Dyllan T. Thomson v. Stephanie M. Ekholm

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: May 12, 2026
• Docket: 60409-4
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

May 12, 2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II In the Matter of the Parenting of: No. 60409-4-II

M.L.E.-T.,

DYLLAN TYME THOMSON,

Appellant,

v.

STEPHANIE MARIE EKHOLM, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Respondent.

CRUSER, J.—Dyllan Thomson appeals the trial court’s order granting Stephanie Ekholm’s

motion for reconsideration and awarding her attorney fees. Thomson argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by granting Ekholm’s motion for reconsideration because the motion was

filed more than 10 days after the order was entered in violation of CR 59(b). In the alternative,

Thomson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Ekholm attorney fees and

costs on revision that were not part of the record before the superior court commissioner.

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Ekholm’s untimely

motion for reconsideration. Therefore, we need not address Thomson’s alternate argument

regarding attorney fees. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Ekholm’s motion

for reconsideration. No. 60409-4-II

FACTS

Dyllan Thomson sought a temporary family law order (TFLO) addressing where the

parties’ daughter would attend school. Thomson contended that the school the child was presently

attending was inconveniently located for him. The trial court commissioner entered a TFLO

ordering that the child would continue to attend the same school. Thomson filed a motion for

revision. Ekholm filed a response and an attorney fee affidavit. On October 18, 2024, the trial court

denied the motion for revision and reserved the issue of attorney fees. Fourteen days later, on

November 1, 2024, Ekholm filed a motion for reconsideration asking the trial court to address the

issue of attorney fees and arguing that the motion was timely because the order denying the motion

for revision was not made available to counsel until October 24, 2024. Thomson filed a timely

response arguing, among other things, that the motion for reconsideration was not timely. The trial

court granted Ekholm’s motion for reconsideration and granted her request for attorney fees and

costs. Thomson appeals.

DISCUSSION

Thomson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered Ekholm’s

motion for reconsideration because it was filed more than 10 days after the challenged order was

entered in violation of CR 59(b). We agree.1

CR 59(b) provides that a motion for reconsideration “shall be filed not later than 10 days

after the entry of the judgment, order, or other decision.” “Judgments shall be deemed entered for

all procedural purposes from the time of delivery to the clerk for filing.” CR 58(b). The trial court

“may not extend the time for taking any action under [rule] . . . 59(b).” CR 6(b)(2). Meaning, the

1 Ekholm did not file a response to this appeal.

2 No. 60409-4-II

trial court does not have the discretion to enlarge the time period for filing a motion for

reconsideration. Metz v. Sarandos, 91 Wn. App. 357, 360, 957 P.2d 795 (1998) (holding that

extending time for an untimely motion for reconsideration because the parties did not receive a

copy of order was abuse of discretion).

In Metz, we reversed the trial court’s determination that the 10-day period in which to file

a motion to reconsider commenced on the date counsel received the trial court’s order on summary

judgment, rather than the date the summary judgment order was delivered to the clerk for filing.

Id. Relying on the aforementioned provisions in CR 58(b) and CR 6(b), we said “the trial court

had no discretionary authority to extend the time period for filing a motion for reconsideration.”

Id.

Here, as in Metz, the trial court determined that the 10-day period for filing the motion to

reconsider began 4 days after the judgment was filed by the clerk because counsel contended that

the order on revision was not available to counsel on the day it was filed with the clerk. As in Metz,

this was an abuse of discretion because the motion to reconsider was not timely filed within 10

days after entry of the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Ekholm’s untimely

motion for reconsideration and, thus, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Ekholm’s motion

for reconsideration.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

3 No. 60409-4-II

CRUSER, J. We concur:

GLASGOW, J.

VELJACIC, C.J.