Dymond Thomas v. Department of Homeland Security

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 25-2471
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-2471 Doc: 8 Filed: 03/30/2026 Pg: 1 of 2

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-2471

DYMOND THOMAS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; BENJAMIN BAIN-CREED, Assistant U.S. Attorney; SETH JOHNSON, Assistant U.S. Attorney; DENA J. KING, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina; DANIEL LEAL, Special Agent of Homeland Security; JONATHAN CERDEN, HSI Task Force Officer; GREGORY ALTIZER, HSI Task Force Officer,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:24-cv-00916-GCM)

Submitted: March 26, 2026 Decided: March 30, 2026

Before RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dymond Thomas, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-2471 Doc: 8 Filed: 03/30/2026 Pg: 2 of 2

PER CURIAM:

Dymond Thomas appeals the district court’s November 19, 2025, order denying his

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the court’s order dismissing his pro se complaint.

On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal brief. See 4th Cir. R.

34(b). Because Thomas’s informal brief does not challenge the district court’s reasons for

denying his Rule 60(b) motion, he has forfeited appellate review of the court’s order. * See

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important

document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that

brief.”). And even if Thomas had not forfeited appellate review of that order, we would

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. See Justus v.

Clarke, 78 F.4th 97, 104 (4th Cir. 2023) (stating standard of review). Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

* Thomas’s informal brief seems to challenge the district court’s June 17, 2025, dismissal order. Because Thomas did not timely appeal that order, however, we lack jurisdiction to review it. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). To explain, Thomas had 60 days, or until Monday, August 18, 2025, to appeal the dismissal order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C). But Thomas did not file his notice of appeal until December 10, 2025. And because Thomas did not file his Rule 60(b) motion within 28 days of the entry of the dismissal order, that motion did not toll the appeal period for the dismissal order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Moreover, “an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.” Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).