08/25/2026
DA 26-0098
Case Number: DA 26-0098
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 206N
ELIZABETH KRAGH, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MONTANA ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF, INC., a Montana Domestic nonprofit corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-25-418 Honorable Tara J. Elliott, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Elizabeth Kragh, Self-Represented, Missoula, Montana For Appellee:
J.R. Casillas, Orr McDonnell Law, PLLC, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 29, 2026 Decided: August 25, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Appellant Elizabeth Kragh (Kragh), appearing pro se, challenges the January 29, 2026 Order Granting Summary Judgment issued by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, granting summary judgment in favor of the Montana Association of the Deaf, Inc. (MAD) and dismissing her Complaint with prejudice. The District Court concluded that (1) Kragh’s claim for inspection of corporate records (Count I) was moot because MAD produced the requested minutes in discovery; (2) Kragh’s challenge to the June 2023 officer election (Count II) failed as a matter of law because the election involved uncontested positions, caused no damages, and was superseded by later elections (and was also subject to waiver and laches); and (3) Kragh’s financial-oversight claim (Count III) lacked evidentiary support because the $888.54 discrepancy alleged in the Complaint was explained and accounted for in discovery. We affirm.1
1 On May 26, 2026, this Court denied Kragh’s Motion to Supplement the Record. In that Order, we determined we would not decide MAD’s M. R. App. P. 19(5) request for attorney fees incurred in responding to Kragh’s motion at that time, but took the motion under advisement “along with the entire review of the record and briefs on appeal.” Kragh v. Mont. Ass’n of the Deaf, Inc., No. DA 26-0098, Order (Mont. May 26, 2026). MAD’s request for attorney fees is denied.
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¶3 Kragh filed this action on May 7, 2025, asserting three claims against MAD: (1) violation of the statutory right to inspect and copy corporate records under § 35-2-907, MCA; (2) an ultra vires action based on the alleged improper election of officers at MAD’s June 2023 biennial conference; and (3) breach of fiduciary duties arising from alleged financial oversight failures, including an $888.54 discrepancy. MAD answered and later moved for summary judgment on all counts. MAD’s motion relied on the discovery record showing production of the requested minutes, admissions about the uncontested nature of the 2023 elections, and production of financial records explaining the alleged discrepancy.
¶4 Kragh opposed summary judgment and sought additional discovery under M. R. Civ. P. 56(f), asserting that video recordings of board meetings, internal communications, and a ten-year bylaw amendment history were necessary to oppose MAD’s motion. The District Court denied Kragh’s discovery requests and Rule 56(f) relief, and later granted MAD’s motion for summary judgment. Kragh timely appealed.
¶5 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standards of M. R. Civ. P. 56. Sieben Ranch Co. v. Adams, 2021 MT 172, ¶ 8, 404 Mont. 510, 494 P.3d 307. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Bird v. Cascade Cnty., 2016 MT 345, ¶ 9, 386 Mont. 69, 386 P.3d 602. Once the moving party meets that burden, the nonmoving party must present material and substantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact; conclusory statements, speculation, or mere denials are insufficient. Sieben Ranch, ¶ 8. We draw all reasonable inferences in
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favor of the nonmoving party. Sieben Ranch, ¶ 8. The district court’s legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Bird, ¶ 9.
¶6 Kragh challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on each count. We address each claim in turn and conclude that the District Court correctly resolved the case on the record before it. Count I – Statutory Inspection Rights (§ 35-2-907, MCA)
¶7 Kragh’s Complaint alleges that MAD denied her statutory inspection rights by refusing multiple written requests for meeting minutes and by conditioning access on signing a “zero-tolerance” policy. MAD’s summary judgment showing established that it produced the requested meeting minutes in discovery on September 15 and September 26, 2025. The District Court found that MAD’s production mooted Count I because Kragh received the minutes she sought and identified no ongoing denial of access or pending request that MAD refused.
