Durso v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Durso v. City of New York

251 A.D.2d 8, 673 N.Y.S.2d 651, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6378

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 2, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 251 A.D.2d 8 (Durso v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Durso v. City of New York, 251 A.D.2d 8, 673 N.Y.S.2d 651, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6378 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter Tolub, J.), entered January 9, 1997, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

[9]*9In the course of evaluating whether plaintiffs back injury disabled him from performing limited police duty, defendant police surgeon allegedly conferred with plaintiffs treating physicians, examined his records, ordered at least one diagnostic test, and on one occasion recommended that plaintiff not take a prescribed pain medication that made him nauseous. These actions did not constitute “advice” or “treatment” such as might take the case out of the well-established rule that “[a] physician-patient relationship does not exist where the examination is conducted solely for the purpose or convenience or on behalf of an employer; in order to establish that relationship, there must be something more than a mere examination” (Violandi v City of New York, 184 AD2d 364, 365; compare, Twitchell v MacKay, 78 AD2d 125; Hickey v Travelers Ins. Co., 158 AD2d 112). In the absence of a factual issue regarding the existence of a physician-patient relationship, summary judgment was properly granted dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint alleging malpractice or negligence. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter Tolub, J.), entered January 9, 1997, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

[9]*9In the course of evaluating whether plaintiffs back injury disabled him from performing limited police duty, defendant police surgeon allegedly conferred with plaintiffs treating physicians, examined his records, ordered at least one diagnostic test, and on one occasion recommended that plaintiff not take a prescribed pain medication that made him nauseous. These actions did not constitute “advice” or “treatment” such as might take the case out of the well-established rule that “[a] physician-patient relationship does not exist where the examination is conducted solely for the purpose or convenience or on behalf of an employer; in order to establish that relationship, there must be something more than a mere examination” (Violandi v City of New York, 184 AD2d 364, 365; compare, Twitchell v MacKay, 78 AD2d 125; Hickey v Travelers Ins. Co., 158 AD2d 112). In the absence of a factual issue regarding the existence of a physician-patient relationship, summary judgment was properly granted dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint alleging malpractice or negligence. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

251 A.D.2d 8, 673 N.Y.S.2d 651, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/durso-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack