MEMORANDUM OPINION
*1 Charley James Dushkin was convicted, after a jury trial, of third-degree assault, second-degree criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct.1 Dushkin now appeals, raising three claims: (1) insufficient evidence existed to support his third-degree assault conviction; (2) the superior court abused its discretion in not granting a new trial based on a juror's failure to report, in response to questions on the juror questionnaire, that her family members were involved in pending criminal cases; and (3) his sentence is excessive.
For the reasons set out in this decision, we affirm the judgment of the superior court.
Facts
In July 2021, thirty-one-year-old Dushkin worked as a seasonal deckhand for sixty-two-year-old Gary Koski, who ran a commercial fishing business. As part of his employment, Dushkin lived in the business's crew quarters, which were located near Koski's house. Because the crew quarters had limited facilities, crew members (including Dushkin) were allowed to enter Koski's house to use the shower and kitchen or to watch television.
During the early evening of July 18, 2021, Koski was sitting in a chair in his living room, “dozing off” while watching television. Because Koski was cold, he was holding a large knit blanket tightly against himself, pulled up over his shoulders. Dushkin came into the room and sat down in a chair that belonged to Koski's deceased mother. Koski asked Dushkin to move. This angered Dushkin, who became belligerent. Koski suspected Dushkin was drunk, based on his reaction. Due to Dushkin's behavior and suspected intoxication, Koski asked him to go back to the crew quarters.
Following this, Dushkin approached the still-seated Koski and, “out of the blue,” Dushkin began punching Koski in the face. Because the blanket was “up over [Koski's] shoulders,” Koski could not fight back or effectively use his arms to shield himself from Dushkin's blows. Instead, Koski could defend himself only by lifting his knee to try to keep Dushkin away and wrapping one of Dushkin's arms in the blanket to stop him from freely hitting Koski. Despite Koski's efforts, Dushkin was still able to repeatedly punch Koski in the face with at least one hand. After punching Koski three or four times in the face, Dushkin left the house.
After beating Koski, Dushkin got into Koski's work truck and drove to a nearby dock. At the dock, Dushkin was stumbling and appeared drunk, so a dock employee asked Dushkin to leave. In response, Dushkin “square[d] off” and “took a swing” at the dock employee, who then called 911.
Alaska State Troopers responded to the 911 call and detained Dushkin. Dushkin struggled against the troopers’ attempts to restrain him, so they used pepper spray to subdue him. Even after being pepper sprayed, Dushkin continued to kick at the troopers while they placed him in a patrol vehicle.
Koski later received medical treatment for his injuries from Dushkin's attack. The treating physician testified that, as a result of the beating, Koski sustained two black eyes, multiple fractures to his nose, a fracture to his eye socket, and a laceration to his face.
Proceedings
*2 For his conduct at Koski's house, Dushkin was charged with second- and third-degree assault and first-degree vehicle theft.2 For his conduct at the dock, Dushkin was charged with second-degree criminal trespass and disorderly conduct.3 And because Dushkin was on conditions of release in another case, he was also charged with violating those conditions.4
At trial, Dushkin moved for a judgment of acquittal on the second- and third-degree assault charges after the State's case-in-chief. Dushkin argued that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he used his hands as a dangerous instrument — a necessary element of those charges.5 The court denied this motion.
Dushkin was found guilty of third-degree assault, second-degree criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct. Dushkin also separately pleaded no contest to violating his conditions of release. He was acquitted of the remaining charges (second-degree assault and first-degree vehicle theft).
Two months after the verdicts, Dushkin filed a motion for a new trial based upon juror misconduct. Specifically, Dushkin alleged that one of the jurors failed to disclose that her son had a pending criminal case. After an evidentiary hearing (discussed in more detail below), the trial court denied this motion.
The trial court sentenced Dushkin to a composite sentence of 5 years and 136 days with 2 years suspended (3 years and 136 days to serve). This composite sentence is comprised of 5 years with 2 years suspended for third-degree assault, 90 days with no time suspended for criminal trespass, 45 days with no time suspended for violating conditions of release, and 1 day with no time suspended for disorderly conduct, with each sentence running fully consecutively to every other sentence.
