Durkin v. Board of Fire Commissioners

99 A. 432, 89 N.J.L. 468, 4 Gummere 468, 1916 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 8
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedDecember 7, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 99 A. 432 (Durkin v. Board of Fire Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Durkin v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 99 A. 432, 89 N.J.L. 468, 4 Gummere 468, 1916 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 8 (N.J. 1916).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Kalisch, J.

The five prosecutors, Michael J. Durkin, Thomas S. Reilly, Charles S. Storch, Cornelius Smith and [469]*469James Eagan, Jr., are members of the fire department of the city of Newark.

Each of the prosecutors was reduced, by the board of fire commissioners of the city of Newark, from the rank and salary of a battalion chief to the rank and salary of a captain.

The prosecutors, severally, sued out writs of certiorari to review the legality of the action of the board, and, as the same legal question is presented by these writs, the cases were consolidated and argued together.

The facts are briefly these: In June, 1914, the prosecutors, who were captains in the fire department, were made battalion chiefs. The city of Newark then contained five battalion districts under the supervision of four battalion chiefs, there being a vacancy in one of the districts. Each battalion chief was equipped, at the expense of the municipality, with a horse and gig at an initial cost of about $550. The upkeep of these equipments was the source of considerable expense. The promotion of the prosecutors' car ried with it an increase of $100 in the salary of each, annually. No new battalion districts were created and no .equipments had been furnished to the promoted men. The effect of the advance of the prosecutors to battalion chiefs was to increase the force of the latter from five to nine for the five battalion districts. To carve out of the old division new battalion districts, and to provide the proper equipment for the new battalion chiefs, and to maintain the battalion stations properly, would require the expenditure of large sums of money.

Tt further appeared that the affairs of the fire department had been conducted with efficiency at the time, when, in 1914, the five battalion districts were under the supervision of the four battalion chiefs.

Confronted with this situation, the board of fire commissioners of 1915, on the 11th day of February, 1915, notified each of the prosecutors to appear before the board on February 24th, 1915, and show cause why he should not be reduced to the rank of captain for reasons of economy. The prosecutors, with counsel, appeared before the board at the time stated and asked leave to file written answers, which [470]*470privilege was accorded them. At the request of their counsel a further continuance was granted them, and they filed their several answers on March 3d, 1915, in which they set up that their reduction to the rank of captain for reasons of economy was not in the nature of a charge against them in compliance with the Civil Service law, and that the board was without power -to make the reduction in rank on grounds of economy, and furthermore that no such grounds existed. The prosecutors offered no testimony before the board and were content to rest upon their answers, whereupon the board passed the following resolution: “Resolved, That for reasons of economy Battalion Chiefs Thomas S. Reilly, Charles C. Storch, James Eagan, Jr., Michael J. Durkin and Cornelius Smith, be and are hereby reduced to the rank and salary of captain, beginning March 16th, 1915. Adopted March 3d, 1915.”

Mne reasons have been assigned by counsel for the prosecutors why the resolution demoting the prosecutoi*s should be set aside, but only two are relied on and presented in the brief for our consideration. The two reasons relied on and argued in the brief embody the following propositions: Firstly, that no member of the fire department can be reduced in rank except for cause as specified by the statutes, and only after a trial upon specific charges; secondly, that the prosecutors could only be reduced in rank in accordance with the Civil Service law.

In order to sustain the view expressed in the first proposition, counsel for the prosecutors pointed out that the act approved March 24th, 1885, (Pamph. L., p. 130; Comp. Stat., p. 2391, § 256), prescribes that the officers and men employed by municipal authority in the fire department of any city shall severally hold their respective offices and continue in their respective employment as such municipal officers and employes during good behavior, efficiency and residence in such city, except where, by statute, the term of any such officer and employe is determined and fixed and does not depend upon the pleasure or caprice of any municipal officer, officers or board authorized to make appointment or employment in said department, and that such officer or employe shall not [471]*471be removed from such office or employment for political reasons or for any other cause than incapacity, misconduct, non-residence or disobedience of just rules and regulations. And from this counsel argues that according to the construction put on this statute, in Michaelis v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 154, where it was held that the transfer of an employe in the Jersey City fire department from his position of engineer to that of stoker, the latter position being attended with different duties and different pay, was invalid, and it appearing that the reduction of the prosecutors in the present case is to a rank requiring different duties and less pay, therefore, the present ease is controlled by the one cited, and the reduction in rank of the prosecutors must be declared invalid.

And it is further insisted that because section 1 of the act of 1906 (Pamph. L., p. 429; Comp. Stat., p. 2402, pl. 298) provides, among other things, that battalion chiefs shall hold their office or employment during good behavior and shall be removed for cause after a hearing or opportunity therefor is afforded, the word “cause” in the statute must be held to mean one of the causes designated in the act of 1885.

The force of this argument is much weakened by the fact that in an act entitled “An act to remove the fire and police departments in the cities of this state from political control,” approved May 2d, 1885 (Pamph. L., p. 326; Comp. Stat., p. 2341), under which a. board of fire commissioners was organized in the city of ISTewark, it is provided by section 1, pladtum 64, page 2341 of the compiled statutes that the board of fire commissioners shall be entrusted with the government, control and management of the fire department, and with the direction and control of all public fire matters, subject to the inspection and supervision of the common council of such city, as in the act provided.

And that by pladtum 70, section 7, it is further provided, inter alia, that the board shall be authorized and empowered to employ such persons as may be deemed necessary by said board from time to time, a tub shall be authorized and empowered to declare vacant any and all of the offices or posi[472]*472tions therein or thereunder as to such board may appear best for the public interest in the department.

And that by placitum 71, section 8, it is further provided, inter alia, that the board shall have full power and right to suspend and to expel or discharge any person employed or appointed in or under the control of the board, provided good cause shall be shown for such suspension, expulsion or discharge after an investigation by such board.

The legal effect of these provisions, and their effect on the provisions of the earlier act of 1885, supra, was dealt with by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Newark v. Lyon, 53

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Bluebook (online)
99 A. 432, 89 N.J.L. 468, 4 Gummere 468, 1916 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/durkin-v-board-of-fire-commissioners-nj-1916.