-1241, 2016 WL 1696927, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016);

see also Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Iowa 1979) (declining to consider

constitutional attacks on contempt statute because “none of these questions . . .

were ever presented to the district court”). As a result, we do not address the

merits of these unpreserved claims. 11

IV. Conclusion

Because we conclude the court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction

over Troy Wilbur and Eagle Rise Developments, LLC, we annul the writ as to them.

But we sustain the writ as to Alexander Wilbur and vacate the fine and jail sentence

imposed on him.

WRIT ANNULLED IN PART AND SUSTAINED IN PART.