Sufficient evidence supported the third-degree assault conviction
On appeal, Dushkin argues there was insufficient evidence that he injured Koski with a “dangerous instrument” — a necessary element of his third-degree assault conviction.6
When we review the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.7 The evidence is sufficient if the facts, when viewed in this manner, could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.8
Here, Dushkin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding that he used his hands as dangerous instruments. A dangerous instrument is “anything that, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury.”9 At trial, the State argued that Dushkin used his hand in a manner that created a substantial risk of “serious physical injury.” When the State alleges that a defendant used their hands as a dangerous instrument, the State must show “that the manner in which the hand was used in the case at issue posed an actual and substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury, rather than a risk that was merely hypothetical or abstract.”10 This requires “examining the precise manner in which the hand is actually used,”11 i.e., how the blow was delivered,12 the amount of force used,13 and whether circumstances rendered the victim particularly vulnerable.14
*3 Dushkin used a closed fist to repeatedly strike Koski in the face. At the time of the attack, Dushkin was standing over a seated Koski, which placed Dushkin in an advantageous position to generate force. The evidence indicates Dushkin took advantage of this position, generating forceful blows that were powerful enough to fracture Koski's nose in multiple places and his eye socket.
Koski was also in a particularly vulnerable position. Koski was in a chair, had been “dozing off,” and was holding a thick blanket “tight[ly] up against [himself],” which prevented him from effectively using his arms to fight back or shield himself from Dushkin's blows. Moreover, Koski was sixty-two years old and Dushkin was half his age.
Given these facts, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Dushkin used his hands in a manner that “posed an actual and substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury” to Koski.15
Dushkin counters that the evidence was nevertheless insufficient because the State did not introduce testimony from a medical expert about the force of Dushkin's blows, the risks of serious physical injury resulting from his blows, or the way Koski's age and physical position made him particularly vulnerable to Dushkin's attack. But a jury does not necessarily need expert medical testimony to determine that punches that fractured the victim's nose and orbital bones were delivered with sufficient force to create a real risk of serious physical injury.16
We therefore conclude there was sufficient evidence supporting Dushkin's conviction for third-degree assault.
Denying Dushkin's motion for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion
Dushkin next argues that the superior court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial due to purported juror misconduct that he raised two months after trial.
The purported misconduct Dushkin identifies is based on the following facts. The juror questionnaire asked every prospective juror: “Have you or any family member been involved with a court case?” and “Have you or any family member been a victim of a crime?” One juror, D.N., put “Mother-in-law” with respect to the first question and “1997, misdemeanor, theft” in response to the second question. But a couple of months after the trial, defense counsel became aware that D.N.’s answers were incomplete. At the time D.N. completed the questionnaire, one of her sons had a pending criminal case — her twenty-two-year-old son had pleaded guilty to a single count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and was awaiting sentencing.
Dushkin moved for a new trial, arguing that D.N.’s failure to disclose her son's criminal case was juror misconduct that warranted a new trial because D.N. consciously withheld the information about her son's case.
*4 At an evidentiary hearing on the new trial motion, D.N. also revealed that at the time she filled out the jury questionnaire her other young adult son had a pending driving under the influence case. D.N. testified that she did not disclose her sons’ cases because she understood the questionnaire, by virtue of its “have ... been” phrasing, to only be asking about fully resolved criminal cases — not ongoing ones — and both cases were ongoing.
In a written order, the trial court found D.N.’s testimony credible, determining that she had not consciously withheld relevant information and had genuinely understood the juror questionnaire to refer to fully resolved cases.
We have explained that the test for assessing juror misconduct involves a two-part inquiry: “(1) whether the evidence establishes a serious violation of the juror's duty, and if so, (2) whether the violation deprived the complaining party of a fair trial. A serious violation of a juror's duty may be demonstrated by ‘fraud, bribery, forcible coercion, or any obstruction of justice.’ ”17
We have recognized that a defendant establishes that a juror obstructed justice in situations where a juror understood during voir dire that the undisclosed information was relevant and “consciously withheld this information in the face of questions and admonitions that reasonably called for” it.18 Dushkin argued that he had established a “serious violation of the juror's duty” on this basis. The court in this case appears to have assumed that, as an objective matter, the above-noted questions on the juror questionnaire reasonably called for disclosure as to pending cases, but it nonetheless held that D.N. did not “consciously withhold” this information because she in good faith interpreted the verb tense of the questions as only referring to completed cases. This holding involves a factual issue for which we may only reverse if we conclude that the factual finding was “clearly erroneous,”19 which we do not find to be the case. And because the first factor of the juror misconduct test was not met, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dushkin's motion for a new trial.
Dushkin's sentence is not excessive
Lastly, Dushkin argues that his third-degree assault sentence was excessive. The court imposed a composite sentence of 5 years and 136 days with 2 years suspended (3 years and 136 days to serve). Dushkin's sentence specifically for the third-degree assault conviction was 5 years with 2 years suspended (3 years to serve).
As an initial matter, it is improper to attack a single sentence as excessive when a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes.20 When a defendant is sentenced for multiple crimes, the sentence for a single charge “does not stand alone” — it is part of a crafted whole.21 As a result, when considering whether a sentence is excessive, “[t]he proper question for us to ask is whether the sentence on all the charges, given the totality of the circumstances, was excessive.”22 We thus do not review sentences individually.23
*5 But even construing Dushkin's challenge as a properly framed attack on his total sentence as excessive, the overall sentence was still not clearly mistaken.24
Dushkin faced a maximum possible composite sentence of 5 years and 183 days.25 The court found one mitigating factor — that Dushkin's conduct was among the least serious third-degree assaults — because Dushkin did not use his hands in a “specialized” way.26 However, the court also found three aggravating factors, which were all based on Dushkin's extensive criminal history.27
Additionally, the court found that Dushkin was a worst offender, that he posed “a high public safety risk,” and that he had a “persistent disregard for law enforcement and court orders.” As a result, the court concluded that Dushkin needed a substantial prison sentence followed by close supervision to protect the public and to have a chance of interrupting Dushkin's lengthy pattern of criminal behavior.
These findings are supported by the record. Dushkin has a substantial criminal history, which includes eighteen convictions since 2008. These convictions include multiple instances of assaultive or attempted-assaultive conduct. And here, Dushkin first assaulted Koski, then attempted to punch a dock employee, and finally struggled with troopers when they arrested him.
Dushkin's previous attempts at rehabilitation were also unsuccessful. Dushkin's prior sentences included multiple orders to undergo treatment and rehabilitative programs that would assist him in not attacking others. And at the time of his conduct in this case, Dushkin was on probation for fourth-degree assault and was on conditions of release for two other assault charges. Despite these prior attempts at treatment and being on probation, Dushkin still attacked Koski, trespassed at the docks, and attempted to punch a dock employee. Further, while incarcerated, pending sentencing in this case, Dushkin attacked his cell mate by pinning him to a piece of furniture and punching him in the eye, resulting in Dushkin receiving 14 days of punitive segregation. Cumulatively, this supports the superior court's finding that Dushkin's prior attempts at rehabilitation were unsuccessful and that rehabilitation was not the appropriate primary sentencing criterion.
*6 Dushkin argues that the court erred by giving limited weight to the mitigating factor and Dushkin's potential for rehabilitation. But the court's sentence was primarily driven by the need to protect the public from Dushkin's continued assaultive behavior, not the severity of Dushkin's conduct in this case. And the mitigating factor had no influence on the court's sentence for Dushkin's convictions for criminal trespass and disorderly conduct. As a result, the court did not err in its weighing of the mitigating factor.
In terms of Dushkin's rehabilitative potential, the court reasonably concluded that Dushkin's unsuccessful rehabilitation efforts — which stretched over a decade — meant that Dushkin's rehabilitative potential deserved less weight than the need to protect the community, deter Dushkin, and reaffirm social norms.28 Despite the court's emphasis of these other factors, the court still stated that its sentence was structured to give Dushkin a substantial period of supervised probation with the hope that it would assist in rehabilitating him. The court's weighing of Dushkin's rehabilitative potential was not error.
Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude that Dushkin's sentence was not clearly mistaken.29
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.