MEMORANDUM
Aleks Dushi (“Dushi”), a native and citizen of Albania, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The BIA issued a written decision and adopted the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. We therefore review the BIA’s decision. See Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.2010); see also Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2006). We grant the petition and remand.
I. Credibility
Credibility determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.2009). Under the substantial evidence standard, credibility findings are upheld unless evidence compels a contrary result. See Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir.2007). The BIA must articulate a legitimate basis on which to question an applicant’s credibility and must offer specific and cogent reasons for any stated disbelief. See Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir.2002). “[W]hen each of the IJ’s or BIA’s proffered reasons for an adverse credibility finding fails, we must accept a petitioner’s testimony as credible.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2004).
We recite the facts only as needed to explain our decision,1 and we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s adverse credibility determination.
Because Dushi filed his claim for asylum before May 11, 2005, we apply the preREAL ID Act standards for adverse credibility findings. See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1021 n. 3 (9th Cir.2009) (applying pre-REAL ID Act standards because petitioner’s asylum application was filed before May 11, 2005). Under our preREAL ID Act standard, “[mjinor inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of persecution, [do not] go to the heart of the asylum claim, or [do not] reveal anything about an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding.” Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). Discrepancies that are not attempts to enhance [241]*241claims of persecution generally have no bearing on credibility. Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir.2004).
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding based on four inconsistencies between Dushi’s airport interview and his asylum proceedings. Two of these inconsistencies do not go to the heart of Dushi’s asylum claim. First, whether Dushi bought his fake passport in Albania or in France does not relate to the merits of Dushi’s asylum claim. See Zhu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir.2008) (“The inconsistency about whether [petitioner] acquired her passport in Hong Kong or in Chile ... fails to go to the heart of her asylum claim.”). Second, whether Dushi changed his name in Albania or when he converted to the Greek Orthodox faith in Greece also does not relate to the merits of Dushi’s asylum claim. Further, Dushi explained that he considered the name change in Albania to be only on “paper” and that it was not until he converted to the Greek Orthodox faith and took a Christian name that he felt he had changed his name. Because these two inconsistencies do not go to the heart of Dushi’s asylum claim and do not relate to the persecution he alleges, the BIA improperly relied on them to find Dushi not credible.
Additionally, the IJ must consider and address the applicant’s explanation for an identified discrepancy. See Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir.2009). Here, the IJ did not address Dushi’s plausible explanations for his other two inconsistencies.
In his merits hearing, Dushi explained that he was in a terrible mental state when he arrived in the United States, having just fled Albania, and that he was frightened of being deported. Dushi testified that as a result, he did not remember what he told the immigration officer at the airport.
Even though the IJ did not address Dushi’s explanation, the BIA did and concluded that his explanation was “patently inconsistent” with his purpose of coming to this country to seek asylum. However, we “hesitate to view statements given during airport interviews as valuable impeachment sources because of the conditions under which they are taken and because a newly-arriving alien cannot be expected to divulge every detail of the persecution he or she sustained.” Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir.2004); see Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, it is perfectly understandable that Dushi would be reluctant to fully disclose his circumstances during the airport interview, given his experience with government officials in Albania. See Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d at 1023 (recognizing that “ ‘an arriving alien who has suffered abuse during interrogation sessions by government officials in his home country may be reluctant to reveal such information during the first meeting with government officials in this country’ ” (quoting Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir.1998))). Thus, the BIA erred because it did not fully consider the reality of Dushi’s situation as a newly-arriving refugee who feared being deported.
The BIA also concluded that Dushi was not credible because the doctor’s report he submitted did not mention his stabbing wound. However, in nearly identical circumstances we have concluded that the omission of details from a doctor’s report is “insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir.2002). Additionally, in this case, the doctor’s report Dushi submitted was prepared by the same doctor in Albania who told him not to file a complaint against the police officers who [242]*242beat him. Under these circumstances, the BIA erred in finding that Dushi was not credible because this doctor omitted a serious injury from his report.
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MEMORANDUM
Aleks Dushi (“Dushi”), a native and citizen of Albania, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The BIA issued a written decision and adopted the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. We therefore review the BIA’s decision. See Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.2010); see also Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2006). We grant the petition and remand.
I. Credibility
Credibility determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.2009). Under the substantial evidence standard, credibility findings are upheld unless evidence compels a contrary result. See Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir.2007). The BIA must articulate a legitimate basis on which to question an applicant’s credibility and must offer specific and cogent reasons for any stated disbelief. See Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir.2002). “[W]hen each of the IJ’s or BIA’s proffered reasons for an adverse credibility finding fails, we must accept a petitioner’s testimony as credible.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2004).
We recite the facts only as needed to explain our decision,1 and we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s adverse credibility determination.
