Dusseau v. Roscommon State Bank

264 N.W.2d 350, 80 Mich. App. 531, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2068
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 5, 1978
DocketDocket No. 31561
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 264 N.W.2d 350 (Dusseau v. Roscommon State Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dusseau v. Roscommon State Bank, 264 N.W.2d 350, 80 Mich. App. 531, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2068 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinion

D. E. Holbrook, J.

This is an action in equity brought by plaintiff mortgagor, to restrain defendant bank from foreclosing a mortgage until the value of a portion of the mortgaged property released by the mortgagee was duly ascertained and credited against the mortgage. Defendant bank counterclaimed for foreclosure. Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of foreclosure in favor of defendant, wherein the value of the land partially released was determined to be $2,500.

Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in that the market value of the released portion of the mortgaged premises greatly exceeded the value placed on the land and credited against the mortgage.

On July 31, 1972, plaintiff and her former husband, Lloyd A. Miller, borrowed from defendant bank the sum of $11,000 and executed a mortgage on certain property described as follows: The West 1/2 of the Northeast 1/4 pf the Northeast 1/4 of Section 36, Twp 27 North, Range 2E, Elmer Twp, Oscoda County, Michigan. Said mortgage was re[533]*533corded in liber 29 of mortgages, page 71 in the Register of Deeds Office for Oscoda County.

On July 15, 1973, plaintiff was divorced from Lloyd A. Miller by a judgment of divorce entered in the circuit court of Oscoda County, Michigan.

Under the terms of the judgment of divorce, a property settlement between the parties was ratified and made a part of the judgment. It provided that plaintiff was awarded the north 1/2 of subject mortgaged property, and plaintiffs former husband, Lloyd A. Miller, was awarded the south 1/2 of said subject mortgaged property and therein said Lloyd A. Miller agreed to assume the existing mortgage. The plaintiffs property awarded therein consisted of the homestead and other out buildings. The property awarded to Mr. Miller was vacant land. The mortgage provided that it was to be paid back at $1,100 per year on principal and interest was payable semi-annually at the rate of eight percent per annum. On July 31, 1973, Mr. Miller borrowed money from the bank on a personal note in order to pay the first $1,100 which was duly paid against the mortgage. He also paid interest amounting to $860, due up to July 31, 1973.

At the time of the mortgage Miller was in business at Mio and subsequently experienced financial difficulties in the fall of 1974. At that time, he made arrangements with a realtor, Mr. John Booth, to borrow $7,500 on the south 1/2 of the mortgaged property and another ten acres close by. Finally, it was decided that Miller would deed the property to Booth, the realtor, and $5,000 was paid to Miller. Miller and Booth then saw Mr. Jenner, president of the defendant bank, about obtaining a release of the south 1/2 of the mortgaged property. At this time, Mr. Jenner under[534]*534stood that there had been a divorce, that the property had been divided by the divorce judgment and that Mr. Miller had agreed to pay the mortgage. Mr. Jenner agreed to release the property for $2,500, which was paid by check by Booth to Miller and defendant bank. Miller indorsed the check and the defendant bank applied the proceeds first to an unindorsed note of Miller’s under his business name of Marsh Construction Company. Later the defendant bank, claiming error, applied said amount to the unindorsed personal note of Miller which was used to make the first payment on the mortgage. As a result, the defendant bank applied to the mortgage $792 interest to July 31, 1974, and $50.07 on the principal and interest of $393 paying interest to January 31, 1975. On November 20, 1974, date of the partial release, there was $9,900 due on the principal and interest of eight percent from July 31, 1973. There were other small amounts claimed for life insurance which are not material to a decision in this case.

The trial court disregarded the bank’s entries and granted the entire $2,500 received against the mortgage. The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in determining the market value of the released property at $2,500.

It appears to this Court that when the parties were divorced and property settlement was approved and made a part of the divorce judgment, they voluntarily apportioned the mortgaged property between themselves, with a further provision that Mr. Miller was to assume the mortgage. This is immaterial to a decision in this case, because subsequently Miller went into bankruptcy. The defendant bank, knowing that the parties had been divorced and that the land had been divided [535]*535and apportioned between them and that the husband had agreed to assume the mortgage, was required to act in good faith in any partial release granted to the husband, Mr. Miller, of his portion of the mortgaged property. In 59 CJS, Mortgages, § 430, p 655, it is stated in part:

"Release or Purchase of Part by Mortgagee1
"A mortgagee who releases or purchases a part of the mortgaged premises must credit the value of that part in favor of the purchasers of other parts, so that they can be charged only with the remainder of the debt.
"If the mortgagee releases or purchases a part of the mortgaged premises, he is held to have consented to an apportionment of the mortgage and the value of that part is to be credited on the mortgage in favor of the purchasers of other parts, so that they can be charged only with the remainder of the debt. * * * It has been held that the amount to be credited is the market value at the date of the release or purchase, even though it exceeds the ratable contributory shares of the others toward the total indebtedness.” (Footnotes omitted.)

We now review the testimony concerning market value of the released portions of the mortgaged premises. Five witnesses testified as to the value of the subject ten acres of land that was released from the mortgage by defendant bank and awarded to Mr. Miller under the divorce judgment.

Bobby E. Jenner, president of defendant bank, testified in part as follows:

”Q. [by Mr. Carl, plaintiff, counter-defendant’s attorney] There wasn’t any doubt in your mind, was there, Mr. Jenner, that the value of that south 10 acres, Parcel Number Two, was greater than the amount received by you, $2,500.00?
[536]*536"A. Yes, it could be some greater, I didn’t think it was too far off.
”Q. Do you recall * * *
"THE COURT: (Interposing) Didn’t you say it was sold for seventy-five hundred?
"A. That’s 20 acres, sir, the one Number Four and Number Two sold for seventy-five hundred, I think, according to the deposition.
"THE COURT: The mortgage didn’t cover them before?
"A. No, just Number One and Two.
"Q. (Continued by Mr. Carl) Do you recall testifying at the deposition in the following manner, and my question, Page 24, Question * * *
"THE COURT: (Interposing) What page?
"Q. (Continued by Mr. Carl) Page 24, Question, But the land, itself, was worth more than $2,500.00? Answer, Yes, the 10 acres. You recall having testified to that?
"A. Shaking head yes.
"Q.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
264 N.W.2d 350, 80 Mich. App. 531, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2068, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dusseau-v-roscommon-state-bank-michctapp-1978.