¶8 Kragh argues on appeal that the claim is not moot because (1) MAD produced the minutes only after litigation began (invoking the “catalyst” theory), and (2) she seeks declaratory relief to prevent future conditioning of inspection rights. The District Court correctly applied the mootness doctrine. The record shows that MAD produced the minutes in discovery, and Kragh does not identify any present, ongoing denial of access that the court could remedy. The production of the requested records removed the live controversy over those specific documents; the court therefore lacked a justiciable controversy as to Count I. Heringer v. Barnegat Dev. Grp., LLC, 2021 MT 100, ¶ 19, 404 Mont. 89, 485 P.3d 731 (explaining that a matter is moot if the issue presented at the
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outset of the action has ceased to exist or if a court can no longer grant effective relief). Kragh’s desire for a generalized declaratory ruling about future hypothetical denials does not create a present, concrete controversy and the District Court correctly declined to issue an advisory opinion. Kragh’s “catalyst” argument—that MAD produced records only after suit was filed—does not preserve a live controversy where the requested relief (access to the minutes) has been provided and no continuing denial is shown. The District Court’s mootness ruling was correct on the record before it. Kragh failed to identify a genuine dispute of material fact showing an ongoing denial of inspection rights that would preclude summary judgment. Count II – Ultra Vires Election of Officers
¶9 Kragh challenges MAD’s June 2023 biennial election, asserting that officers were elected by acclamation rather than by the written ballot required by MAD’s bylaws, Article 12, § 1. The undisputed record before the District Court established that each officer position had only one candidate at the June 2023 conference, that Kragh attended the conference and voiced no contemporaneous objection, and that MAD conducted new elections in June 2025 in compliance with its bylaws. MAD also elicited Kragh’s discovery response confirming she sought primarily declaratory and injunctive relief and admitted she sought no monetary damages tied to the election.
¶10 On these undisputed facts the District Court concluded that judicial intervention was unwarranted: the election involved uncontested positions, Kragh suffered no demonstrable injury, she raised no contemporaneous objection, and subsequent compliant elections mooted any practical relief. The court also relied on waiver and laches principles.
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¶11 Kragh argues on appeal that the written-ballot requirement is mandatory and cannot be waived, that the District Court misapplied Montana precedent, and that the court improperly relied on out-of-state authority: Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 590 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1979), and Scheire v. Int’l Show Car Ass’n, 717 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1983). The record does not support reversal.
¶12 First, the District Court applied the correct summary judgment standard and resolved Count II on the undisputed facts. MAD’s showing established that the June 2023 election was uncontested, Kragh was present and did not object at the time, and Kragh admits she seeks no monetary damages. Under the governing summary judgment standard, MAD met its initial burden and Kragh failed to present material and substantial evidence showing a genuine dispute of fact about injury, causation, or the necessity of judicial intervention. Her speculation that internal communications or videos might reveal intent or knowledge does not create a genuine factual dispute where the undisputed record shows no injury and subsequent elections cured any practical effect of the 2023 procedure.
¶13 Second, waiver (voluntary relinquishment of a known right) and laches (unreasonable delay that prejudices the opposing party) were appropriate defenses. Kragh attended the June 2023 meeting and did not object when the acclamation occurred. Montana law recognizes that a member who attends a meeting and fails to object to procedural irregularities may be deemed to have waived those objections unless timely raised. See § 35-2-531(2)(b), MCA (a member’s attendance at a meeting waives objection to consideration of a matter not within the meeting notice unless the member objects when the matter is presented). The District Court reasonably concluded that Kragh’s silence and
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nearly two-year delay in bringing suit supported waiver and laches defenses, particularly where MAD relied on the election’s validity in conducting organizational affairs and later held compliant elections. Kragh’s disagreement with the District Court’s legal framing does not create a genuine factual dispute requiring trial.
¶14 Third, Kragh’s contention that the written-ballot requirement is absolute and therefore the election must be void regardless of consequences does not address the dispositive threshold the District Court applied—whether judicial intervention was warranted given the absence of injury and the availability of effective relief. The District Court correctly recognized that courts exercise restraint in intervening in internal organizational affairs of private entities and that, on the undisputed record, Kragh could not show the kind of injury that would justify judicial micromanagement of MAD’s internal elections. See Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982) (generally explaining courts’ reluctance to intervene in operational affairs of private entities unless failure to do so places too great of a burden on its shareholders or members); see also D.A. Davidson & Co. v. Slaybaugh, 2024 MT 264, ¶ 13, 418 Mont. 531, 558 P.3d 1100 (recognizing “the general rule that courts should not engage in the internal affairs of a voluntary organization” in the absence of mistake, fraud, collusion, unreasonableness, or arbitrariness). The Scheire case is consistent with this concept. Scheire brought breach of contract and fraud claims against the International Show Car Association for violating its bylaws and construing them in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner because it allowed a past division champion car to participate in the race after its Division Rule 2 was introduced and it failed to disqualify a second racecar as inoperable under its Classification and
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Judging Rule 5. The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Association, holding the Association properly allowed the past division champion car to race as the Association’s desire to act in accordance with precedent was not unreasonable. The court further held it was not error to fail to disqualify the second car as inoperable because even if the alleged inoperable car had been disqualified, the contestant’s overall point totals would have remained the same. Scheire, 717 F.2d at 466. Scheire failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that he suffered injury and damages attributable to the alleged improper conduct. Scheire, 717 F.2d at 465-66 (generally discussing the principle of judicial noninterference in internal disputes of voluntary associations and the balancing test set forth in Cal. Dental Ass’n, 590 P.2d at 406— balancing the burdens on the courts and on the interest of the association in its autonomy against the aggrieved member’s interests in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction). The court’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s Scheire framework and on principles of judicial restraint was applied to the undisputed facts and did not produce reversible error. Kragh’s disagreement with the legal test does not create a material factual dispute.
