Dwayne Burgess v. J. Raya

Ninth Circuit

Dwayne Burgess v. J. Raya

690 F. App'x 483

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 26, 2017

Docket15-17462

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 690 F. App'x 483 (Dwayne Burgess v. J. Raya) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dwayne Burgess v. J. Raya, 690 F. App'x 483 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Dwayne Lamont Burgess appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hooper v. County of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Burgess’ First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims because a judgment in Burgess’ favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary proceedings. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (extending Heck to disciplinary proceedings).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Burgess’ excessive force claim as Heck-barred to the extent that Burgess alleged that defendants used pepper spray for a purpose other than to regain control. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364; see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (force is not excessive when “applied in a good faith effort to restore discipline and order and not maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”).

However, to the extent that Burgess alleged that he was exposed to pepper spray for a prolonged period of time despite alerting defendants to his health issues, Heck does not bar Burgess’ claims. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 696-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (claim not barred by Heck if the alleged use of excessive force occurred after the conduct on which the conviction was based). Because the district court relied only on Heck in dismissing this claim, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings on this claim only.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Dwayne Lamont Burgess appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hooper v. County of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Burgess’ First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims because a judgment in Burgess’ favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary proceedings. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (extending Heck to disciplinary proceedings).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Burgess’ excessive force claim as Heck-barred to the extent that Burgess alleged that defendants used pepper spray for a purpose other than to regain control. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364; see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (force is not excessive when “applied in a good faith effort to restore discipline and order and not maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”).

However, to the extent that Burgess alleged that he was exposed to pepper spray for a prolonged period of time despite alerting defendants to his health issues, Heck does not bar Burgess’ claims. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 696-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (claim not barred by Heck if the alleged use of excessive force occurred after the conduct on which the conviction was based). Because the district court relied only on Heck in dismissing this claim, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings on this claim only.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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690 F. App'x 483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dwayne-burgess-v-j-raya-ca9-2017.

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