Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 255 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-25-627
DYLAN NELSON Opinion Delivered April 29, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 04CR-18-1913]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBIN F. GREEN, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Dylan Nelson appeals the Benton County Circuit Court order revoking his
probation. On appeal, Nelson argues that the circuit court erred by finding that he violated
a condition of his probation. We affirm.
On July 1, 2019, Nelson pled guilty to second-degree domestic battery and second-
degree endangering the welfare of a minor. He was sentenced to sixty months’ probation for
domestic battery and twelve months’ probation for endangering the welfare of a minor.
On June 5, 2024, the State petitioned to revoke Nelson’s probation, and on
November 19, the State filed a second amended petition. In the second amended petition,
the State alleged that on May 20, Nelson committed the new offenses of second-degree
domestic battery, first-degree terroristic threatening, and third-degree domestic battery. The
State further alleged that Nelson possessed a controlled substance and a firearm and had not paid probation-supervision fees totaling $180. The State also claimed that between June 10
and September 17 and between November 4 and November 9, Nelson had violated a no-
contact order.
On December 12, 2024, the court held a revocation hearing. At the beginning of the
hearing, the State introduced a May 23, 2024 no-contact order prohibiting Nelson from
contacting his spouse, Haley Nelson, and their minor children. The State also introduced
emails from a jail account purporting to show contact between Nelson and Haley in June,
July, and September and a jail log showing that Haley had visited Nelson on November 5
and 6.
Officer Benjamin Taylor testified that he is an officer with the Siloam Springs Police
Department and that he responded to a domestic-disturbance call at a residence on May 20,
2024. Officer Taylor explained that at the scene, he spoke with Haley’s mother, Kimberly
Smith, who reported that Nelson had “placed his hands around [Haley’s] throat and in the
process of doing that . . . had hit the infant [son] that she was holding.” He stated that he
then spoke with Haley, and she confirmed Smith’s report. He testified that Haley
additionally informed him that Nelson had “smacked” their eight-year-old daughter across
the face. Officer Taylor testified that he spoke with Nelson’s daughter who confirmed that
Nelson had hit her. Officer Taylor stated that Nelson’s daughter had a welt on her face in
the shape of four fingers. The State introduced photos of Nelson’s daughter’s face.
2 Haley’s mother, Smith, testified that Nelson admitted to her (Smith) that he had
slapped his daughter because “she deserved it.” Smith also stated that the daughter had a red
mark on her face.
Michael Dealy testified that he supervised Nelson’s probation and that Nelson had
failed to pay supervision fees for five months and that he owed $180. On cross-examination,
Dealy stated that Nelson had “reported well” and had not failed a drug test.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Nelson had violated the terms
of his probation by committing second-degree domestic battery, violating the no-contact
order, and failing to pay his supervision fees. On March 5, 2025, the circuit court entered
findings of fact, and on March 7, the court entered an order revoking Nelson’s probation
and sentencing him to 120 months in the Arkansas Division of Correction. This appeal
followed.
Probation may be revoked upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of the probation. Williams
v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 422. On appeal, a revocation will not be overturned unless the
decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. We must give due regard to
the circuit court’s superior position in determining the credibility of witnesses and weight to
be given their testimony. Id. Only one violation is required to sustain a revocation. Springs v.
State, 2017 Ark. App. 364, 525 S.W.3d 490.
On appeal, Nelson argues that the circuit court erred by finding that he violated a
condition of his probation. He challenges all the court’s findings. As to the court’s finding
3 that he failed to pay his supervision fees, Nelson argues that the State failed to prove he
willfully failed to pay. He points out that there was no testimony concerning his employment,
and he asserts that he had reported well and had not failed a drug test.
It is the State’s burden to prove that the failure to pay was inexcusable. Alexander v.
