Dusty Michelle Woolley v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

D. Arizona

Dusty Michelle Woolley v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

DecidedNovember 5, 2025

Docket2:22-cv-00546

StatusUnknown

This text of Dusty Michelle Woolley v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Dusty Michelle Woolley v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dusty Michelle Woolley v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (D. Ariz. 2025).

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Dusty Michelle Woolley, No. CV-22-00546-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Dusty Michelle Woolley (“Plaintiff”) has filed a motion for attorney fees 16 under Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). In Plaintiff’s first 17 Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 24), Plaintiff, through counsel, seeks an 18 award of $8,626.91 in total attorney fees. The Commissioner states that Plaintiff’s 19 counsel is the real party-in-interest, but that he neither supports nor opposes counsel’s 20 request for attorney fees. (Doc. 26 at 2). The Court will grant Plaintiff’s counsel her 21 requested fees. 22 Section 4061 establishes “the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for successful 23 representation of Social Security benefits claimants.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 24 789, 795–96 (2002). “The statute deals with the administrative and judicial review stages 25 discretely: [Section] 406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; 26 [Section] 406(b) controls fees for representation in court.” Id. at 794. Section 406(b) 27 provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who 28 1 Unless where otherwise noted, all Section references are to the Social Security Act. 1 was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as 2 part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 3 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 4 judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Fees are payable out of, and not in addition to, the 5 amount of a claimant’s past-due benefits. Id. 6 Before awarding fees, the Court must consider whether the 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) fee 7 requested is (1) within the statutory guidelines; (2) consistent with the fee agreement; and 8 (3) reasonable in light of the contingent-fee agreement. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807– 9 08. Additionally, courts will require plaintiff’s counsel to refund to the plaintiff the lesser 10 of the fees awarded under Section 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 11 2412 (“EAJA”). See Parrish v. Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *2 n.3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 12 2008) (“When EAJA fees are paid and there is also an award of attorney fees under 13 406(b), a plaintiff’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee. 14 There is thus a dollar-for-dollar offset of any 406(b) fee by an EAJA award.”) (internal 15 quotation and citation omitted); Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215 16 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Where the same attorney represented a claimant at each stage of judicial 17 review, the court need merely offset all EAJA awards against the § 406(b) award.”). 18 Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks a total fee award of $8,626.91 for 25% of Plaintiff’s past- 19 due benefits—which the parties agreed to as a contingency fee. (Doc. 25 at 5). Plaintiff 20 sought judicial review for the denial of her Supplemental Security Income benefits (Doc. 21 1) and the Court reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and 22 remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. (Id. at 2). On 23 remand, Plaintiff was awarded benefits and paid $34,507.64 in total back-pay benefits, 24 paid out over the course of three installments, six months apart. (Doc. 25-1 at 5). 25 Plaintiff’s counsel was also previously awarded $6,850.00 in fees under the EAJA. (Doc. 26 23). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion and Memorandum in support of the Motion 27 (Docs. 24 & 25), the Court finds that the time expended, and amounts charged by 28 counsel, are reasonable for this case. 1 First, Plaintiff’s request for fees does not exceed twenty-five percent of the total 2 past-due benefits obtained by Plaintiff. (Doc. 25-2 at 2). Plaintiff was awarded 3 retroactive benefits in the amount of $34,507.64, but twenty-five percent of that benefit 4 award was withheld for attorney fees. (Id.) The amount that Plaintiff pursues for 5 attorney fees—$8,626.91—is exactly 25%2 as statutorily required. See Gisbrecht, 535 6 U.S. at 807–08. 7 Second, the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and her counsel stated that 8 Plaintiff’s counsel would receive twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded to 9 Plaintiff because of counsel’s representation. (Doc. 25-3 at 2). This means that 10 Plaintiff’s request is consistent with the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and counsel 11 and that it mirrors the requirements of Section 406(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 12 Finally, Plaintiff’s total fee request is reasonable considering the contingent fee 13 agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted an itemization of services that represents that 14 she spent a total of 29.4 hours laboring on this matter. (Doc. 25-4 at 1–3). The attached 15 Itemization of Services illustrates that Plaintiff’s counsel has been representing Plaintiff 16 since March 31, 2022. (Id. at 2). Her work has included reviewing the unfavorable 17 decision of the ALJ, reviewing Orders set out by the Court, as well as reviewing medical 18 opinions and transcript testimony. (Id.) Other work performed by counsel accords with 19 the work normally performed by attorneys on these cases like drafting legal arguments on 20 why the ALJ’s decision was improper, countering the responding brief, and researching 21 and crafting arguments in Plaintiff’s favor. (Id. at 3). 22 If Plaintiff’s counsel was paid hourly for the work she did in this matter, she 23 would receive a fee equivalent to $293.43 per hour for the 29.4 hours of related work she 24 performed.3 Having considered the reasonableness factors set forth in Giesbrecht, the 25 Court concludes that this amount is a reasonable rate. 535 U.S. at 808; see also Parrish 26 v. Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2008) (“This Court finds counsel’s