Because Dushi filed his claim for asylum before May 11, 2005, we apply the preREAL ID Act standards for adverse credibility findings. See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1021 n. 3 (9th Cir.2009) (applying pre-REAL ID Act standards because petitioner’s asylum application was filed before May 11, 2005). Under our preREAL ID Act standard, “[mjinor inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of persecution, [do not] go to the heart of the asylum claim, or [do not] reveal anything about an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding.” Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). Discrepancies that are not attempts to enhance [241]*241claims of persecution generally have no bearing on credibility. Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir.2004).
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding based on four inconsistencies between Dushi’s airport interview and his asylum proceedings. Two of these inconsistencies do not go to the heart of Dushi’s asylum claim. First, whether Dushi bought his fake passport in Albania or in France does not relate to the merits of Dushi’s asylum claim. See Zhu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir.2008) (“The inconsistency about whether [petitioner] acquired her passport in Hong Kong or in Chile ... fails to go to the heart of her asylum claim.”). Second, whether Dushi changed his name in Albania or when he converted to the Greek Orthodox faith in Greece also does not relate to the merits of Dushi’s asylum claim. Further, Dushi explained that he considered the name change in Albania to be only on “paper” and that it was not until he converted to the Greek Orthodox faith and took a Christian name that he felt he had changed his name. Because these two inconsistencies do not go to the heart of Dushi’s asylum claim and do not relate to the persecution he alleges, the BIA improperly relied on them to find Dushi not credible.
Additionally, the IJ must consider and address the applicant’s explanation for an identified discrepancy. See Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir.2009). Here, the IJ did not address Dushi’s plausible explanations for his other two inconsistencies.
In his merits hearing, Dushi explained that he was in a terrible mental state when he arrived in the United States, having just fled Albania, and that he was frightened of being deported. Dushi testified that as a result, he did not remember what he told the immigration officer at the airport.
Even though the IJ did not address Dushi’s explanation, the BIA did and concluded that his explanation was “patently inconsistent” with his purpose of coming to this country to seek asylum. However, we “hesitate to view statements given during airport interviews as valuable impeachment sources because of the conditions under which they are taken and because a newly-arriving alien cannot be expected to divulge every detail of the persecution he or she sustained.” Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir.2004); see Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, it is perfectly understandable that Dushi would be reluctant to fully disclose his circumstances during the airport interview, given his experience with government officials in Albania. See Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d at 1023 (recognizing that “ ‘an arriving alien who has suffered abuse during interrogation sessions by government officials in his home country may be reluctant to reveal such information during the first meeting with government officials in this country’ ” (quoting Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir.1998))). Thus, the BIA erred because it did not fully consider the reality of Dushi’s situation as a newly-arriving refugee who feared being deported.
The BIA also concluded that Dushi was not credible because the doctor’s report he submitted did not mention his stabbing wound. However, in nearly identical circumstances we have concluded that the omission of details from a doctor’s report is “insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir.2002). Additionally, in this case, the doctor’s report Dushi submitted was prepared by the same doctor in Albania who told him not to file a complaint against the police officers who [242]*242beat him. Under these circumstances, the BIA erred in finding that Dushi was not credible because this doctor omitted a serious injury from his report.
Last, the BIA erred in requiring corroborative evidence, which, under the preREAL ID Act standard, is only required where the petitioner has failed to testify credibly. See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2000) (affirming that an “alien’s testimony, if unrefuted and credible, direct and specific, is sufficient to establish the facts testified without the need for any corroboration”), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (per curiam); see also Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.2000) (“[T]he BIA may not require independent corroborating evidence from an asylum applicant who testifies credibly....”). As discussed above, substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, so Dushi should be deemed credible. Because corroborative evidence is not required where a petitioner testified credibly, the BIA erred in finding Dushi not credible because he failed to submit an affidavit from his aunt in Greece.
Moreover, the IJ erred in not giving Dushi an opportunity to explain why he had not provided an affidavit from his aunt. See Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir.2000); Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d at 688. The IJ never specifically requested testimony or an affidavit from Dushi’s aunt and stated for the first time in her decision that the absence of such evidence from his aunt was a ground for finding Dushi not credible. Thus, the IJ erred in not providing Dushi an opportunity to explain why he had not submitted an affidavit from his aunt.
In sum, because the BIA’s determination that Dushi was not credible is not based on substantial evidence, we grant the petition and remand to the BIA for further consideration in light of Dushi’s credible testimony. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir.2004).
II. Motion to Reopen
Because we grant Dushi’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s adverse credibility finding, and remand pursuant to INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam), we need not decide whether the BIA erred in denying Dushi’s motion to reopen based on his submission of new evidence.
III. Conclusion
We GRANT the petition and REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings to determine whether, accepting Dushi’s testimony as credible, he is eligible for relief. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir.2006).
PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.