Durley v. Wilson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 26, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00822
StatusUnknown

This text of Durley v. Wilson (Durley v. Wilson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Durley v. Wilson, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ TIMOTHY DURLEY,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 21-cv-822-pp

AIMEE WILSON, M. SCHMIDT, and D. BOUSHKA,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Timothy Durley, who is incarcerated at Waupun Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants gave him foods containing peanuts despite knowing he is severely allergic to peanuts. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to let an incarcerated plaintiff proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On July 7, 2021, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.53. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on July 20, 2021. The

court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must

dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court liberally construes complaints filed by

plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff has sued Aimee Wilson and D. Boushka, whom he alleges are food service supervisors at Waupun, and M. Schmidt, who is the food service chef. Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2. He alleges that on February 24, 2021, and

“many time’s after,” he received peanut butter or peanut butter bars in his meal bags or on his meal tray. Id. at 2. The plaintiff alleges he is severely allergic to peanut butter and peanut butter bars and that he gets a special diet that says “multi allergy” on it. Id. at 3. He says that staff in the restricted housing unit, where he is housed, are supposed to check his meal trays or bagged meals for the special diet. Id. The plaintiff alleges he “wrote to the kitchen” and to each of the defendants after the first time he received peanut items, and he “receive[d] a

reply saying the matter will be taken care of.” Id. at 2. But he says he did not receive a reply to his later complaints about the issue. Id. On at least one occasion in June 2021, the plaintiff had an allergic reaction to peanut butter. Id. at 2–3. Nurse Ahlborg (who is not a defendant) treated his symptoms with a nebulizer and diphenhydramine liquid or pills. Id. at 3. The plaintiff alleges that he and the Health Services Unit at Waupun told food services about his allergy, but he still receives peanut butter items in his meal and snack bags and on his meal trays. Id. at 3. The plaintiff sues the defendants in their

individual capacities for monetary damages. Id. at 3–4. C. Analysis The plaintiff’s allegations amount to a claim of deliberate indifference, which arises under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective

component, an incarcerated plaintiff must show that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Durley v. Wilson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/durley-v-wilson-wied-2022.