Dutchover v. Moapa Band of Paiute Indians

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: May 3, 2021
• Docket: 2:19-cv-01905
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 EDDIE DUTCHOVER, Case No. 2:19-cv-01905-KJD-BNW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v.

10 MOAPA BAND OF PAIUTE INDIANS, et al.,

11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF #28). Plaintiff filed a response 13 in opposition (ECF #37) to which Defendants replied (ECF #42). 14 I. Factual and Procedural Background 15 Plaintiff Eddie Dutchover (“Dutchover”) filed this action against Defendant Moapa Band 16 of Paiute Indians (“the Tribe”), eight individual Tribe members, the Moapa Tribal Council, and 17 Moapa Tribal Enterprises. (ECF #8, at 1). Dutchover was employed as a police officer with the 18 Moapa Tribal Police Department for almost seven years. Id. at 3. Dutchover describes the work 19 environment as hostile because of the way the Tribe members treated him as a 20 Caucasian/Hispanic man. Id. at 5. Some of the Tribe members referred to Dutchover as “white 21 cop,” “cracker,” and “tribal cop killer.” Id. at 4. Others, including members of the Moapa Tribal 22 Council, indicated to Dutchover a preference to “fire all the white people and hire only 23 native/Indian people.” Id. at 8. The same Tribe members have referred to Dutchover as “wonder 24 bread,” “whitey,” and “HICU” which is a Paiute word for “white people.” Id. Additional 25 harassment included threats to fire Dutchover, refusing to give Dutchover a portion of a 26 settlement the Tribe had received, requesting that Dutchover not give citations to friends or he 27 would be fired, not including Dutchover in pay raises for general store employees, and reminders 28 that Dutchover had killed a Tribe member in an officer-involved shooting for which Dutchover 1 was deemed to use appropriate force in self-defense. Id. at 4–19. 2 Dutchover originally filed this suit without the assistance of counsel. (ECF #1). He has 3 since obtained counsel and filed an amended complaint. (ECF #8). The complaint lists seven 4 causes of action. Id. at 19–26. First is a violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17, 5 alleged against all defendants. Id. at 20. Second, retaliation under federal law, 42 U.S.C. 6 § 2000e-3, alleged against all defendants. Id. at 20–21. Third, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 7 Equal Protection, alleged against all defendants. Id. at 21–22. Fourth, violation of the Civil 8 Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleged against all defendants. Id. at 22. Fifth, civil 9 conspiracy, alleged against all defendants. Id. at 23. Sixth, intentional/negligent infliction of 10 emotional distress, alleged against all defendants. Id. at 24. Finally, negligent hiring/retention, 11 alleged against all defendants. Id. at 25. 12 Dutchover’s service of process was difficult due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF #37, 13 at 2). The reservation was closed to all except members of the Tribe so Dutchover’s process 14 server could not enter the reservation. Id. Dutchover was granted four extensions of time for 15 service and eventually served one person with the summonses and copies of the complaints for 16 all the defendants. (ECF #28, at 4). Laura Perry (“Perry”), Chairwoman of the Moapa Business 17 Council, which is the governing body of the Tribe, was approached at a restaurant off the 18 reservation. Id. The process server approached Perry, confirmed her identity, and left ten 19 unsealed envelopes on a stool next to her. Id. Two of the envelopes bore no name or address, 20 while the other eight were addressed to the individual defendants named in the complaint. Id. 21 The summonses were then returned as executed, with the box checked indicating that Laura 22 Perry was authorized to “accept service of process on behalf of” another party. (ECF #34). In the 23 blank portion of the summonses where the party must fill out the name of the party for whom the 24 individual is authorized to accept service, the process server wrote “Chairwoman of Moapa Band 25 of Paiutes Tribe.” Id. This motion to dismiss then followed. 26 II. Legal Standard 27 Under Rule 8, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 28 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint does not require 1 “detailed factual allegations,” but “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 2 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 3 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 4 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 5 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). All “[f]actual 6 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 7 U.S. at 555. While the court “must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we 8 ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 9 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “When the claims in a complaint have not 10 crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed.” Hendon v. 11 Geico Ins. Agency, 377 F.Supp.3d 1194, 1196 (D. Nev. 2019). 12 When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to serve, “courts must determine 13 whether good cause for the delay has been shown on a case by case [sic] basis.” In re Sheehan, 14 253 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). District courts “must extend time for service upon a showing 15 of good cause.” Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs may be 16 required “to show the following factors in order to bring the excuse to the level of good cause: 17 ‘(a) the party to be served received actual notice of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would suffer no 18 prejudice; and (c) plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his complaint were dismissed.’” Id. 19 (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991)). In the absence of a showing of 20 good cause, “the district court may extend time for service upon a showing of excusable 21 neglect.” Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1198. 22 III. Analysis 23 A. Sovereign Immunity 24 Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity and before this action may proceed to the merits, 25 the Court must determine whether immunity exists. Whether a party has waived its sovereign 26 immunity is “a question of subject matter jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 27 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). “The Supreme Court has characterized [sovereign] immunity as ‘a 28 necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance,’ and we employ a ‘strong 1 presumption against [its] waiver.’” Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 832 F.3d 2 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Courts have found that there are “only 3 two ways in which a tribe may lose its immunity from suit. Congress may abrogate tribal 4 immunity . . . [o]r . . . a tribe may itself waive immunity.” Id. “A tribe’s sovereign immunity is a 5 powerful protection from suit, but it is not impenetrable and may be surrendered.” Quinault 6 Indian Nation v. Pearson for Estate of Comenout, 868 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2017). It is well 7 “settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 8 expressed.’” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 438 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v. 9 Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)). 10 Dutchover does not argue that Congress has abrogated the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. 11 Instead, he argues that the Tribe waived its sovereign immunity by “entering into a federal 12 contract and by enacting, promoting, and adhering to federal law, including Title VII.” (ECF 13 #37, at 8). According to Dutchover, the Tribe funded his employment with a federal grant. 14 Dutchover admits that this, by itself, did not make him an employee with federal employment 15 protection as defined in Title VII or constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. Dutchover asks 16 the Court to also consider the Tribe’s training and policies offering protections similar to those 17 offered by Title VII. One such anti-discrimination training was presented by an employee of the 18 federal government. However, Dutchover has not cited a single case in which a court has ruled 19 that similar behaviors constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Tribe argues that a 20 waiver of sovereign immunity must be express and cannot be implied by such behaviors and the 21 Court agrees. 22 A waiver of tribal sovereign immunity must “manifest the tribe’s intent to surrender 23 immunity in ‘clear’ and unmistakable terms.” Bodi, 832 F.3d at 1016 (internal quotations in 24 original). The Tribe has made no such manifestation. The Ninth Circuit has held that a tribe does 25 not waive sovereign immunity by entering into an agreement with a government agency where 26 the agreement did not explicitly waive the immunity. Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 27 1075, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013). The agreement in Maxwell was between a tribe’s fire department and 28 a local fire department and did not explicitly waive immunity, even though it stated that the tribe 1 would have “the same immunity from liability for civil damages . . . as is provided by law for the 2 district and its employees.” Id. That language was not explicit enough to waive sovereign 3 immunity, especially when other portions of the agreement retained immunity. Id. Just because 4 the Tribe has workplace discrimination policies similar to those found in Title VII and a 5 government employee presented a training on the matter, does not mean that the Tribe intended 6 to waive its sovereign immunity. That is not an explicit or unequivocal expression of a waiver. 7 B. Section 1983 Claims 8 Dutchover’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed against the Tribe because the Tribe has not 9 waived immunity. Additionally, “actions under section 1983 cannot be maintained in federal 10 court for persons alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.” Evans 11 v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1989). “The traditional definition of acting under color 12 of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by 13 virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of 14 state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 15 299, 326 (1941)). Generally, “a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his 16 official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id. at 50. None of 17 the defendants were state employees. None of the defendants exercised any power or authority 18 granted to them pursuant to state law. Instead, it was tribal law that gave Defendants authority. 19 Therefore, Dutchover has failed to state a § 1983 claim against any of the defendants because 20 they were not acting under color of state law. 21 C. Section 1981 Claims 22 The Tribe argues that Dutchover’s § 1981 claims must be dismissed because they are 23 merely veiled claims for disparate treatment in the employment setting and tribes are exempt 24 from Title VII. Such claims against a Tribe are not permitted. “It would be wholly illogical to 25 allow plaintiffs to circumvent the Title VII bar against race discrimination claims based on a 26 tribe’s Indian employment preference programs simply by allowing a plaintiff to style his claims 27 as § 1981 suit.” Taylor v. Ala. Intertribal Council Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th 28 Cir. 2001). As such, in addition to being dismissed due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, 1 Dutchover’s § 1981 claims against the Tribe or any of the individuals acting in their official 2 capacity are dismissed. 3 However, § 1981 claims may be pursued against individuals who are not acting in their 4 official capacity. Allen v. Mayhew, No. CIV S-04-0322-LKK-CMK, 2008 WL 697628, at *2 5 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 14, 2008) (“These claims are based on alleged wrongdoing of the individual, not 6 the actions of the tribe. . . Here, plaintiff alleges specific actions on the part of certain defendants 7 which, regardless of the actions of the casino or tribe, state a claim under § 1981.”). Dutchover’s 8 complaint is vague and alleges § 1981 violations against all defendants. It does not state if the 9 defendants are named in the cause of action in their official or individual capacities. While it is 10 vague, the complaint does allege facts that some of the individual defendants, not acting in their 11 official capacity with the Tribe, violated § 1981 and the claims against the individuals are not 12 dismissed for that reason. However, as discussed infra, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 13 the individual defendants, and for that reason the § 1981 claims against the individual defendants 14 are dismissed. 