Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Mansfield Paint Co.

201 A.D. 223, 194 N.Y.S. 386, 1922 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6290
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 16, 1922
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 201 A.D. 223 (Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Mansfield Paint Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Mansfield Paint Co., 201 A.D. 223, 194 N.Y.S. 386, 1922 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6290 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinion

Van Kiek, J.:

The summons in this action was served and the action begun in August, 1921. An amended complaint was served in October, 1921, and an amended answer in December, 1921. On December 17,1921, upon the pleadings and the affidavit of one of the attorneys for the plaintiff, an order was granted, without notice, directing that the defendant be examined as an adverse party, by and through its secretary, Claude S. Wilson, and his deposition be taken pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Practice Act applicable thereto, by a referee named in the order and at the time and place specified therein. On January' 3, 1922, the return day of an order to show cause why the order of December seventeenth should not be vacated, an order was made denying the motion and ordering that the defendant be examined as directed before the referee appointed and at a time and place named. It is from this latter order that this appeal is taken.

The appellant’s first proposition is that the examination of the defendant was procured under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but should have been had under the Civil Practice Act. The respondent also invokes this act. The orders recite that the deposition be taken pursuant to the provisions of both statutes.

The Civil Practice Act took effect October 1, 1921 (Civil Practice Act, § 1578), and was made to apply to all actions and proceedings thereafter commenced (§ 1568). Section 1577 of the act repeals the Code of Civil Procedure, but not as to actions and proceedings begun before October 1, 1921. Section 1573 provides: [225]*225“ Existing rights preserved. The provisions of this act, or the repeal of any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure thereby, shall not affect or impair any act done or right accrued or acquired, or any liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred or imposed, or any limitation or defense accrued or established, prior to its enactment, but the same may be asserted, enforced, prosecuted or inflicted in the same manner and to the same extent as if this act had not been passed.” Section 1569 provides: Pending actions and proceedings. Proceedings pursuant to law in an action or special proceeding taken prior to the time this act takes effect shall not be rendered ineffectual or impaired by this act or by the repeal thereby of any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise expressed, and subsequent proceedings in such action or special proceeding must be conducted in accordance with the laws in force on the day before this act takes effect, except as otherwise provided in this article, and except that the court or judge may apply thereto, in the interest of justice, any remedial provision of this act not inconsistent with the proceedings theretofore had or taken in such action or special proceeding. The provisions of article nine of this act are expressly made applicable to pending actions and proceedings.” Article 9 contains the provisions for relieving from mistakes, defects and irregularities. (§§ 105-112.) Sections 288 to 294 provide for taking testimony by deposition. The testimony of an adverse party may be taken without order of the court by giving notice to the adversary, stating in writing the person before whom the testimony is to be taken, the time and place at which it is to be taken, the name of the person to be examined, and the issues upon which such person is to be examined. (§§ 288, 290.) Any question as to the right to take the testimony, or as to the time or place, or as to the matters or issues as to which the testimony is to be taken may be raised by a motion to vacate or modify the notice. This motion may be heard upon an order to show cause, returnable at chambers or to the court, or upon notice; and, “ If the taking of the deposition be Pot authorized by the provisions of this article the court shall vacate the notice.” (§ 291.) Or an order of the court may be asked in the first instance, in which case the motion shall be upon notice to the other parties. (§ 292.)

It seems the plain purpose of the Legislature that the Civil Practice Act should go immediately into effect on October 1, 1921, and that its provisions should take the place of the Code of Civil Procedure, except that it should not be applied when any rights, which had accrued or had been acquired, or any liability which had been [226]*226incurred prior to October 1, 1921, would, by applying it, be rendered ineffectual or impaired; that all remedial provisions of the Civil Practice Act, which were not inconsistent with, or prejudicial to, proceedings theretofore had and to existing rights of parties, should be applied by the courts in the interests of justice in actions and special proceedings begun before October 1, 1921.

In actions and proceedings begun before October 1, 1921, but which may be in the courts for years to come, to avoid inconsistency and confusion and in the interest of justice, the provisions of the Civil Practice Act should be uniformly availed of whenever, without prejudice to accrued rights, they can be applied. The provisions for taking depositions are remedial provisions and their application by the court in this case does not conflict with any rights of the parties which had been acquired, or had accrued.

In the instant case the plaintiff did not serve the notice provided for in section 290 of the Civil Practice Act, but procured an order of the court ex parte. We think this did not prejudice the rights of defendant for two reasons: (1) Under the Civil Practice Act plaintiff with approval of the court could have had the examination asked simply by giving the notice authorized in section 290; the order gave the necessary notice. (2) While section 292 of the Civil Practice Act provides that, if an order is obtained, it shall be obtained upon notice, the fact is that, after the order had been obtained, an order was procured by the defendant to show cause why the prior order should not be vacated and staying all proceedings pending the determination of the motion under the order to show cause. The whole matter then was brought before* the court, both parties being present, and the court made an order directing the examination. No substantial right of the defendant has been prejudiced by the omission to give notice of the application for the first order; upon the return of the order to show cause the defendant was given full opportunity to be heard and we think there was a substantial compliance with the Civil Practice Act and, in any event, that the defect in the omission of notice of motion for the order to examine may be deemed supplied and by this court disregarded. (Civil Practice Act, § 105.)

The appellant further contends that the ex parte order should have been vacated because the motion papers upon which it was granted were defective and not in compliance with the well-established rule. Since the Civil Practice Act should govern the determination of this appeal, the question is whether or not the papers on which- the order was granted satisfy the requirements of that act. It was the purpose in the Civil Practice Act to simplify the procedure for procuring depositions and generally to allow deposi[227]*227tions to be taken unless the testimony sought is not material or necessary, or the interests of justice would not be subserved. The practice under the Code of Civil Procedure was technical and often unjustly deprived a party of the right or privilege of taking depositions before trial.

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Bluebook (online)
201 A.D. 223, 194 N.Y.S. 386, 1922 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eagle-picher-lead-co-v-mansfield-paint-co-nyappdiv-1922.