Durkin v. Durkin Fuel Acquisition Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Durkin v. Durkin Fuel Acquisition Corp.

224 A.D.2d 574, 639 N.Y.S.2d 716

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 20, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 224 A.D.2d 574 (Durkin v. Durkin Fuel Acquisition Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Durkin v. Durkin Fuel Acquisition Corp., 224 A.D.2d 574, 639 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment interpreting the terms of [575]*575several restrictive covenant agreements (Action No. 1), and a related action, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment interpreting the terms of the same restrictive covenant agreements (Action No. 2), (1) Raymond C. Durkin, Andrew J. Durkin, and Carmel Terminals, Inc., the plaintiffs in Action No. 1, appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Bar-one, J.), entered December 16, 1994, which denied their motion for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, and (2) Durkin Water Supply Corp., Andrew J. Durkin, James M. Durkin, Raymond Durkin, Thomas Durkin, Andrew Durkin, Carmel Terminals, Inc., and Brewster Terminal, L.P., the defendants in Action No. 2, appeal from an order of the same court, also entered December 16, 1994, which granted the motion of the plaintiffs in Action No. 2 for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants in Action No. 2 from selling, operating, or maintaining an oil terminal located in Carmel, New York.

Ordered that the order in Action No. 1 is affirmed; and it is further;

Ordered that the order in Action No. 2 is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that Durkin Fuel Acquisition Corp. and Robinson Oil Corp. are awarded one bill of costs.

The terms of the restrictive covenant in this case are reasonable under the circumstances (see, Karpinski v Ingrasci, 28 NY2d 45; Town Line Repairs v Anderson, 90 AD2d 517), and justify a preliminary injunction in Action No. 2.

With respect to the appeal from the order in Action No. 1, we note only that permanent injunctions and declaratory judgments are not provisional remedies and may not be obtained in a motion prior to the joinder of issue (see, CPLR 103, 3001, 3211, 3212, 6301 et seq.). Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Ritter and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

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—In an action, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment interpreting the terms of [575]*575several restrictive covenant agreements (Action No. 1), and a related action, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment interpreting the terms of the same restrictive covenant agreements (Action No. 2), (1) Raymond C. Durkin, Andrew J. Durkin, and Carmel Terminals, Inc., the plaintiffs in Action No. 1, appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Bar-one, J.), entered December 16, 1994, which denied their motion for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, and (2) Durkin Water Supply Corp., Andrew J. Durkin, James M. Durkin, Raymond Durkin, Thomas Durkin, Andrew Durkin, Carmel Terminals, Inc., and Brewster Terminal, L.P., the defendants in Action No. 2, appeal from an order of the same court, also entered December 16, 1994, which granted the motion of the plaintiffs in Action No. 2 for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants in Action No. 2 from selling, operating, or maintaining an oil terminal located in Carmel, New York.