15 D. Title VII Claims 16 In addition to being dismissed due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, Dutchover’s Title 17 VII claims are also dismissed because Title VII “specifically exempts Indian tribes from its 18 coverage.” E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 Because the Tribe is exempt from Title VII claims, Dutchover’s claims for Title VII violations 20 and retaliation against the Tribe are dismissed. The Title VII claims against the individuals are 21 also dismissed because Title VII “limit[s] civil liability to the employer.” Miller v. Maxwell 22 Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). Dutchover’s complaint requests back pay for the 23 Title VII claims which are alleged against all defendants and “individuals cannot be held liable 24 for back pay.” Id. All civil liability under Title VII is limited to employers and the Title VII 25 claims against the individuals are dismissed. 26 E. Corporate Arm of Tribe 27 Dutchover argues that there is a corporate entity created by the Tribe that runs the police 28 department, is the actual employer, and does not enjoy sovereign immunity. The Tribe argues 1 that there is no corporate entity that runs the police department, but if there were, it would be an 2 arm of the Tribe and enjoy sovereign immunity. The Court agrees. 3 To determine if an entity is an arm of a tribe that enjoys sovereign immunity, courts look 4 at certain factors. Specifically, courts consider (1) the method of creation of the economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their 5 structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of control the tribe 6 has over the entities; (4) the tribe’s intent with respect to the sharing of its sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and the 7 entities. 8 White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014). In a motion to dismiss the Court 9 must accept as true all facts pleaded in the complaint. While the Tribe states that there is no 10 corporate entity that manages business or police relations, the complaint states that there is. If 11 there is, it enjoys sovereign immunity. Operating the police department is an essential function of 12 government and “core to the notion of sovereignty.” Id. Additionally, “preservation of tribal 13 cultural autonomy [and] preservation of tribal self-determination,’ are some of the central 14 policies underlying the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.” Id. (quoting Breakthrough Mgmt. 15 Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010)). There 16 is no indication that the Tribe intended to create a corporate entity to run the police department 17 that would not share the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. Many of the defendants sit on the Tribe’s 18 governing board, indicating that the Tribe has involvement and control over any such corporate 19 entity. As such, whatever corporation may exist to manage the police department would be an 20 arm of the Tribe that enjoys sovereign immunity. None of the parties have waived sovereign 21 immunity and the claims against the Tribe and the corporate entity that Dutchover alleges 22 controls the police department are dismissed. 23 F. Individual Defendants 24 While many of the claims against the individual defendants are dismissed for substantive 25 reasons, the claims against the individual defendants must also be dismissed for procedural 26 deficiencies. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants due to 27 insufficient service. Rule 4(e) lays out how an individual may be served. It states that a party 28 may be served by 1 (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place 2 of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) 3 delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. 4 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). Dutchover delivered the summonses and copies of the complaint for all the 5 defendants on Perry, a single defendant. He did not deliver a copy to the individual defendants 6 personally, did not leave a copy at the individuals’ residences, and has not provided any reason 7 why Perry, the Chairwoman of the Tribe’s governing body, is authorized to accept service for the 8 individuals. Dutchover merely states that Perry is authorized to accept service for the Tribe, not 9 the individuals. “A federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the 10 defendant has been served in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.” Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 11 492 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the claims against the individual defendants are dismissed for 12 lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service. While the Court recognizes the added 13 difficulty in serving the defendants while the reservation was closed due to COVID-19, 14 Dutchover did not make any attempts to request permission from the Court for alternate methods 15 of service. The magistrate judge encouraged Dutchover to consider whether alternative methods 16 of service might have been helpful. Instead of filing a motion for alternative service, Dutchover 17 delivered service to Perry for all the defendants. Additionally, Dutchover did not make any 18 attempt to serve the defendant who does not live on the reservation and was not limited by the 19 COVID-19 closure. Dutchover showed diligence in his attempts to serve originally but has not 20 shown here that good cause or excusable neglect warrant another extension of time to effectuate 21 service. Instead of requesting an alternative method of service, Dutchover merely improperly 22 served one defendant on behalf of all the defendants. As such, the claims against the individual 23 defendants are dismissed and an extension of time to serve the individual defendants is not 24 warranted. 25 G. State Law Claims 26 The Tribe, including any corporate arm of the Tribe, has not waived its sovereign 27 immunity and the claims against it are dismissed. The claims against the individuals are 28 dismissed as well for lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of sufficient service. Absent the federal claims, the Court no longer has original jurisdiction and only exercises supplemental 2 | jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when the only federal claims are extinguished. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Az., Inc., 715 F.3d 5 | 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 6 | over the state law claims and the remaining claims for civil conspiracy, intentional/negligent 7 | infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring/retention are dismissed. 8 TV. Conclusion 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF #28) 10| isGRANTED. 11 | Dated this 3rd day of May, 2021. 12 Kent J. Dawson 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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