Dyess v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.

463 S.W.2d 724, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 241, 1971 Tex. LEXIS 295
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 17, 1971
DocketB-2234
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 463 S.W.2d 724 (Dyess v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dyess v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 463 S.W.2d 724, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 241, 1971 Tex. LEXIS 295 (Tex. 1971).

Opinion

McGEE, Justice.

Mary Ruth Dyess, the beneficiary under a Group Accidental Death policy, filed this suit against the Insurance Company to recover accidental death benefits for the death of her husband. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s motion for judgment based upon a jury verdict, sustained defendant’s motion for judgment non ob-stante veredicto and rendered judgment that plaintiff take nothing. Judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 454 S.W.2d 860. The judgments of the courts below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals.

Plaintiff alleged that her husband, J. F. Dyess, on October 10, 1967, sustained bodily injuries, caused solely by accident in the nature of gunshot wounds in the chest; that on the same day, as a direct result of such bodily injuries, directly and independently of all other causes, J. F. Dyess died. Plaintiff sought judgment for the sum of $20,000.00, together with interest, penalty and attorney’s fees. Defendant filed a general denial and special plea that Dyess’s death was the result of an intentionally *725 self-inflicted injury by gunshot. One of the risks excepted by the terms of the policy was: “suicide or intentionally self inflicted injury, while sane or insane.”

The jury found: (1) that Dyess’s death resulted directly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injury; (2) that such death did not result directly or indirectly from suicide; (3) that such death did not result directly or indirectly from an intentionally self-inflicted injury. It was stipulated that a reasonable attorney’s fee for plaintiff would be $5,500.00.

In view of the action of the trial court in granting a judgment non obstante vere-dicto, on the ground that there was no evidence to support each finding of the jury, we must review and consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom which support the answers of the jury, and reject the evidence and inferences which are contrary to the jury’s findings. Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Sup.1970); C. & R. Transport, Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Sup.1966); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Cartwright v. Canode, 106 Tex. 502, 171 S.W. 696 (1914); Calvert, No Evidence and Insufficient Evidence Points of Error, 38 Texas L.Rev. 361 (1960).

We will summarize the evidence most favorable to plaintiff and in support of the jury findings. Mr. and Mrs. Dyess were getting along fine before and at the time of his death. At the time of his death, he was experiencing no financial difficulties. Dyess had been regularly employed by the same employer for about ten years. His fellow employees observed that he appeared to be happy in his work, enjoyed a good relationship with his fellow workers, and exhibited a happy disposition.

Dyess had a keen interest in sports and had made plans to go hunting on his farm on Wednesday, October 11, 1967, before going to Lubbock to attend the Texas Tech-Texas A & M football game the following Saturday. Tickets for the game had been purchased by his son, Michael. Dyess and Mrs. Dyess planned to spend the day with him Saturday and Sunday. Dyess frequently went hunting, fishing and engaged in other activities with his children.

Dr. Campbell, Dyess’s family doctor, testified that Dyess, prior to February, 1966, had shown symptoms of depression and crying. Dr. Markowitz, Dr. Campbell’s partner, at that time prescribed Etrafon for emotional problems. Dr. Campbell referred him to Dr. Timkin, a psychiatrist, who did not continue to see him. Dr. Campbell “saw him about three times or so after that, on this one drug, and he apparently improved.” Dr. Campbell and Dr. Markowitz continued to see him until June of 1966. Dr. Campbell had no notes, nor could he recall Dyess saying anything about suicide. Dr. Markowitz, on February 2, 1967, referred him to Beverly Hills Hospital. Dyess was not seen in Dr. Campbell’s office between June, 1966 and February, 1967.

Dyess was under the direct supervision of Dr. Speegle during his stay in the Beverly Hills Clinic from February 2, 1967 to April 6, 1967. Dr. Speegle, reading from the hospital records related part of the information in Dyess’s file: “Chief complaint: Depression, preoccupation with religion, delusional and hallucinatory.” He diagnosed Dyess as a schizophrenic paranoid.. Dyess stated that he had thought about committing suicide. For this reason Dyess was closely observed for four or five days. He was given tranquilizers and a combined program of electric shock and insulin coma therapy. He soon appeared to get over what appeared to be the hallucinatory activity. He became in better spirits. He no longer was depressed and he was increasingly pleasant and more cooperative. Dr. Speegle’s opinion at the time of Dyess’s discharge from the hospital was that he was “ * * * in complete remission of symptoms and was over his schizophrenic reaction.” He was, according to Dr. Speegle, “well”.

*726 When asked if he recognized the possibility of return of the symptoms, Dr. Spee-gle replied: “One can have a similar illness more than once. We do not necessarily expect a return nor is return inevitable, whether it is schizophrenic reaction, pneumonia, or various other things, one can have the illness more than once.” Dr. Speegle also observed that one who has suffered the symptoms of a schizophrenic paranoid type is no more likely to have them again than one who has not suffered from them. Dyess came back for two follow-up treatments but missed the third because of his physical illness. Dr. Speegle further testified that he was not aware of any general feelings on the part of psychiatrists that paranoid schizophrenics are particularly prone to self destruction. Dr. Speegle observed that on the return visits, Dyess was in excellent spirits, showing no signs of the symptoms similar to those at the time of his admission to the hospital. Dyess showed no signs of being depressed or entertaining suicidal thoughts. Further, Dr. Speegle testified that he did not feel a person could be very depressed, certainly to the point of suicide, without it being very obvious to those around him. With reference to Dyess’s suicidal tendencies while in the hospital, Dr. Speegle testified: “I would think that they were more towards' the fleeting end of the spectrum * * * rather than really suicidal plans * * *. Of course, with a few shock treatments they cleared up in just a matter of a few days * * *. I would feel more likely that while we instituted suicidal precautions, I was not truly concerned that the man really was, would try to do something to harm himself at that time.”

On October 9, 1967, Mrs. Dyess called her husband to come home from work to take her, her sister’s child and a neighbor’s little girl to the State Fair of Texas, along with their own two children, and to accompany her to see Dr. Campbell, with whom she had an appointment. Her sister said she saw Mr. Dyess that night after the group had returned from the Fair. Dr. Campbell corroborated Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
463 S.W.2d 724, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 241, 1971 Tex. LEXIS 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dyess-v-connecticut-general-life-insurance-co-tex-1971.