State, 2018 Ark. App. 466, at 3, 561 S.W.3d 744, 746. Once the State has introduced
evidence of nonpayment, the burden of going forward shifts to the defendant to offer some
reasonable excuse for failing to pay. Vail v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 407, 438 S.W.3d 286. It is
then the defendant’s obligation to justify the failure to pay by providing evidence of a
reasonable excuse for the nonpayment. Id. The defendant may not “sit back and rely totally
upon the [circuit] court to make inquiry into his excuse for nonpayment.” Alexander, 2018
Ark. App. 466, at 4, 561 S.W.3d at 746. The State is not required to negate every possible
excuse for nonpayment in its case-in-chief. Reese v. State, 26 Ark. App. 42, 759 S.W.2d 576
(1988). While the ultimate burden of proving inexcusable nonpayment remains on the State,
if the defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable explanation for his failure to pay, then it
is difficult to find clear error in a circuit court’s finding of inexcusable nonpayment. Springs,
2017 Ark. App. 364, 525 S.W.3d 490.
In this case, Officer Dealy testified that Nelson had not paid his supervision fee for
five months and that he owed $180. After Dealy testified about Nelson’s nonpayment,
Nelson did not provide a justification for his failure to pay. Given these circumstances, we
cannot say that the circuit court’s finding that Nelson violated his probation by inexcusably
failing to pay his supervision fee is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Because
4 the State need only prove that Nelson committed one violation, we need not address
Nelson’s arguments concerning the other violations. See Springs, 2017 Ark. App. 364, 525
S.W.3d 490.
Even so, the evidence also supports the circuit court’s finding that Nelson violated
his probation by committing second-degree domestic battery against his daughter. Nelson
argues on appeal that the State failed to prove that his daughter sustained a physical injury
or that he knowingly caused injury to her. He claims the photo of his daughter does not
show markings from physical trauma, and he argues that there was inconsistent testimony
concerning the circumstances surrounding her injury.
A person commits second-degree domestic battery if the person knowingly causes
physical injury to a family or household member he knows to be sixty years of age or older
or twelve years of age or younger. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-304(a)(4) (Repl. 2024). Physical
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Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 255 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-25-627
DYLAN NELSON Opinion Delivered April 29, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 04CR-18-1913]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBIN F. GREEN, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Dylan Nelson appeals the Benton County Circuit Court order revoking his
probation. On appeal, Nelson argues that the circuit court erred by finding that he violated
a condition of his probation. We affirm.
On July 1, 2019, Nelson pled guilty to second-degree domestic battery and second-
degree endangering the welfare of a minor. He was sentenced to sixty months’ probation for
domestic battery and twelve months’ probation for endangering the welfare of a minor.
On June 5, 2024, the State petitioned to revoke Nelson’s probation, and on
November 19, the State filed a second amended petition. In the second amended petition,
the State alleged that on May 20, Nelson committed the new offenses of second-degree
domestic battery, first-degree terroristic threatening, and third-degree domestic battery. The
State further alleged that Nelson possessed a controlled substance and a firearm and had not paid probation-supervision fees totaling $180. The State also claimed that between June 10
and September 17 and between November 4 and November 9, Nelson had violated a no-
contact order.
On December 12, 2024, the court held a revocation hearing. At the beginning of the
hearing, the State introduced a May 23, 2024 no-contact order prohibiting Nelson from
contacting his spouse, Haley Nelson, and their minor children. The State also introduced
emails from a jail account purporting to show contact between Nelson and Haley in June,
July, and September and a jail log showing that Haley had visited Nelson on November 5
and 6.
Officer Benjamin Taylor testified that he is an officer with the Siloam Springs Police
Department and that he responded to a domestic-disturbance call at a residence on May 20,
2024. Officer Taylor explained that at the scene, he spoke with Haley’s mother, Kimberly
Smith, who reported that Nelson had “placed his hands around [Haley’s] throat and in the
process of doing that . . . had hit the infant [son] that she was holding.” He stated that he
then spoke with Haley, and she confirmed Smith’s report. He testified that Haley
additionally informed him that Nelson had “smacked” their eight-year-old daughter across
the face. Officer Taylor testified that he spoke with Nelson’s daughter who confirmed that
Nelson had hit her. Officer Taylor stated that Nelson’s daughter had a welt on her face in
the shape of four fingers. The State introduced photos of Nelson’s daughter’s face.
2 Haley’s mother, Smith, testified that Nelson admitted to her (Smith) that he had
slapped his daughter because “she deserved it.” Smith also stated that the daughter had a red
mark on her face.
