Dziedzic v. Kelly

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Dziedzic v. Kelly

143 A.D.2d 537, 533 N.Y.S.2d 25, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10882

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 27, 1988

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 143 A.D.2d 537 (Dziedzic v. Kelly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dziedzic v. Kelly, 143 A.D.2d 537, 533 N.Y.S.2d 25, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10882 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988).

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Opinion

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Petitioner’s primary argument on appeal is that his Tier III hearing was not commenced in a timely fashion. We find that since the seven-day period for commencing petitioner’s hearing (7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]) ended on Veterans’ Day, a public holiday, respondent’s request for an extension of time and the commencement of the hearing on the next succeeding business day was timely (see, General Construction Law § 25-a [1]; cf., People ex rel. Frost v Meloni, 124 AD2d 1032, lv denied 69 NY2d 606; Matter of Picciano v Hammock, 92 AD2d 1043, 1044, lv denied 59 NY2d 606). Petitioner’s remaining argument regarding the penalty range for Tier III violations has no merit (see, Matter of Coleman v Kelly, 130 AD2d 976, affd [538]*53872 NY2d 850). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Dadd, J. — art 78.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Green, Pine and Davis, JJ.

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Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Petitioner’s primary argument on appeal is that his Tier III hearing was not commenced in a timely fashion. We find that since the seven-day period for commencing petitioner’s hearing (7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]) ended on Veterans’ Day, a public holiday, respondent’s request for an extension of time and the commencement of the hearing on the next succeeding business day was timely (see, General Construction Law § 25-a [1]; cf., People ex rel. Frost v Meloni, 124 AD2d 1032, lv denied 69 NY2d 606; Matter of Picciano v Hammock, 92 AD2d 1043, 1044, lv denied 59 NY2d 606). Petitioner’s remaining argument regarding the penalty range for Tier III violations has no merit (see, Matter of Coleman v Kelly, 130 AD2d 976, affd [538]*53872 NY2d 850). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Dadd, J. — art 78.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Green, Pine and Davis, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

143 A.D.2d 537, 533 N.Y.S.2d 25, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10882, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dziedzic-v-kelly-nyappdiv-1988.

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