RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1562-24
D.W.A.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.L.H.,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Submitted January 8, 2026 ‒ Decided March 30, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FV-12-0426-04.
A.L.H., self-represented appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials to protect plaintiff's confidentiality. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). Defendant A.L.H. appeals from the December 19, 2024 order denying his
motion for a downward modification of child support obligation arrears. We
affirm.
The parties are well-acquainted with the facts and procedural posture of
this case, which need not be repeated in detail. Nonetheless, we provide a brief
recitation of facts relevant to this appeal.
The parties were in a relationship and resided together for several years,
ending in 2003. During the course of their relationship, they had two children,
both now adults and emancipated. In 2004, a final restraining order (FRO) was
entered against defendant, and his child support obligation was established.
In December 2007, the court ordered defendant to pay child support in the
amount of $310 per week. A year later, the court held a hearing on plaintiff's
application for a bench warrant for defendant's arrest and a lump-sum payment
toward his arrears of $32,881.39. After hearing defendant's testimony and
argument from plaintiff's counsel, the court ordered defendant to pay $5,000
toward his arrears and continued the weekly child support payments of $310,
with an additional $100 per week applied to arrears.
On May 31, 2019, defendant's child support obligation to his daughter was
terminated, leaving arrears in the amount of $141,915.14. Child support for the
A-1562-24 2 remaining child was $185 per week. Over a year later, on July 16, 2020,
defendant's child support obligation for his son was terminated leaving a weekly
arrears obligation of $476. Thereafter, the September 1, 2022 order required
defendant to pay: $1,000 by September 15, 2022, and an additional $1,000 by
October 13, 2022. The order further obligated defendant to pay $476 per week
and remain current on his payments thereafter, as well as to provide the
probation department with proof of ten job searches per week. It explicitly
provided a bench warrant would issue in the event defendant failed to comply
with its terms. Notably, defendant did not timely appeal from the September
order.
In March 2023, probation moved to enforce litigant's rights as defendant
failed to comply with the September 2022 order. In its April 3, 2023 order, the
court directed defendant to make a $2,500 payment within two weeks, and an
additional $2,500 payment within the following two weeks. At that time,
defendant's arrears totaled more than $164,000.
Defendant appealed from both orders, which enforced his continued
obligation to pay child support arrears to plaintiff. We declined to consider the
September 2022 order and affirmed the April 2023 order. D.W.A. v. A.L.H.,
No. A-2794-22 (App. Div. Mar. 20, 2024).
A-1562-24 3 Following our decision, defendant filed another application for a
downward modification of child support arrears. The court held a hearing on
June 4, 2024, but ultimately denied the application.
In November 2024, defendant filed a fourth application for downward
modification of his $476 per week arrearage obligation. He requested an audit
and validation of arrears alleged by the probation division, as well as payment
arrangements that could reasonably be met.
After holding a hearing on December 17, 2024, the court denied
defendant's motion, finding "willful noncompliance." It determined defendant
did not make any regular payments towards the arrearage. Additionally,
defendant did not submit any financial documentation in compliance with the
court's June 4, 2024 order. The court directed defendant to pay a $2,500 lump
sum within thirty days and his failure to comply would result in the issuance of
a bench warrant. On December 19, 2024, the court amended the FRO
memorializing its decision. This appeal ensued.
Defendant raises the following arguments for our consideration: plaintiff
filed for child support when they were residing together and defendant was not
credited for the financial support provided during that period, nor the monetary
value of items plaintiff allegedly stole; plaintiff withheld the children based on
A-1562-24 4 the FRO while defendant was required to pay child support; the arrears were
inflated by the December 2008 order, which imposed an additional $100 per
week payment toward those arrears; defendant claims five additional years of
child support were paid while his son was in college without supporting
documentation showing enrollment for that period; and the records maintained
by the probation department did not accurately reflect the amount of child
support paid by him. Additionally, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues
he was "pushed" by probation to reimburse Social Services $2,400 for payments
made to plaintiff on behalf of their children. We reject defendant's contentions.
