DWAYNE M. CRUTHIRD v. ALLISON HALLET & Others.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 11, 2023
• Docket: 22-P-0707
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-707

DWAYNE M. CRUTHIRD

vs.

ALLISON HALLET1 & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Dwayne M. Cruthird, appeals from a judgment

entered in favor of the defendant superintendent and

correctional officers at the Massachusetts Alcohol and Substance

Abuse Center (MASAC) following a bench trial in the Superior

Court. The plaintiff argues that because the trial judge denied

the defendants' motions for directed verdicts at the close of

the plaintiff's case and at the close of all the evidence, the

judge erred, as a matter of law, by finding in favor of the

defendants. We affirm.

As the plaintiff correctly points out, a trial judge must

deny a motion for a directed verdict if "anywhere in the

1 Individually and in her official capacity as superintendent of the Massachusetts Alcohol and Substance Abuse Center. 2 Frederick Fontaine and Timothy Scott, individually and in their

official capacities. evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of

circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference

could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff." Poirier v. Plymouth,

374 Mass. 206, 212 (1978), quoting Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361

Mass. 341, 343 (1972). In deciding the motion, "[t]he evidence

is to be viewed in a light favorable to the plaintiff, and the

tribunal may not examine the weight or credibility of the

evidence" (citations omitted). Cooper v. Cooper-Ciccarelli, 77

Mass. App. Ct. 86, 91 (2010).3

The plaintiff presented evidence that he wrote a letter to

MASAC officials complaining of racial discrimination and that

after he wrote the letter, he was transferred to "higher

custody." The defendants presented evidence that they

transferred the plaintiff not because of his letter, but because

of multiple rule violations. For the purpose of the motions for

directed verdicts, the judge was required to view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and, therefore, to

3 The defendants should not have moved for a directed verdict in a bench trial. See Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620 n.3 (1992). If they believed the plaintiff had failed to present evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case, they could have moved for involuntary dismissal under Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (2), 365 Mass. 803 (1974). Kendall, supra. The holding to the contrary in M.G. v. G.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 144-148 (2018), is limited to practice in the District Court. Because the procedural error giving rise to the plaintiff's arguments was of the defendants' own making, we proceed to address the substance of his appeal.

2 discredit the defendants' testimony. In rendering the final

judgment, however, the judge, acting as the trier of fact, was

permitted to make credibility determinations and draw his own

conclusions, and his conclusion was that the plaintiff had

failed to prove retaliation, intimidation, violation of the

plaintiff's constitutional and civil rights, or civil

conspiracy. The plaintiff faults the defendants for failing to

move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but because the

verdict was in their favor, they had no reason to do so.

"In reviewing a judge's decision after a jury-waived trial,

'we accept the judge's findings of fact as true unless they are

clearly erroneous' but 'scrutinize without deference the legal

standard which the judge applied to the facts.'" Psy-Ed Corp.

v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 710 (2011), quoting Kendall v.

Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620, 621 (1992). As we have

explained, the plaintiff's legal claims are without merit.

Because the plaintiff makes no argument that the judge's

findings were clearly erroneous as a matter of fact, we have no

3 occasion to review those findings.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Milkey, Massing & Henry, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: May 11, 2023.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.