Dustin Barral v. Brooktree Apartments and 2300 West Apartments

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00105
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 DUSTIN BARRAL, Case No. 3:24-cv-00105-ART-CLB

4 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 5 (ECF Nos. 31, 33) BROOKTREE APARTMENTS and 2300 6 WEST APARTMENTS,

7 Defendants.

8 Plaintiff Dustin Barral sued Brooktree Apartments and 2300 West 9 Apartments under the federal Fair Housing Act. Barral alleges that both 10 apartments illegally rejected him based on his status as a registered sex offender. 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 Dustin Barral is a registered sex offender. (See ECF No. 30.) He visited 13 Defendants Brooktree Apartments and 2300 West Apartments to ask to rent an 14 apartment. (Id.) Staff at both apartment complexes told him that they do not rent 15 to registered sex offenders. (Id.) Barral sued both apartment complexes in 16 Nevada’s Second Judicial District Court, and Defendants removed the case. (See 17 1.) Both Defendants moved to dismiss the claim. (ECF Nos. 4, 7.) The Court 18 granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend. (ECF 19 No. 25.) Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, alleging violations of 20 the Fair Housing Act and Nevada’s Fair Housing Law. (ECF No. 30.) 21 Before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss of Defendants Brooktree 22 Apartments and 2300 West Apartments. (ECF Nos. 31, 33.) As detailed below, 23 the Court dismisses both causes of action without prejudice, and with leave to 24 amend. 25

28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon 3 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint 4 must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 5 is entitled to relief” and enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible 6 on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 7 555, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). All factual allegations 8 set forth in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most 9 favorable to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 10 2001). A facially plausible claim may be dismissed for “lack of a cognizable legal 11 theory.” Solida v. McKelvey, 820 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016). 12 III. Discussion 13 A. Fair Housing Act 14 Section 42 U.S.C. § 3604 of the Fair Housing Act states that it is unlawful 15 “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale 16 or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection 17 therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 18 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, Plaintiff must allege 19 that he was “subjected to different terms, conditions, or privileges because of a 20 protected status.” Cabrera v. Alvarez, 977 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 21 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 22 Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff fails to allege that he is a 23 member of any of the classes protected by the Fair Housing Act or that 24 Defendants’ adverse actions were based on his status as a protected class 25 member. (ECF Nos. 31, 33.) Other federal district courts that have considered 26 whether sex offender status is a protected status under the Fair Housing Act are 27 in accord. See, e.g., Pierce v. Cockrell, No. 3:24-CV-00286-RRB, 2025 WL 28 2418472, at *4 (D. Alaska July 22, 2025), reconsideration denied, No. 3:24-CV- 1 00286-RRB, 2025 WL 2783561 (D. Alaska Sept. 30, 2025) (appeal dismissed by 2 Ninth Circuit as frivolous on December 16, 2025); Reaves v. Wenerowicz, No. CIV. 3 12-301, 2012 WL 6209893, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2012); Brown v. Menszer, No. 4 CIV. A. 99-0790, 2000 WL 1228769, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2000). Plaintiff 5 therefore does not state a claim for discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.1 6 The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Fair Housing Claim without prejudice, and with 7 leave to amend. 8 B. Nevada’s Fair Housing Law 9 For the same reasons Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Fair Housing 10 Act, he likewise fails to state a claim under Nevada’s Fair Housing Law. NRS 11 118.100 prohibits any person from “refus[ing] to sell or rent” to someone “because 12 of race, religious creed, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, 13 gender identity or expression, ancestry, familial status or sex.” Nevada’s Fair 14 Housing Law “mirrors the [Federal Housing Act].” Torres v. Rothstein, No. 2:19- 15 CV-00594-APG-EJY, 2020 WL 2559384, at *3 (D. Nev. May 20, 2020). 16 Plaintiff also does not allege membership in a class protected by Nevada’s 17 Fair Housing Law or that Defendants took adverse actions based on his status as 18 a protected class member. (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff thus fails to state a colorable 19 claim under Nevada’s Fair Housing Law. Accordingly, the Court also dismisses 20 this claim without prejudice, and with leave to amend. 21 22 23 24 25 1 Additionally, some portions of the Fair Housing Act even require the exclusion 26 of sex offenders. For example, under 42 U.S.C. § 13663, owners of federally 27 assisted housing “shall prohibit admission . . . for any household that includes any individual who is subject to a lifetime registration requirement under a [] sex 28 offender registration program.” 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a). 1 || IV. CONCLUSION 2 The Court grants Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 31, 33) and 3 || dismisses Plaintiffs complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend before 4 || Tuesday, February 17, 2026. 5 6 DATED THIS 15TH day of January 2026. 7 8 een Pee Wasted

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28