¶15 Finally, the June 2025 elections—conducted in compliance with MAD’s bylaws— eliminated any practical effect of the 2023 procedure. Where the challenged election produced no demonstrable injury and has been superseded, the District Court correctly concluded that no effective relief remained. Kragh’s appeal does not identify record evidence showing a genuine dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment on Count II.
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Count III – Financial Oversight and the $888.54 Discrepancy
¶16 Kragh alleged that MAD’s financial oversight was deficient and that an $888.54 discrepancy remained unexplained. The record shows that MAD produced comprehensive financial documentation in discovery (bank statements, ledgers, and reports) and explained that the $888.54 difference resulted from comparing two different reports: the President mistakenly reported a May 1, 2023 balance at a March 2024 meeting instead of the December 29, 2023 balance; the difference represented income added during 2023 and was accounted for in the financial records. MAD corrected the March 2024 minutes in May 2024 and the Board ratified the corrections.
¶17 Kragh contends on appeal that discovery revealed a broader pattern of financial mismanagement (PayPal transfers, a $288 deposit error, a $5,000 budget line item, and trustee admissions of neglect) and that the District Court erred in resolving Count III on summary judgment. The District Court correctly limited Count III to the specific discrepancy pleaded in the Complaint and concluded that MAD’s production and explanation resolved that discrete allegation. The court also noted that Kragh attempted to expand Count III in her opposition to the summary judgment motion and that the court had previously denied leave to amend to broaden the pleadings.
¶18 On the record before the District Court, MAD met its burden to show there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to the $888.54 discrepancy: the financial records account for the funds, the discrepancy was explained as a reporting error, and the minutes were corrected and ratified. Kragh’s later attempts to raise additional financial concerns in opposition papers do not create a genuine dispute of material fact on the specific claim
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pleaded where the District Court had already limited the case to the pleaded discrepancy and where MAD produced documentary evidence resolving that discrepancy. Kragh’s Rule 56(f) request for additional discovery (video recordings, internal communications, and a ten-year bylaw history) was denied because she did not identify with sufficient specificity the particular facts within those materials that would preclude summary judgment. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying further discovery under Rule 56(f) where Kragh failed to show how the requested materials would create a genuine dispute of material fact on the pleaded claims. See Hinderman v. Krivor, 2010 MT 230, ¶ 16, 358 Mont. 111, 244 P.3d 306 (Rule 56(f) relief requires a non-speculative showing that additional discovery will produce facts preventing summary judgment). Procedural Rulings and Scope of Review
¶19 Kragh contends the District Court abused its discretion by denying discovery motions (motion to compel, Rule 56(f) motion) and by entertaining MAD’s summary judgment motion while discovery remained open. The record shows MAD produced the requested minutes in discovery on September 15 and 26, 2025, and subsequently filed its motion for summary judgment on October 4, 2025. The District Court denied Kragh’s discovery motions after considering the parties’ meet-and-confer correspondence and the proportionality and relevance arguments under M. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The court’s denial of additional discovery and its decision to proceed to adjudicate summary judgment were within its discretion because Kragh failed to show how the requested materials would create a genuine issue of material fact on the pleaded claims. Hinderman, ¶¶ 16-17. The court’s scheduling and discovery rulings do not provide a basis for reversal where the
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record demonstrates that Kragh had the core materials relevant to her pleaded claims and where she did not identify specific facts that additional discovery would produce to defeat summary judgment. See Rosenthal v. Cnty. of Madison, 2007 MT 277, ¶¶ 38-42, 339 Mont. 419, 170 P.3d 493 (district court has discretion to limit discovery and deny motions to extend discovery where movant fails to show how additional discovery would preclude summary judgment).
¶20 The District Court correctly applied the summary judgment standard set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56 and our precedent. MAD met its initial burden on each pleaded claim by producing the requested minutes (mooting Count I), showing the June 2023 election involved uncontested positions and caused no demonstrable injury (defeating Count II), and producing financial records that explained and accounted for the $888.54 discrepancy (defeating Count III). Kragh failed to present material and substantial evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact on any claim. Her Rule 56(f) motion and discovery requests did not identify with sufficient specificity the facts that additional materials would reveal to preclude summary judgment. The District Court’s denial of additional discovery and its grant of summary judgment were correct on the record before it.
¶21 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
¶22 Affirmed.
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/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
We Concur:
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE