In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00386-CR
DUSTIN LEE JONES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 181st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 33344B, Honorable Titiana Frausto, Presiding
May 19, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Pending before this Court is a motion to withdraw supported by a brief filed
pursuant to Anders v. California.1 In December 2023, in exchange for a plea of guilty to
the charge of continuous violence against the family,2 Appellant, Dustin Lee Jones, was
placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of three years. His
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
2 TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.11. community supervision was subject to certain terms and conditions. The State filed a
motion to proceed to adjudication. At the hearing on the motion, Appellant pleaded not
true to each of the State’s allegations. The trial court found all the allegations true,
revoked community supervision, adjudicated Appellant guilty of the original offense, and
assessed a sentence of ten years of imprisonment.
In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a
conscientious examination of the record, and in his opinion, it reflects no potentially
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling
authorities, the records support that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated he has complied with the
requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief and
records to Appellant, (2) notifying him of the right to file a pro se response if he desired to
do so, and (3) informing him of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review.
In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.3 By letter, this Court granted Appellant an opportunity
to exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should he be so inclined. Id. at
3 Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary
review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Id. at 408 n.22, 411. The duty to send the client a copy of this Court’s decision is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33.
2 409 n.23. Appellant filed a response raising several issues. The State did not favor us
with a brief.
ANALYSIS
By this Anders appeal, counsel evaluates Appellant’s original guilty plea and the
subsequent proceedings. He candidly concedes there are no reversible issues on which
to pursue this appeal.
We too have independently examined the record to determine whether there are
any non-frivolous issues which might support this appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have found no such
issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After
reviewing the record, counsel’s brief, and Appellant’s response, we agree there is no
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d
824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
REFORMATION OF BILL OF COSTS
In accordance with Phea v. State, No. 07-24-00311-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS
1175 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 25, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication), counsel asks this Court to reform the judgment to delete the assessed $15
time-payment fee and “any provision” for attorney’s fees.
3 Time-Payment Fee
In Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), the Court held that
the pendency of an appeal stops the clock for purposes of the time-payment fee. A time-
payment fee assessed before appellate mandate issues is premature and should be
stricken in its entirety, without prejudice to refiling should such fee become ripe. Id. Thus,
we delete the $15 time-payment fee assessed against Appellant.
Attorney’s Fees
The record shows Appellant was assessed $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees when he
was placed on deferred adjudication in December 2023. The Bill of Costs generated on
December 18, 2023, reflects that assessment. Appellant agreed to pay those attorney’s
fees as part of his plea agreement. A challenge to the originally imposed attorney’s fees
at this juncture is untimely. Fincher v. State, Nos. 07-25-00039-CR, 07-25-00040-CR,
2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 4978, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 15, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Tunstall v. State, Nos. 07-24-000269-CR, 07-24-
00270-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8560, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 10, 2024, no.
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
However, the Bill of Costs generated following Appellant’s adjudication of guilt
includes an assessment of $3,090.00 of attorney’s fees. A trial court errs if it orders
reimbursement of court-appointed attorney’s fees without record evidence demonstrating
a defendant’s financial resources to offset the costs of legal services. Mayer v. State,
309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). There is nothing in the record to show the
trial court found Appellant had the present ability to pay as required by article 26.05(g) of
4 the Code of Criminal Procedure.4 See Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013) (“Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.05(g) requires a present
determination of financial resources and does not allow speculation about possible future
resources.”); Jones v. State, No. 12-25-00217-CR, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 911, at *3–4
(Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[i]f
the record does not demonstrate a material change in the defendant’s financial
circumstances, there is no basis for ordering reimbursement of attorney’s fees”).
Appellant is indigent, that status has not changed, and he indicated to the trial court he
did not have the present ability to pay fees. See Jackson v. State, 562 S.W.3d 717
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00386-CR
DUSTIN LEE JONES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 181st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 33344B, Honorable Titiana Frausto, Presiding
May 19, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Pending before this Court is a motion to withdraw supported by a brief filed
pursuant to Anders v. California.1 In December 2023, in exchange for a plea of guilty to
the charge of continuous violence against the family,2 Appellant, Dustin Lee Jones, was
placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of three years. His
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
2 TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.11. community supervision was subject to certain terms and conditions. The State filed a
motion to proceed to adjudication. At the hearing on the motion, Appellant pleaded not
true to each of the State’s allegations. The trial court found all the allegations true,
revoked community supervision, adjudicated Appellant guilty of the original offense, and
assessed a sentence of ten years of imprisonment.
