Duvoisin v. Anderson (In Re Southern Industrial Banking Corp.)

92 B.R. 297, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1669, 18 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 451, 1988 WL 108730
United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Tennessee·Decided October 14, 1988·No. Adv. 3-83-00372·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

GEORGE C. PAINE, II, Chief Judge.

The question presented is whether investors can shield withdrawals from Southern Industrial Banking Corporation (“SIBC”) made 90 days before bankruptcy with the ordinary course of business exception in § 547(c)(2).

The following constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bankr.R. 7052. This is a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F).

FACTS

SIBC, one of several interdependent financial institutions controlled by “Jake” and C.H. Butcher, was an industrial loan and thrift company which accepted the investments of their customers and in return issued debt instruments in various forms such as investment certificates, passbook accounts, thrift certificates, etc. See DuVoisin v. Anderson (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.), 59 B.R. 978 (E.D. Tenn.1986). 1 SIBC induced hundreds if not thousands of individuals, many of whom were retired and on fixed incomes, to invest their savings in these debt instruments.

The Butchers treated SIBC as their private fiefdom. The testimony of James E. Steiner, the president of SIBC, demonstrated the extent to which the Butchers controlled the operation. 2 Although Steiner was the chief operating officer of SIBC, he could not approve “other loans” which he described as those in excess of $50,000. The Butchers and their accountant, David Crabtree, made these decisions and Steiner then issued the checks and filled out the forms, a most unusual task for the president and chief operating officer of a large financial institution. The Butchers ladled out $31,000,000 in “other loans” to themselves, their companies, their family, their friends, their business associates, politicians and, of course, a loyal employee such as Steiner.

The financial empire of the Butchers was well into its collapse in February of 1983. In approximately the first week of February,. the State Commissioner of Insurance contacted Steiner and ordered him to stop issuing new investment certificates and to discontinue their advertisements inducing additional investors to do business with SIBC. Further evidence of the collapse was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) coordinated examinations in 1982 of all Butcher related financial institutions. The FDIC ultimately focused on United American Bank (“UAB”) in the week prior to February 14, 1983 for the purpose of selling or closing UAB.

While officers and employees of SIBC were aware of the financial problems of UAB by early Monday, February 14, most of the general public probably learned for the first time of the seriousness of UAB’s problems when it failed to open that day. Knowledge of this failure panicked SIBC *300 investors who spent most of the week beginning Monday, February 14, 1983 withdrawing or attempting to withdraw their investments from SIBC. In the nine week period from December 10,1982 until February 11, 1983, approximately $7,521,000 in investments was withdrawn. In the five days from February 14 until February 18 investors withdrew more than twice that amount, approximately $15,619,000.

SIBC attempted to prepare for this onslaught. Steiner was contacted on Sunday, February 13 at 4:00 a.m. for a meeting at 6:00 a.m., and he stayed at his office most of that Sunday. On Monday, February 14 at 6:00 a.m., Steiner had another meeting with SIBC investment counselors and branch managers to inform them how to deal with the anticipated run.

At one branch it was decided that only two investment counselors would deal with investors and the other two would be hidden in a back room. The two dealing with the investors were told to slow down the process of withdrawals as much as possible.

That Monday, numerous people were in the parking lots of the branches. James Travis, the manager at the West Town Branch and supervisor of three other branches, described the scene as one of commotion. At one point Steiner ran out of his office at that branch after hearing a loud noise thinking Travis had been shot by an irate investor. On Tuesday and Wednesday, February 15 and 16, SIBC’s bank accounts ran out of cash and investors were receiving bad checks. Travis described Wednesday as chaotic. That day when he opened the door to customers, the parking lot was full and hecklers were yelling at him. On Thursday morning, Travis didn’t know what bank on which to write checks and the investment counselors would not go out to deal with the investors until they had proof of money in a bank on which SIBC could write checks.

Roy Nichols, an assistant vice-president and supervisor of another four branches, described a similar picture. He attended the Monday morning meeting and then said business was different from then on. He testified their day-to-day concern was just keeping SIBC alive and things were definitely out of the ordinary. According to him, every branch was experiencing runs and every branch had a bad check problem.

Some SIBC investors were able to withdraw their investments during this run period. Others were not so fortunate and lost their life savings. They continue to wait for a dividend from the reorganization of SIBC. '

One example of the investor who received nothing was Hoyle McNeil, a retired businessman and former city councilman and vice-mayor of Knoxville. McNeil had a $20,000 certificate of indebtedness for a term of six months which he had invested in October of 1982. During the week of the run, probably Wednesday, he went to his branch. He was told the accounts were frozen and that he could not get his investment back even with the usual and ordinary penalty. McNeil has lost his total investment in SIBC unless the trustee succeeds at avoiding preferences and other transfers in order to equitably distribute the assets and losses in the SIBC reorganization.

Another such honest but unfortunate investor was Thomas R. Howell who had worked at the Knoxville Utilities Board for 33 years. He chose to invest his hard earned savings in three certificates of investment in November of 1982 and January of 1983. The certificates totalled over $48,-000. Howell went to his branch on Tuesday, February 15 after hearing that UAB had failed. He was told he couldn’t redeem his certificates because they had not matured. This was extraordinary since SIBC had always allowed early redemption. He, like all other investors, had been told he could get his investment back at any time with an interest penalty. As with McNeil, Howell also has lost his savings except to the extent that he receives a distribution from the reorganization.

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Duvoisin v. Anderson (In Re Southern Industrial Banking Corp.), 92 B.R. 297, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1669, 18 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 451, 1988 WL 108730 (Tenn. 1988).

92 B.R. 297 (Duvoisin v. Anderson (In Re Southern Industrial Banking Corp.)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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