Dveirin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 27, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-05146
StatusUnknown

This text of Dveirin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (Dveirin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dveirin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, (E.D. La. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA JACK DVEIRIN * CIVIL ACTION VERSUS * NO. 23-5146 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY * SECTION “A” (2) COMPANY ORDER AND REASONS Pending before me is Plaintiff Jack Dveirin’s Motion to Compel. ECF No. 29. Defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company timely filed an Opposition Memorandum. ECF No. 59. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary. Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the

reasons stated herein. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND Plaintiff Jack Dveirin filed suit against State Farm Fire & Casualty Company seeking to recover contractual insurance benefits and extra-contractual damages relating to property damage sustained during Hurricane Ida. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff issued Interrogatories and Requests for Production on August 1, 2024, to which State Farm responded on October 4, 2024. ECF No. 29 at 1. Dissatisfied, Plaintiff now moves to compel responses to Interrogatory Nos. 6, 14 and 18, Requests for Production Nos. 1, 8-9, 13, 25 and 31, and for deposition dates of Neysa Leicher, Grayson Butler and potential experts that recently inspected the property. ECF No. 29-1 at 3. Plaintiff argues that State Farm has raised improper objections, improperly invoked Rule 33(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and failed to provide deposition dates. Id. at 4-15. In Opposition, State Farm notes that the motion is moot as to deposition dates as the parties have agreed to stay discovery until the resolution of the pending motion to disqualify counsel.

ECF No. 59 at 1. It further argues that the motion is premature because Plaintiff failed to conduct the required Rule 37 conference in good faith and then filed this motion before the agreed deadline. Id. at 3-4. State Farm has since delivered supplemental responses that moot the motion as to Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 8 and Requests for Production Nos. 1, 8 and 9. Id. at 4-5.1 State Farm argues that, until reading Plaintiff’s motion, it did not understand that he sought the guidelines and manuals for Roofing Locator Service, and it will produce same upon entry of a protective order. Id. at 5.2 State Farm also argues that no further response is required for Interrogatory No. 18 because it is not proper to require State Farm to marshal its evidence and respond, on a line-by- line basis, to the 416 separate line items in Plaintiff’s two repair estimates. Id. at 6-7. Further, State Farms argues that no further response is require for Request for Production No. 13 because

information regarding payments to third party adjusters and vendors is irrelevant and proprietary, and relevant information from same is available through deposition. Id. at 8-10. II. APPLICABLE LAW A. Scope of Discovery Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes parties to: obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the

1 Although State Farm cites to Exhibit B as evidence of its supplemental responses, that exhibit is only the cover letter transmitting same, not the supplemental discovery responses. ECF No. 59-2. 2 The Court entered the requested protective order on January 15, 2025. ECF No. 61. importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.3

Information need not be admissible into evidence to be discoverable.4 Rather, information merely needs to be proportional and relevant to any claim or defense.5 The party claiming it would suffer an undue burden or expense is typically in the best position to explain why, while the party claiming the information is important to resolve the issues in the case should be able “to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party understands them.”6 The threshold for relevance at the discovery stage is lower than the threshold for relevance of admissible evidence at the trial stage.7 At the discovery stage, relevance includes “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”8 Discovery should be allowed unless the party opposing discovery establishes that the information sought “can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.”9 If relevance is in doubt, a court should allow discovery.10 Facts that are not considered in determining the ultimate issues may be eliminated in due course of the proceeding.11 While the discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials,12 discovery does have “ultimate and necessary boundaries.”13 The parties and the court have a collective responsibility to ensure that discovery

3 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment. 7 Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro, 274 F.R.D. 585, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citations omitted). 8 Id. (brackets and citations omitted). 9 Dotson v. Edmonson, No. 16-15371, 2017 WL 11535244, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2017) (Morgan, J.) (citing Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005)). 10 E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., L.L.C., 270 F.R.D. 430, 433 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro–Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 11 Rangel, 274 F.R.D. at 590 n.5 (quoting In re Gateway Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-209, 2009 WL 3296625, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2009)). 12 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (citations omitted). 13 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)). is proportional, and Rule 26(b)(2)(C) mandates that the Court limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed, if it determines: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).14 “The court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.”15 B. Duties in Responding to Interrogatories and Requests for Production Both Rules 33 and 34 require a party to serve responses within 30 days of service, absent court order or stipulation. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(2); 34(b)(2)(A).

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Related

Hickman v. Taylor
329 U.S. 495 (Supreme Court, 1947)
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
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Upjohn Co. v. United States
449 U.S. 383 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Truswal Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering, Inc.
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Jackson v. United States Department of Labor
214 F.3d 586 (Fifth Circuit, 2000)
Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc.
227 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Texas, 2005)
Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro
274 F.R.D. 585 (S.D. Texas, 2011)
United States v. Mackey
36 F.R.D. 431 (District of Columbia, 1965)
United States v. Davis
636 F.2d 1028 (Fifth Circuit, 1981)
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Bluebook (online)
Dveirin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dveirin-v-state-farm-fire-and-casualty-company-laed-2025.