Dustin Hoose v. United States

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 29, 2020
Docket19-15023
StatusUnpublished

This text of Dustin Hoose v. United States (Dustin Hoose v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dustin Hoose v. United States, (11th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

Case: 19-15023 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________

No. 19-15023 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________

DC Docket No. 5:18-cv-00244-MTT

DUSTIN HOOSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________

(September 29, 2020)

Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Case: 19-15023 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 2 of 7

Dustin Hoose, a delivery driver, was injured by an unsecured gate as he was

driving on an Air Force base in Georgia. Hoose sued the United States under the

Federal Tort Claims Act, but the district court granted summary judgment for the

government. On appeal, Hoose argues that the district court erred when it concluded

that, as a matter of law, he assumed the risk of injury when he attempted to drive

around the gate’s arm. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hoose stocked Robins Air Force Base in Georgia with Red Bull products

weekly for eight months. Hoose’s round included the base’s commissary. To get to

and from the commissary, Hoose had to drive through a gated entry made up of two

swinging gate arms, one on each side of the road. Generally, the gate was open when

Hoose made his deliveries, but sometimes it was not. When not open, the gate was

closed with a chain and padlock, so Hoose would have to wait for a commissary

employee to open it. To open the gate, the employee would push each arm towards

the curb and let it rest there. Hoose knew that the employees did not secure the gate

arms on either side when the gate was open. The gate was left unattended when the

entrance was open to vehicles during the day.

Five to six times, Hoose had seen the open gate arms moved by the wind.

Depending on which way the wind was blowing, the arms would either swing by a

matter of inches away from or into the roadway. Hoose thought that on a windy day

2 Case: 19-15023 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 3 of 7

the arms might swing into the roadway and become a hazard, so he informed his

supervisor about it in the hope that he would discuss the gate with Air Force

personnel. Hoose also knew based on his past experience working with

Occupational Safety Health Administration standards that gates should be secured

in either an open or closed position.

On November 4, 2015, a cloudy and windy day, Hoose drove through the fully

open gates to the commissary. He made his delivery and started driving back. He

approached the gate at about fifteen miles per hour and noticed that its right arm was

over the curb and several feet into the roadway. The arm, though in the roadway,

was stationary, so, about thirty feet from the gate, Hoose moved to the center of the

road, straddling the lanes. About four or five feet from the gate, Hoose felt a gust of

wind blow through his open window and saw the gate arm move toward the front

fender of his delivery truck. When the gate arm struck the vehicle, Hoose panicked

and hit the gas, causing the gate arm to crash through the windshield and strike

Hoose in the head.

Hoose sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for premises

liability negligence, and the government filed a motion for summary judgment,

arguing that Hoose assumed the risk of an accident when he chose to drive around

the gate arm. The district court granted the government’s motion, concluding that

there was no genuine issue of material fact that Hoose had “knowledge and

3 Case: 19-15023 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 4 of 7

appreciation of the hazard” when he voluntarily drove around the unsecured gate on

a windy day. Hoose appeals the district court’s order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Holloman v. Mail-Well

Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate when

the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no

genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of

the moving party.” Id. at 836–37; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

DISCUSSION

Hoose argues that the district court erred in granting the government summary

judgment because there was a genuine dispute about whether he assumed the risk.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the district court has jurisdiction over personal

injury claims against the United States “if a private person[] would be liable to the

claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The Act “was designed to provide redress for ordinary torts

recognized by state law.” Ochran v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir.

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government does not dispute that it

has waived sovereign immunity, so this case is governed by Georgia law. See

Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying

4 Case: 19-15023 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 5 of 7

Georgia law to a negligence claim against the government arising from an accident

at Robins Air Force Base).

Georgia law provides that a property owner is liable to people invited onto his

property “for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the

premises and approaches safe.” O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Assumption of the risk is an

affirmative defense to a premises liability claim. Sones v. Real Est. Dev. Grp., Inc.,

606 S.E.2d 687, 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). A defendant establishes this defense by

showing “(1) that the plaintiff had some actual knowledge of the danger[,] (2) that

he understood and appreciated the risk therefrom, and (3) that he voluntarily exposed

himself to such risk.” York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 470, 471 (Ga.

Ct. App. 1995). The plaintiff must have acted “with a full appreciation of the danger

involved and without restriction from his freedom of choice either by the

circumstances or by coercion.” Id.; see also Landings Ass’n v. Williams, 728 S.E.2d

577, 580 (Ga. 2012) (holding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff assumed the risk

of an alligator attack when she “chose to go for a walk at night near a lagoon in a

community in which she knew wild alligators were present”). Summary judgment

based on the defense of assumption of the risk is appropriate if “the facts are so plain

and palpable that they demand a finding by the court as a matter of law.” Bass

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Related

Michelle Ochran v. United States
273 F.3d 1315 (Eleventh Circuit, 2001)
Otis J. Holloman v. Mail-Well Corporation
443 F.3d 832 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc.
459 S.E.2d 470 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1995)
Bass Custom Landscapes, Inc. v. Cunard
575 S.E.2d 17 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2002)
Vaughn v. Pleasent
471 S.E.2d 866 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1996)
Sones v. Real Estate Development Group, Inc.
606 S.E.2d 687 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2004)
The Landings Ass'n v. Williams
728 S.E.2d 577 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2012)

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