Our review of a Family Part order regarding child support is limited.
Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 587 (App. Div. 2016).
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its
'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J.
Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412
(1998)).
"When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify
child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or
her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013) (quoting Jacoby v.
Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012)). "The trial court's 'award
A-1562-24 5 will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly
contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'" Id. at
326 (quoting Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, "[w]e will reverse only if we find the trial judge clearly abused
[their] discretion." Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 2012).
However, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super.
546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App.
Div. 2013)).
A child support order is reviewable upon a showing of changed
circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). Modifications of child
support obligations "turn on the discretionary determinations of Family Part
judges." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2006). As to
arrearages, it is well-established that "the enforcement, collection, [and]
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1562-24
D.W.A.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.L.H.,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Submitted January 8, 2026 ‒ Decided March 30, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FV-12-0426-04.
A.L.H., self-represented appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials to protect plaintiff's confidentiality. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). Defendant A.L.H. appeals from the December 19, 2024 order denying his
motion for a downward modification of child support obligation arrears. We
affirm.
The parties are well-acquainted with the facts and procedural posture of
this case, which need not be repeated in detail. Nonetheless, we provide a brief
recitation of facts relevant to this appeal.
The parties were in a relationship and resided together for several years,
ending in 2003. During the course of their relationship, they had two children,
both now adults and emancipated. In 2004, a final restraining order (FRO) was
entered against defendant, and his child support obligation was established.
In December 2007, the court ordered defendant to pay child support in the
amount of $310 per week. A year later, the court held a hearing on plaintiff's
application for a bench warrant for defendant's arrest and a lump-sum payment
toward his arrears of $32,881.39. After hearing defendant's testimony and
argument from plaintiff's counsel, the court ordered defendant to pay $5,000
toward his arrears and continued the weekly child support payments of $310,
with an additional $100 per week applied to arrears.
On May 31, 2019, defendant's child support obligation to his daughter was
terminated, leaving arrears in the amount of $141,915.14. Child support for the
A-1562-24 2 remaining child was $185 per week. Over a year later, on July 16, 2020,
defendant's child support obligation for his son was terminated leaving a weekly
arrears obligation of $476. Thereafter, the September 1, 2022 order required
defendant to pay: $1,000 by September 15, 2022, and an additional $1,000 by
October 13, 2022. The order further obligated defendant to pay $476 per week
and remain current on his payments thereafter, as well as to provide the
probation department with proof of ten job searches per week. It explicitly
provided a bench warrant would issue in the event defendant failed to comply
with its terms. Notably, defendant did not timely appeal from the September
order.
In March 2023, probation moved to enforce litigant's rights as defendant
failed to comply with the September 2022 order. In its April 3, 2023 order, the
court directed defendant to make a $2,500 payment within two weeks, and an
additional $2,500 payment within the following two weeks. At that time,
defendant's arrears totaled more than $164,000.
Defendant appealed from both orders, which enforced his continued
obligation to pay child support arrears to plaintiff. We declined to consider the
September 2022 order and affirmed the April 2023 order. D.W.A. v. A.L.H.,
No. A-2794-22 (App. Div. Mar. 20, 2024).
A-1562-24 3 Following our decision, defendant filed another application for a
downward modification of child support arrears. The court held a hearing on
June 4, 2024, but ultimately denied the application.
In November 2024, defendant filed a fourth application for downward
modification of his $476 per week arrearage obligation. He requested an audit
and validation of arrears alleged by the probation division, as well as payment
arrangements that could reasonably be met.
After holding a hearing on December 17, 2024, the court denied
defendant's motion, finding "willful noncompliance." It determined defendant
did not make any regular payments towards the arrearage. Additionally,
defendant did not submit any financial documentation in compliance with the
court's June 4, 2024 order. The court directed defendant to pay a $2,500 lump
sum within thirty days and his failure to comply would result in the issuance of
a bench warrant. On December 19, 2024, the court amended the FRO
memorializing its decision. This appeal ensued.