Michael Dealy testified that he supervised Nelson’s probation and that Nelson had
failed to pay supervision fees for five months and that he owed $180. On cross-examination,
Dealy stated that Nelson had “reported well” and had not failed a drug test.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Nelson had violated the terms
of his probation by committing second-degree domestic battery, violating the no-contact
order, and failing to pay his supervision fees. On March 5, 2025, the circuit court entered
findings of fact, and on March 7, the court entered an order revoking Nelson’s probation
and sentencing him to 120 months in the Arkansas Division of Correction. This appeal
followed.
Probation may be revoked upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of the probation. Williams
v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 422. On appeal, a revocation will not be overturned unless the
decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. We must give due regard to
the circuit court’s superior position in determining the credibility of witnesses and weight to
be given their testimony. Id. Only one violation is required to sustain a revocation. Springs v.
State, 2017 Ark. App. 364, 525 S.W.3d 490.
On appeal, Nelson argues that the circuit court erred by finding that he violated a
condition of his probation. He challenges all the court’s findings. As to the court’s finding
3 that he failed to pay his supervision fees, Nelson argues that the State failed to prove he
willfully failed to pay. He points out that there was no testimony concerning his employment,
and he asserts that he had reported well and had not failed a drug test.
It is the State’s burden to prove that the failure to pay was inexcusable. Alexander v.
State, 2018 Ark. App. 466, at 3, 561 S.W.3d 744, 746. Once the State has introduced
evidence of nonpayment, the burden of going forward shifts to the defendant to offer some
reasonable excuse for failing to pay. Vail v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 407, 438 S.W.3d 286. It is
then the defendant’s obligation to justify the failure to pay by providing evidence of a
reasonable excuse for the nonpayment. Id. The defendant may not “sit back and rely totally
upon the [circuit] court to make inquiry into his excuse for nonpayment.” Alexander, 2018
Ark. App. 466, at 4, 561 S.W.3d at 746. The State is not required to negate every possible
excuse for nonpayment in its case-in-chief. Reese v. State, 26 Ark. App. 42, 759 S.W.2d 576
(1988). While the ultimate burden of proving inexcusable nonpayment remains on the State,
if the defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable explanation for his failure to pay, then it
is difficult to find clear error in a circuit court’s finding of inexcusable nonpayment. Springs,
2017 Ark. App. 364, 525 S.W.3d 490.
In this case, Officer Dealy testified that Nelson had not paid his supervision fee for
five months and that he owed $180. After Dealy testified about Nelson’s nonpayment,
Nelson did not provide a justification for his failure to pay. Given these circumstances, we
cannot say that the circuit court’s finding that Nelson violated his probation by inexcusably
failing to pay his supervision fee is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Because
4 the State need only prove that Nelson committed one violation, we need not address
Nelson’s arguments concerning the other violations. See Springs, 2017 Ark. App. 364, 525
S.W.3d 490.
Even so, the evidence also supports the circuit court’s finding that Nelson violated
his probation by committing second-degree domestic battery against his daughter. Nelson
argues on appeal that the State failed to prove that his daughter sustained a physical injury
or that he knowingly caused injury to her. He claims the photo of his daughter does not
show markings from physical trauma, and he argues that there was inconsistent testimony
concerning the circumstances surrounding her injury.
A person commits second-degree domestic battery if the person knowingly causes
physical injury to a family or household member he knows to be sixty years of age or older
or twelve years of age or younger. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-304(a)(4) (Repl. 2024). Physical
injury means the impairment of physical condition, infliction of substantial pain, or
infliction of bruising, swelling, or a visible mark associated with physical trauma. Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-1-102(14)(a) (Repl. 2024). A person’s intent or purpose, being a state of mind, can
seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be shown by direct evidence
but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223,
599 S.W.3d 353.
Here, Officer Taylor testified that Haley reported that Nelson struck his eight-year-
old daughter’s face. Officer Taylor testified that he spoke with Nelson’s daughter, and she
confirmed it. He stated that the child had a welt on her face in the shape of four fingers.
5 Smith, Haley’s mom, also testified that Nelson told her he had slapped his daughter because
“she deserved it.” As to any inconsistencies in the testimony, it is within the purview of the
circuit court to decide questions of credibility. Partain v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 220, 687
S.W.3d 164. Moreover, the State introduced a photo of Nelson’s daughter’s face, which
shows visible markings. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the circuit court’s decision
that Nelson violated his probation by committing second-degree domestic battery is clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.
Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Dalton Cook, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.