Dustin Rutledge v. Resource Transportation
This text of Dustin Rutledge v. Resource Transportation (Dustin Rutledge v. Resource Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
08-1149
DUSTIN RUTLEDGE
VERSUS
RESOURCE TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 3 PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 06-08635 SAM L. LOWERY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE
MARC T. AMY JUDGE
Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Billy Howard Ezell and James T. Genovese, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Robert B. Purser Purser Law Firm Post Office 1670 Opelousas, LA 70571 (337) 948-0815 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS: National Loss Control Management, Inc. Resource Transportation
Christopher C. McCall Baggett, McCall, Burgess, Watson & Gaughan Post Office Drawer 7820 Lake Charles, LA 70606-7820 (337) 478-8888 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Dustin Rutledge AMY, Judge.
The workers’ compensation judge awarded penalties and attorney fees to the
claimant for the employer’s failure to approve medical treatment and pay certain
medical bills. The employer appeals, contending that the judge erred in assessing
penalties and attorney fees and in failing to specify for which expenses and treatments
the penalties and attorney fees were assessed. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
The record indicates that on July 8, 2004, the claimant, Dustin Rutledge, while
in the course and scope of his employment with Resource Transportation, was injured
when lightning struck in the area surrounding him. The claimant is receiving
indemnity benefits; accordingly, this litigation does not involve the payment of such
benefits. On December 14, 2006, the claimant filed a disputed claim for
compensation, seeking penalties and attorney fees for the employer’s failure to
authorize treatment and failure to pay medical expenses. The parties do not dispute
that on July 24, 2007, they reached an agreement wherein the employer/insurer agreed
to pay for and/or approve specified medical treatment. The record reveals that the
payments and authorizations were still not made three months after the settlement was
reached; accordingly, the claimant filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement and
sought sanctions. After a hearing, the workers’ compensation judge entered a
judgment on December 18, 2007, ordering the employer/insurer to authorize all
unauthorized medical treatment and pay for all medical services outlined in the July
24, 2007 agreement. A second hearing resulted in an order allowing the claimant to
see Dr. Soileau. Finally, after a third hearing was conducted, the workers’
compensation judge ordered that the employer pay penalties in the amount of
$8,000.00 and attorney fees in the amount of $6,250.00. The employer/insurer appeals, assigning as error the workers’ compensation judge’s assessment of penalties
and attorney fees due to its assertion that the nonpayment was beyond its control. It
also questions the failure to “identify specific expenses and treatment for which
penalties and attorney fees were being awarded.”
Discussion
“The applicable standard of review in determining whether a defendant should
be cast with penalties and attorney fees is the manifest error-clearly wrong standard.”
Bennett v. Pilgrim’s Pride, 07-753, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/07), 972 So.2d 423,
429, writ denied, 08-103 (La. 3/7/08), 977 So.2d 907. Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1201(E) and (F)(2) provide:
E. Medical benefits payable under this Chapter shall be paid within sixty days after the employer or insurer receives written notice thereof.
F. Failure to provide payment in accordance with this Section or failure to consent to the employee’s request to select a treating physician or change physicians when such consent is required by R.S. 23:1121 shall result in the assessment of a penalty in an amount up to the greater of twelve percent of any unpaid compensation or medical benefits, or fifty dollars per calendar day for each day in which any and all compensation or medical benefits remain unpaid or such consent is withheld, together with reasonable attorney fees for each disputed claim; however, the fifty dollars per calendar day penalty shall not exceed a maximum of two thousand dollars in the aggregate for any claim. The maximum amount of penalties which may be imposed at a hearing on the merits regardless of the number of penalties which might be imposed under this Section is eight thousand dollars. An award of penalties and attorney fees at any hearing on the merits shall be res judicata as to any and all claims for which penalties may be imposed under this Section which precedes the date of the hearing. Penalties shall be assessed in the following manner:
....
(2) This Subsection shall not apply if the claim is reasonably controverted or if such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or insurer had no control.
2 The supreme court in Williams v. Rush Masonry, Inc., 98-2271, p. 8 (La. 6/29/99),
737 So.2d 41, 46, stated, “Awards of penalties and attorney’s fees in workers’
compensation are essentially penal in nature, being imposed to discourage
indifference and undesirable conduct by employers and insurers.”
The employer/insurer essentially argues that any nonpayment on its part
resulted from conditions over which it had no control; it asserts that the compensation
insurer, having strict billing procedures, could not submit the bills for payment
without receiving the correct referencing codes and corresponding medical reports
from the medical providers. In support of this contention, the employer/insurer points
to the correspondence it sent to each of the claimant’s medical providers, requesting
that the bills be resubmitted with the correct codes and reports. Because no codes or
reports were received, the bills were not paid. At first glance, these procedural issues
may appear to be “conditions over which the employer or insurer had no control”;
however, the record indicates that the letters to the medical providers were not sent
until January 7, 2008—a date that exceeded the sixty days for which the statute
allows and a date that followed the judgment which ordered the enforcement of the
agreement. Sending the correspondence at such a late date fits the description of
“indifference and undesirable conduct” that the Williams court sought to discourage.
Id.
Further, both parties acknowledged that a settlement was reached wherein the
employer/insurer agreed to pay the medical expenses outlined in the letter sent by the
claimant’s attorney on July 24, 2007. The record reveals that the claimant’s attorney
made numerous attempts after the letter was sent to contact the employer/insurer in
order to provide them with an opportunity to uphold the settlement and avoid the
3 assessment of penalties and attorney fees. With the expenses remaining unpaid and
the treatment remaining unauthorized as of March 3, 2008, the workers’
compensation judge did not err in imposing penalties and attorney fees for the
unreasonable delay. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
The employer/insurer also contends that the workers’ compensation judge erred
by not identifying which expenses and treatments the penalties and attorney fees
concerned. It urges that the nonspecificity of the ruling could lead to the claimant
later seeking more penalties and attorney fees for nonpayment of expenses that may
have already been accounted for in the judgment. Because a written settlement letter
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Dustin Rutledge v. Resource Transportation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dustin-rutledge-v-resource-transportation-lactapp-2009.