Dye v. . Morrison

107 S.E. 138, 181 N.C. 309, 1921 N.C. LEXIS 65

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: May 4, 1921
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stacy, J.

It is admitted that tbe plaintiff is tbe owner in fee of tbe locus in quo, and that be bolds tbe same under mesne conveyances from Henry P. Gill, who conveyed said lands in 1896 to D. M. Morrison, plaintiff’s predecessor in title, by deed regular in all respects and duly registered in tbe office of tbe Register of Deeds for Richmond County on 8 June, 1896. Tbe defendants claim right of iiossession to a portion of tbe lands described in tbe complaint by reason of a ninety-nine-year lease executed by tbe said Henry P. Gill to Anny J. Morrison on 7 April, 1896, and under which defendants took possession, but said lease was not registered until 4 March, 1912.

Tbe plaintiff’s deed, from tbe common source of title, having been registered prior to tbe lease of tbe defendants, gives him tbe superior legal claim under our registration laws. Mintz v. Russ, 161 N. C., 538; Combes v. Adams, 150 N. C., 64. And it bas been beld witb us repeatedly that no notice, however full and formal as to the existence of a prior conveyance, will of itself supply the place of registration. Fertilizer Co. v. Lane, 173 N. C., 184; Allen v. R. R., 171 N. C., 339; Lynch v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 110. Our statute, C. S., 3309, establishes priority of right from registration within the county where the land is situated. Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 263; Quinerly v. Quinerly, 114 N. C., 145.

Nor do we think the possession of defendants alone can be said to be notice of any adverse claim. Lanier v. Lbr. Co., 177 N. C., 200. In Sexton v. Elizabeth City, 169 N. C., 385, the rule is stated as follows: “The policy of our law now is that purchasers for value should be protected as against unregistered conveyances of the same property from the vendor, as nothing but registration shall be considered notice to them of any prior deed for the land, it having grown into an axiom that No notice, however full and formal, will supply the place of registration’ ”; citing Piano Co. v. Spruill, 150 N. C., 168, and Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C., 235.

From the foregoing, and considering all the facts and circumstances in the instant case, it would appear that plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until the registration of defendants’ lease, and therefore is not barred by the ten years statute of limitations.

Upon a perusal of the whole record, we find no sufficient reason for disturbing the results of the trial.

No error.