DZIKI v. BISIGNANO

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedSeptember 10, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00451
StatusUnknown

This text of DZIKI v. BISIGNANO (DZIKI v. BISIGNANO) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DZIKI v. BISIGNANO, (S.D. Ind. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

ZACHARY DZIKI, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00451-JRS-MG ) FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of ) Social Security,1 ) ) Defendant. )

Entry Reviewing the Commissioner's Decision

I. Introduction Mr. D. appeals an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income benefits. The Appeals Council denied review, and this action comes before the Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons that follow, the ALJ's decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. II. Background Mr. D. was 23 years of age on the date he applied for supplemental security income. An ALJ held a hearing at which Mr. D. and a vocational expert testified. Both before and at the hearing, Mr. D's counsel requested that a medical expert be consulted on the issue of medical equivalence. These requests were denied.

1 Frank Bisignano is now the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration and is automatically substituted as the defendant in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The Clerk shall update the docket. After the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision applying the familiar five-step sequential analysis in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) and deciding that Mr. D. was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. At step one the ALJ

determined that Mr. D. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date. (R. 19, ECF No. 9-2.) At step two the ALJ determined that Mr. D. has these severe impairments: "homonymous hemianopsia[2] due to cerebrovascular accident, history of arteriovenous malformation, partial optic atrophy3 of the left eye, epilepsy, left parietal resection, and mild cognitive disorder." (Id.) These limitations, the ALJ found, "significantly limit [Mr. D.'s] ability to perform basic work activities." (Id.) At step three, the ALJ concluded that Mr. D.'s impairments did not meet or

equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, that are presumptively disabling. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. (R. 20, ECF No. 9-2.) The ALJ then assessed Mr. D.'s residual functional capacity, which is his capacity to work despite his impairments. She determined that he could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance and climb ramps and stairs; no exposure to open flames or large bodies of water; avoid exposure to vibrations; avoid all use of hazardous moving machinery and exposure to unprotected heights; no job that requires driving or operating a motorized vehicle to perform functions of the job; no teamwork; no work

2 "Homonymous hemianopsia . . . is a visual field deficit affecting corresponding halves of both eyes, often resulting from cerebrovascular injury or tumor." https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK558929 (last visited Sept. 9, 2025). 3 "Optic atrophy refers to damage to [the] optic nerve, which carries impulses from [the] eye to [the] brain" with symptoms such as blurred vision, difficulties with peripheral vision, and difficulties with color vision. https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/12326-optic- atrophy (last visited Sept. 9, 2025). requiring a specific production rate such as assembly line work or work that requires hourly quotas; and no more than occasional routine workplace changes.

(R. 22–23, ECF No. 9-2.) At step four, the ALJ found Mr. D. has no past relevant work. (Id. at 27.) And at step five, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs such as hospital cleaner, industrial cleaner, and dining room attendant, that Mr. D. could perform. (Id. at 28.) III. Analysis An ALJ's decision will be affirmed "if its conclusions are supported by substantial evidence." Moy v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2025). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019)). Courts "do not reweigh evidence," but "conduct a critical review because a decision 'cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues.'" Id. (quoting Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003)). Even under this deferential standard, "an ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion." Id. (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863,

873 (7th Cir. 2000)). Mr. D. argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating Mr. D.'s visual impairment and failing to consult a medical expert, necessitating remand. The Court agrees. The ALJ evaluated Mr. D.'s visual impairment under Listing 2.02 (Loss of visual acuity), Listing 2.03 (Contraction of the visual field), and Listing 2.04 (Loss of visual efficiency, or visual impairment), and concluded that the Listings were not met or medically equaled. (R. 20, ECF No. 9-2.) The ALJ reasoned that the record had no objective medical evidence "to meet or medically equal the criteria of any listed impairment" and that "no acceptable medical source . . . has concluded that the

severity of the claimants impairments medically equal a listed impairment." (Id. at 21.) The state agency consultants, upon whom the ALJ relied, had reviewed Mr. D.'s neuro-opthalmology exams and "did not conclude that the severity of Mr. D.'s impairments, including his visual impairment meets or medically equals any listed impairment, including 2.04." (Id.) But the Court is unable to discern if the state agency consultants ever considered whether Mr. D.'s visual impairment equals Listing 2.02, 2.03, or 2.04. Although the

consultants noted Mr. D. claimed a visual impairment, their reports reflect consideration of Mr. D.'s impairments only under the Neurological disorders listing for Epilepsy, Listing 11.02, and Neurocognitive disorders, Listing 12.02. (R. 70–71, 79, ECF No. 9-3.) The ALJ could not have relied on the state agency consultants' opinions on medical equivalence if the consultants did not consider Listings 2.02, 2.03, and 2.04. See, e.g., Jennifer C. v. King, No. 3:23-cv-50347, 2025 WL 296053, at

*5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2025) (reversing and remanding where ALJ's equivalency finding as to Listing 11.02 was based on state agency physicians' opinions on medical equivalence but they only considered listings other than Listing 11.02); Ezell A. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-1993, 2021 WL 4304650, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2021) (concluding "that Disability Determination and Transmittal forms that do not address the listings cannot be relied upon as a medical opinion on the issue of equivalence" and reversing and remanding ALJ's decision). There is no other medical opinion on medical equivalence in the record. And the ALJ did not cite any other evidence or provide any further explanation to support the conclusion that Mr.

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DZIKI v. BISIGNANO, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dziki-v-bisignano-insd-2025.