Defendant raises the following arguments for our consideration: plaintiff
filed for child support when they were residing together and defendant was not
credited for the financial support provided during that period, nor the monetary
value of items plaintiff allegedly stole; plaintiff withheld the children based on
A-1562-24 4 the FRO while defendant was required to pay child support; the arrears were
inflated by the December 2008 order, which imposed an additional $100 per
week payment toward those arrears; defendant claims five additional years of
child support were paid while his son was in college without supporting
documentation showing enrollment for that period; and the records maintained
by the probation department did not accurately reflect the amount of child
support paid by him. Additionally, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues
he was "pushed" by probation to reimburse Social Services $2,400 for payments
made to plaintiff on behalf of their children. We reject defendant's contentions.
Our review of a Family Part order regarding child support is limited.
Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 587 (App. Div. 2016).
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its
'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J.
Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412
(1998)).
"When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify
child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or
her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013) (quoting Jacoby v.
Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012)). "The trial court's 'award
A-1562-24 5 will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly
contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'" Id. at
326 (quoting Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, "[w]e will reverse only if we find the trial judge clearly abused
[their] discretion." Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 2012).
However, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super.
546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App.
Div. 2013)).
A child support order is reviewable upon a showing of changed
circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). Modifications of child
support obligations "turn on the discretionary determinations of Family Part
judges." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2006). As to
arrearages, it is well-established that "the enforcement, collection, [and]
modification . . . of unpaid arrearages in . . . child support payments are matters
addressed to the sound discretion of the court." In re Rogiers, 396 N.J. Super.
317, 327 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Mastropole v. Mastropole, 181 N.J. Super.
130, 141 (App. Div. 1981)).
Governed by these principles, we discern no basis to disturb the December
19, 2024 order. Defendant renews the arguments previously presented in the
A-1562-24 6 prior applications for downward modification, which have already been
considered and rejected by us on appeal, again without supporting financial
documentation. In our prior decision, we reasoned: "Although defendant's
appearances at the September 2022 and April 2023 hearings were not pursuant
to an arrest warrant, neither the legal nor the equitable arguments defendant
raises on appeal favor relieving him from the obligation to comply with the April
3, 2023 order." D.W.A., slip op. at 12. Nothing has changed; plaintiff remains
entitled to the arrears. Defendant has not met his burden in demonstrating
changed circumstances warranting a down modification of arrearages. See
Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. at 21. Nor has he shown an abuse of discretion. See In
re Rogiers, 396 N.J. Super. at 327.
We likewise reject defendant's argument paying child support for his son
was improper on the grounds his son should have been emancipated at age
eighteen, and the child support obligation should have terminated at that time
rather than in 2020. This argument is unavailing. Children are not automatically
emancipated at eighteen years old. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 5:6-9 (2026) (citing Schumm v. Schumm, 122 N.J. Super.
146 (Ch. Div. 1973)). A child attending college, or working rather than
attending college, is not sufficient by itself to establish emancipation. Filippone
A-1562-24 7 v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 309-10 (App. Div. 1997); see also Llewelyn v.
Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 218 (App. Div. 2015). Defendant offers no
competent evidence his son was not enrolled in college or had a level of
independence sufficient to constitute emancipation. See Dolce v. Dolce, 383
N.J. Super. 11, 17-18 (App. Div. 2006). As we explained in our prior opinion:
"It is inconsequential that the children are now emancipated." D.W.A., slip op.
at 9. Defendant offers nothing more than bald conclusory assertions, which we
do not consider. Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. Super. 11, 32 (App. Div. 2002).
We decline to address defendant's contention regarding the repayment to
the Board of Social Services, raised for the first time on appeal, for two reasons.
First, arguments not raised before the trial court will generally not be considered
on appeal. See Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586 (2012).
Second, we "decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to
the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless
the questions . . . raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or
concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62
N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super.
542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)).
A-1562-24 8 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's
remaining arguments, it is because we find them to be without sufficient merit
to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1562-24 9