Dutchess County Department of Social Services v. Day

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Dutchess County Department of Social Services v. Day

269 A.D.2d 595, 703 N.Y.S.2d 269, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2114

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 28, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 269 A.D.2d 595 (Dutchess County Department of Social Services v. Day) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dutchess County Department of Social Services v. Day, 269 A.D.2d 595, 703 N.Y.S.2d 269, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2114 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In two related support proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Amodeo, J.), dated October 27, 1998, which denied its objections to two orders of the same court (Furman, H.E.), dated August 7, 1998, and August 17, 1998, respectively, which, inter alia, directed the respondent Mary Ann Day to pay only $625 and the respondent Richard Day to pay only $3,750 as reimbursement to the petitioner for money it expended on behalf of the respondents’ minor child while she was in residential care.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner commenced two proceedings, one as to each respondent, seeking reimbursement from them for money it expended on behalf of their minor child while she was in residential care for approximately 25 weeks. After a hearing, the Hearing Examiner determined that for several stated reasons she would deviate from the respondents’ support obligations as [596]*596calculated under the Child Support Standards Act (Family Ct Act § 413). The petitioner’s objections to the Hearing Examiner’s determinations were denied.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Family Court properly found that Family Court Act § 415, rather than § 413, applies to this case (see, Matter of Parker v Stage, 43 NY2d 128, 133-134; Matter of Livingston County Dept. of Social Servs. [Culhane] v Karlsons, 249 AD2d 967). Family Court Act § 415 provides, in pertinent part, that “the spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof * * * if of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person * * * [i]n its discretion, the court may require any such person to contribute a fair and reasonable sum for the support of such relative and may apportion the costs of such support among such persons as may be just and appropriate in view of the needs of the petitioner and the other circumstances of the case and their respective means” (emphasis added). As the petitioner concedes, “public assistance” includes residential and foster care. Under the circumstances of this case, the amount awarded by the Family Court was “just and appropriate” (Family Ct Act § 415).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

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—In two related support proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Amodeo, J.), dated October 27, 1998, which denied its objections to two orders of the same court (Furman, H.E.), dated August 7, 1998, and August 17, 1998, respectively, which, inter alia, directed the respondent Mary Ann Day to pay only $625 and the respondent Richard Day to pay only $3,750 as reimbursement to the petitioner for money it expended on behalf of the respondents’ minor child while she was in residential care.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner commenced two proceedings, one as to each respondent, seeking reimbursement from them for money it expended on behalf of their minor child while she was in residential care for approximately 25 weeks. After a hearing, the Hearing Examiner determined that for several stated reasons she would deviate from the respondents’ support obligations as [596]*596calculated under the Child Support Standards Act (Family Ct Act § 413). The petitioner’s objections to the Hearing Examiner’s determinations were denied.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Family Court properly found that Family Court Act § 415, rather than § 413, applies to this case (see, Matter of Parker v Stage, 43 NY2d 128, 133-134; Matter of Livingston County Dept. of Social Servs. [Culhane] v Karlsons, 249 AD2d 967). Family Court Act § 415 provides, in pertinent part, that “the spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof * * * if of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person * * * [i]n its discretion, the court may require any such person to contribute a fair and reasonable sum for the support of such relative and may apportion the costs of such support among such persons as may be just and appropriate in view of the needs of the petitioner and the other circumstances of the case and their respective means” (emphasis added). As the petitioner concedes, “public assistance” includes residential and foster care. Under the circumstances of this case, the amount awarded by the Family Court was “just and appropriate” (Family Ct Act § 415).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

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269 A.D.2d 595, 703 N.Y.S.2d 269, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2114, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dutchess-county-department-of-social-services-v-day-nyappdiv-2000.

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