In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a
conscientious examination of the record, and in his opinion, it reflects no potentially
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling
authorities, the records support that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated he has complied with the
requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief and
records to Appellant, (2) notifying him of the right to file a pro se response if he desired to
do so, and (3) informing him of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review.
In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.3 By letter, this Court granted Appellant an opportunity
to exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should he be so inclined. Id. at
3 Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary
review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Id. at 408 n.22, 411. The duty to send the client a copy of this Court’s decision is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33.
2 409 n.23. Appellant filed a response raising several issues. The State did not favor us
with a brief.
ANALYSIS
By this Anders appeal, counsel evaluates Appellant’s original guilty plea and the
subsequent proceedings. He candidly concedes there are no reversible issues on which
to pursue this appeal.
We too have independently examined the record to determine whether there are
any non-frivolous issues which might support this appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have found no such
issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After
reviewing the record, counsel’s brief, and Appellant’s response, we agree there is no
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d
824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
REFORMATION OF BILL OF COSTS
In accordance with Phea v. State, No. 07-24-00311-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS
1175 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 25, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication), counsel asks this Court to reform the judgment to delete the assessed $15
time-payment fee and “any provision” for attorney’s fees.
3 Time-Payment Fee
In Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), the Court held that
the pendency of an appeal stops the clock for purposes of the time-payment fee. A time-
payment fee assessed before appellate mandate issues is premature and should be
stricken in its entirety, without prejudice to refiling should such fee become ripe. Id. Thus,
we delete the $15 time-payment fee assessed against Appellant.
Attorney’s Fees
The record shows Appellant was assessed $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees when he
was placed on deferred adjudication in December 2023. The Bill of Costs generated on
December 18, 2023, reflects that assessment. Appellant agreed to pay those attorney’s
fees as part of his plea agreement. A challenge to the originally imposed attorney’s fees
at this juncture is untimely. Fincher v. State, Nos. 07-25-00039-CR, 07-25-00040-CR,
2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 4978, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 15, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Tunstall v. State, Nos. 07-24-000269-CR, 07-24-
00270-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8560, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 10, 2024, no.
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
However, the Bill of Costs generated following Appellant’s adjudication of guilt
includes an assessment of $3,090.00 of attorney’s fees. A trial court errs if it orders
reimbursement of court-appointed attorney’s fees without record evidence demonstrating
a defendant’s financial resources to offset the costs of legal services. Mayer v. State,
309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). There is nothing in the record to show the
trial court found Appellant had the present ability to pay as required by article 26.05(g) of
4 the Code of Criminal Procedure.4 See Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013) (“Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.05(g) requires a present
determination of financial resources and does not allow speculation about possible future
resources.”); Jones v. State, No. 12-25-00217-CR, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 911, at *3–4
(Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[i]f
the record does not demonstrate a material change in the defendant’s financial
circumstances, there is no basis for ordering reimbursement of attorney’s fees”).
Appellant is indigent, that status has not changed, and he indicated to the trial court he
did not have the present ability to pay fees. See Jackson v. State, 562 S.W.3d 717, 723
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, no pet.) (discussing indigency and ability to pay attorney’s
fees). Therefore, the remedy is to delete the assessment of attorney’s fees. See King v.
State, No. 07-24-00414-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 5849, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Aug. 6, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying the judgment
to delete assessed attorney’s fees because the record reflected the appellant did not have
a present ability to pay the cost of his court-appointed attorney’s fees). Accordingly, we
delete $2,090.00 of attorney’s fees assessed after the original plea of guilt. We also
remove any provision for future collection of those court-appointed attorney’s fees.
The district clerk is directed to prepare and file an Amended Bill of Costs reflecting
the modifications made herein and provide copies to this Court, Appellant, and the
4 We acknowledge the trial court asked Appellant whether he had the present ability to pay “court
costs, fees, and [the] fine and Appellant said he did not. When the court asked whether he would have the future ability to pay “court costs, fees, and [the] fine,” Appellant answered affirmatively. That inquiry pertains to costs, fees, and fines other than attorney’s fees. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. § 42.15. 5 Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This order of
reformation extends to any orders to withdraw funds from Appellant’s inmate account.
CONCLUSION
We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment as
modified.
Alex Yarbrough Justice
Do not publish.