Durkee v. Chambers

57 Mo. 575
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedOctober 15, 1874
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 57 Mo. 575 (Durkee v. Chambers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Durkee v. Chambers, 57 Mo. 575 (Mo. 1874).

Opinion

NaptoN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This proceeding was commenced in the Circuit Court of Scotland county in 1872, to subject certain lands in that county, to which defendant had the legal title, to the payment of certain claims belonging to the plaintiff.

It seems that one Allen, the father-in-law of the defendant, Chambers, lived in Callaway county, and had a note upon one Woods, for $3,'250.00, dated in 1857 and secured by a mortgage on a tract of land in Scotland county. Suit was instituted on this note and mortgage in 1852, in Scotland couuty, and was pending in 1862, when Allen weut up to Scotland county and sold the note and mortgage to his son-in-law, the defendant, who then had been living in this county for several years, though previously a citizen of Fulton in Callaway county, and residing during the years 1857, ’8, ’9, partly at the house of Allen.

Allen’s property in Callaway county was not sufficient to pay his debts, in 1862. The suit against Woods by Allen, was, immediately after the transfer to Chambers, continued in Chamber’s name, and was not finally determined until 1870. A credit of $2,000 on the note, besides some small credits indorsed on it, was claimed, and the title to a portion of the tract of land was disputed, and claimed by the heirs of Cad-well. This suit was carried on by defendant, at considerable expense, and loss of time and personal attention on his part, and was ultimately compromised or settled by the defendant’s buying up the Cadwell title, and procuring a deed from the mortgagor Woods, to the entire tract.

The creditors in Callaway then assigned to the present plaintiff their claims against Allen, and upon these judgments had executions issued, and the land levied on [577]*577and sold as Allen’s land ; and tills suit is brought to set aside Chambers’ title, on the ground that the purchase by him was a fraudulent contrivance on the part of Allen and Chambers to hinder, delay and defraud these creditors.

From the bill of exceptions it appears that certain issues involved by the petition and answer, were agreed ou*and submitted to a jury. These issues Avere :

1st. That on the 1st day of May, 1862, and prior and subsequent thereto, said Thomas D. Allen was largely indebted to Robert IT. Damon aud others, of which said indebtedness defendant, Chambers, had full notice. Plaintiff affirms, and defendant denies.

2d. That for the purpose of hindering and delaying his said creditors, the said Thomas D. Allen assigned to the said Aaron K. Chambers a certain promissory note for the sum of $3,250 dated, etc., secured by a mortgage, etc.

3rd, That the said defendant, A. K. Chambers, conspiring with said Allen to hinder, delay and defraud, and for the purpose of enabling the said Allen to hinder, delay and defraud his said creditors, took and received the said assignment and note to himself, and claimed to be the sole and exclusive owner thereof, when in truth and in fact the said Thomas D. Allen was the owner thereof.

These issues, it will be perceived, did not involve any question in regard to the assignment having been made for a valuable consideration, though the petition so claimed, aud asserted the assignment to have been purely voluntary and without any consideration whatever, and the instructions of plaintiff are also based on the assumption that the assignment was not voluntary, and the evidence undoubtedly showed a valuable consideration, concerning the adequacy of which however there was a dispute and a conflict of testimony.

The instructions given for the plaintiff- and defendant are only important as showing the .theory of law on whicli the court submitted the issues to a jury.

The instructions given for the plaintiff were:

[578]*5781st. “If the jury believe from the evidence that on the 7th day of May, 1862, and prior and subsequent thereto, one Thomas D. Allen was indebted to -Damon, etc.; and that defendant had notice of the indebtedness, the jury will find the first issue for the plaintiff.” 2nd. “If the jury believe from the evidence, that, fol the purpose of delaying and hindering his creditors, the said Thojnas D. Allen assigned to the said Chambers a certain promissory note, etc., they will find the second issue for plaintiff.’5 3rd. “If the jury shall believe from the evidence, that Chambers took the assignment from Allen for the purpose of enabling Allen to delay his creditors, they will find the third issu’e for plaintiff.” The 4th is a mere statement of what the pleadings admit. 5th. “If the jury believe that defendant Chambers conspired with Thomas D. Allen to hinder and delay his creditors, or to enable the said Allen to hinder or delay his creditors, and received to himself the note and mortgage assigned, and claimed -to be the owner thereof, they will find the third issue for plaintiff. 6th. “If the jury believe that Chambers paid a full consideration for the assignment from Allen, yet if the jury .further believe that Chambers intended thereby to enable the said -Allen to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, they will find-tlie third issue for plaintiff.”

Four instructions were given for defendant:

1st. “If. the jury find that the defendant Chambers, did purchase in good faith the said promissory note and mortgage of the said Thomas D. Allen, and also the -interest of the said Thomas D. Allen in the suit then pending in Scotland Circuit Court thereon, fora valuable consideration paid or agreed to be paid, they will find for defendant on the second issue submitted, unless they further find that the same was done by the said Allen to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors ; and that defendant Chambers had notice thereof.” 2nd. “Though the jury find from the evidence, that the consideration for which the assignment of the note and mortgage was made, was less than the actual value of the land on which said mortgage was given, yet said assignment was valid in law and does not [579]*579authorize the jury on that account to find for the defendant, unless they further find from the evidence, that the said Allen conspired with the said Chambers, to hinder, delay or defraud said Allen’s creditors, and did so enter into said contract and assignment for that purpose, they will find for defendant on the third issue.” 3rd. “Although the jury find that Allen, now deceased, did, for the purpose of hindering or delaying his creditors, assign to the defendant a promissory note, etc., unless they also find that said defendant had notice of Allen’s indebtedness, they will find for defendant on the second issue.” 4th. “If the jury find that the said Allen was largely indebted to Damon, etc., in Callaway county, yet unless they further find that these debts were subsisting at the time of the transfer, and that defendant Chambers had notice, etc., they will find for defendant.”

Thes'e instructions taken singly are very defective. For instance, the second instruction given for plaintiff is manifestly not the law, if designed to convey the doctrine that a bona fide assignee for value would be affected by the fraudulent intent of his assignor, of which he had no knowledge. But it is apparent from the other instructions on both sides, that such was not the design of the instructions.

The real question for the jury to determine was, whether this purchase was bona fide and for a valuable consideration, or was made on the part of Chambers to aid Allen in covering up the property from his creditors.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
57 Mo. 575, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/durkee-v-chambers-mo-1874.