27 2 Twenty-five percent of $34,507.64 is $8,626.91 (0.25 x 34,507.64).

28 3 Dividing the request amount of attorney fees, $8,626.91, by 29.4 (the amount of work hours committed to representing Plaintiff) yields a total hourly rate of $293.43. 1 || requested attorney’s fees in the total amount of $37,254.30 for 34.5 hours of work, which 2|| calculates to an overall effective rate of $1079.83 per hour, are reasonable in light of the 3|| legal standards set forth in Gisbrecht and the facts of this case.”). The Court will 4|| therefore award $8,626.91 in attorney fees under Section 406(b), but Plaintiff's counsel 5|| must refund Plaintiff the $6,850.00 EAJA award received. (Doc. 23). See Russell v. 6|| Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The dual fee awards [under 42 U.S.C. § 7\| 406(b) and the EAJA] are proper here as long as [the plaintiff's] attorney gives the 8 || smaller of the two awards to his client to compensate [him] for his litigation costs.”). 9 Accordingly, 10 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 24) is granted.

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Dusty Michelle Woolley, No. CV-22-00546-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Dusty Michelle Woolley (“Plaintiff”) has filed a motion for attorney fees 16 under Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). In Plaintiff’s first 17 Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 24), Plaintiff, through counsel, seeks an 18 award of $8,626.91 in total attorney fees. The Commissioner states that Plaintiff’s 19 counsel is the real party-in-interest, but that he neither supports nor opposes counsel’s 20 request for attorney fees. (Doc. 26 at 2). The Court will grant Plaintiff’s counsel her 21 requested fees. 22 Section 4061 establishes “the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for successful 23 representation of Social Security benefits claimants.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 24 789, 795–96 (2002). “The statute deals with the administrative and judicial review stages 25 discretely: [Section] 406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; 26 [Section] 406(b) controls fees for representation in court.” Id. at 794. Section 406(b) 27 provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who 28 1 Unless where otherwise noted, all Section references are to the Social Security Act. 1 was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as 2 part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 3 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 4 judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Fees are payable out of, and not in addition to, the 5 amount of a claimant’s past-due benefits. Id. 6 Before awarding fees, the Court must consider whether the 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) fee 7 requested is (1) within the statutory guidelines; (2) consistent with the fee agreement; and 8 (3) reasonable in light of the contingent-fee agreement. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807– 9 08. Additionally, courts will require plaintiff’s counsel to refund to the plaintiff the lesser 10 of the fees awarded under Section 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 11 2412 (“EAJA”). See Parrish v. Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *2 n.3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 12 2008) (“When EAJA fees are paid and there is also an award of attorney fees under 13 406(b), a plaintiff’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee. 14 There is thus a dollar-for-dollar offset of any 406(b) fee by an EAJA award.”) (internal 15 quotation and citation omitted); Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215 16 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Where the same attorney represented a claimant at each stage of judicial 17 review, the court need merely offset all EAJA awards against the § 406(b) award.”). 18 Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks a total fee award of $8,626.91 for 25% of Plaintiff’s past- 19 due benefits—which the parties agreed to as a contingency fee. (Doc. 25 at 5). Plaintiff 20 sought judicial review for the denial of her Supplemental Security Income benefits (Doc. 21 1) and the Court reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and 22 remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. (Id. at 2). On 23 remand, Plaintiff was awarded benefits and paid $34,507.64 in total back-pay benefits, 24 paid out over the course of three installments, six months apart. (Doc. 25-1 at 5). 