Duzé v. Ace Tractor & Equipment Co.

343 P.2d 315, 173 Cal. App. 2d 300, 1959 Cal. App. LEXIS 1587
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 26, 1959
DocketCiv. No. 23773
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 343 P.2d 315 (Duzé v. Ace Tractor & Equipment Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duzé v. Ace Tractor & Equipment Co., 343 P.2d 315, 173 Cal. App. 2d 300, 1959 Cal. App. LEXIS 1587 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

FOX, P. J.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants in an action for damages for alleged conversion of personal property.

Generally, the allegations of the complaint are that the defendants entered into an oral agreement whereby plaintiff was permitted to store, rent free, certain personal property consisting of tractors and field equipment, on defendants’ premises, and that specified property was converted by the defendants. The defendants answered, and by way of counterclaim alleged that they supplied materials and services in connection with the maintenance, safety and upkeep of the equipment, of the reasonable value of $458.99; expended labor [302]*302to place and locate the equipment, claiming $197 for such services; sold and rented equipment for the sum of $1,800, on which, under defendants’ version of the contract, they were entitled to a 20 per cent commission; and defendants also claimed a 20 per cent commission from the sale of a Caterpillar 12 belonging to the plaintiff.

The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it upheld defendants’ contention that plaintiff was to pay them the reasonable cost of labor in connection with the maintenance of the equipment; the reasonable cost of locating and placing the same on defendants’ premises; that plaintiff agreed to pay defendants a 20 per cent commission on the sale or rental of certain equipment; that the defendants were the procuring cause of the sale of the Caterpillar 12 for $9,100; and that plaintiff agreed to pay defendants a 10 per cent commission on this sale.

The court found that defendants received $1,800 from the sale and rental of plaintiff’s property. Against this amount, however, the following were allowed as offsets: (1) $360 (20% commission on above $1,800), (2) $910 (10% commission from sale of the Caterpillar 12), and (3) $655.99 (materials and services). The offsets amount to $1,925.99, which exceeds by $125.99 the amount found owing to the plaintiff by defendants. Judgment was given defendants in this latter amount. It is from this judgment that plaintiff has appealed.

As a basis for reversal, plaintiff argues that the findings and judgment are not supported by the evidence.

“When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.” (Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805, 807 [313 P.2d 848] ; Martin School of Aviation v. Bank of America, 48 Cal.2d 689, 692 [312 P.2d 251].)

Initially, plaintiff argues there is no evidence establishing that defendants were the procuring cause of the sale of the Caterpillar, or that plaintiff agreed to a 10 per cent commission thereon.

Mr. Brunell, a defendant and president of the defendant corporation, testified that they were to receive a 20 per cent commission upon the sale or lease of the Caterpillar. Mr. Palmer stated the amount to be 10 per cent. Mr. Duzé, on the other hand, contended there was no agreement to pay [303]*303any commission. The trial court resolved this conflict in the evidence and accepted Palmer’s testimony as true. The task of resolving conflicts in the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses rests, of course, with the trier of fact, and not with appellate tribunals.

As to the question of whether defendants were the procuring cause of the ultimate sale of the Caterpillar, the evidence is again conflicting. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendants, it appears from the record that one Jesse Anderson went to defendants’ premises and saw the Caterpillar. He spoke to Thomas Palmer (a joint venturer with defendant corporation) about renting it with an option to buy. Plaintiff was then notified and given Anderson’s telephone number. Subsequently, plaintiff and Anderson met on defendants’ property and thereafter, on September 3, 1954, entered into a written lease for 14 months at $650 per month. Anderson was late with the second rental payment. Plaintiff went to Indio, where he believed Anderson was using the equipment, in an attempt to collect the past due rent. He contacted the Massey Rock Company and discovered Anderson was working with or for them. Plaintiff collected the rent and, according to his testimony, Anderson released all his interests in the machinery and plaintiff then leased it to Massey Rock, on November 3, 1954, for a period of 12 months at the same rental which Anderson had previously paid. Anderson relinquished his interests by making the following notations on his copy of the original lease: “This contract cancelled as of Nov. 3-54 and turned equipment over to Massey Rock and Sand Co., Certified Contractor, Inc. by J. G. Anderson.”

Brunell testified that prior to the time plaintiff and Anderson entered into the original lease, Anderson brought Mr. William Carter, a partner in Massey Rock, to defendants’ property to approve the deal. On cross-examination, Brunell testified as follows:

“Q. And Mr. Anderson talked to Mr. Palmer who was your joint venture associate? A. That is right.
“Q. And the two of them, then, got together with Mr. Duzé; is that correct? A. Ves.
“Q. Did Mr. Palmer—I mean did Mr. Carter, Senior of Massey Rock agree to be bound by this regular contract? A. Yes, he O.K.’d it. Mr. Anderson-
“Q. Did he say, ‘Bill me’? A. No, he said ‘You go ahead [304]*304with the deal. You can work it out, and I will employ the machinery. I will go—we will go ahead with it.’ ”

Prom the above testimony it appears that Massey Rock was initially brought into the picture by or through the efforts of defendants in securing Anderson as a lessee and that, thereafter, Massey Company, in effect, merely took over the original lease from Anderson, even though a new lease was executed. This state of facts justifies a determination that defendants were the procuring cause of the $9,100 paid to the plaintiff.1

Plaintiff next attacks Finding Number VII, which relates to the sale or rental of equipment other than the Caterpillar. In this finding, the court stated that “defendant corporation was the procuring cause of the sale or rental of such equipment as plaintiff consigned to defendant corporation in the gross amount of $1,800.00, and by reason thereof plaintiff became indebted to defendant corporation, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, in a sum equal to 20% thereof, or $360.00.”

This finding is in no respect inconsistent with Finding Number VI, relating to the Caterpillar, which stated defendants were only entitled to a 10 per cent commission. Finding Number VI expressly states that the reduction of commission related only to the Caterpillar and did not affect the rest of the equipment.

Finding Number VII is unquestionably supported by the evidence. There is ample testimony that defendants were to receive a 20 per cent commission on the sale or rental of this equipment. In this regard, Brunell testified as follows on cross-examination:

“Q.

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Munroe v. Silvers
183 Cal. App. 2d 800 (California Court of Appeal, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
343 P.2d 315, 173 Cal. App. 2d 300, 1959 Cal. App. LEXIS 1587, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duze-v-ace-tractor-equipment-co-calctapp-1959.