25 Plaintiff’s counsel was also previously awarded $6,850.00 in fees under the EAJA. (Doc. 26 23). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion and Memorandum in support of the Motion 27 (Docs. 24 & 25), the Court finds that the time expended, and amounts charged by 28 counsel, are reasonable for this case. 1 First, Plaintiff’s request for fees does not exceed twenty-five percent of the total 2 past-due benefits obtained by Plaintiff. (Doc. 25-2 at 2). Plaintiff was awarded 3 retroactive benefits in the amount of $34,507.64, but twenty-five percent of that benefit 4 award was withheld for attorney fees. (Id.) The amount that Plaintiff pursues for 5 attorney fees—$8,626.91—is exactly 25%2 as statutorily required. See Gisbrecht, 535 6 U.S. at 807–08. 7 Second, the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and her counsel stated that 8 Plaintiff’s counsel would receive twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded to 9 Plaintiff because of counsel’s representation. (Doc. 25-3 at 2). This means that 10 Plaintiff’s request is consistent with the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and counsel 11 and that it mirrors the requirements of Section 406(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 12 Finally, Plaintiff’s total fee request is reasonable considering the contingent fee 13 agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted an itemization of services that represents that 14 she spent a total of 29.4 hours laboring on this matter. (Doc. 25-4 at 1–3). The attached 15 Itemization of Services illustrates that Plaintiff’s counsel has been representing Plaintiff 16 since March 31, 2022. (Id. at 2). Her work has included reviewing the unfavorable 17 decision of the ALJ, reviewing Orders set out by the Court, as well as reviewing medical 18 opinions and transcript testimony. (Id.) Other work performed by counsel accords with 19 the work normally performed by attorneys on these cases like drafting legal arguments on 20 why the ALJ’s decision was improper, countering the responding brief, and researching 21 and crafting arguments in Plaintiff’s favor. (Id. at 3). 22 If Plaintiff’s counsel was paid hourly for the work she did in this matter, she 23 would receive a fee equivalent to $293.43 per hour for the 29.4 hours of related work she 24 performed.3 Having considered the reasonableness factors set forth in Giesbrecht, the 25 Court concludes that this amount is a reasonable rate. 535 U.S. at 808; see also Parrish 26 v. Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2008) (“This Court finds counsel’s

27 2 Twenty-five percent of $34,507.64 is $8,626.91 (0.25 x 34,507.64).

28 3 Dividing the request amount of attorney fees, $8,626.91, by 29.4 (the amount of work hours committed to representing Plaintiff) yields a total hourly rate of $293.43. 1 || requested attorney’s fees in the total amount of $37,254.30 for 34.5 hours of work, which 2|| calculates to an overall effective rate of $1079.83 per hour, are reasonable in light of the 3|| legal standards set forth in Gisbrecht and the facts of this case.”). The Court will 4|| therefore award $8,626.91 in attorney fees under Section 406(b), but Plaintiff's counsel 5|| must refund Plaintiff the $6,850.00 EAJA award received. (Doc. 23). See Russell v. 6|| Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The dual fee awards [under 42 U.S.C. § 7\| 406(b) and the EAJA] are proper here as long as [the plaintiff's] attorney gives the 8 || smaller of the two awards to his client to compensate [him] for his litigation costs.”). 9 Accordingly, 10 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 24) is granted. Plaintiff is awarded $8,626.91 in attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the lesser of the fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act. 15 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff's || attorney, Sarah Fern, and can be made by electronic fund transfer (EFT) or by check 17 || mailed to the following address: Larkin & Fern, PLLC, 301 E. Bethany Home Road, Ste. 18 |) C186, Phoenix, AZ 85012. 19 Dated this 5th day of November, 2025. 20

22 norable’Dian¢g4. Hurietewa 3 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28

-4-

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