Durham v. Seymour

6 App. D.C. 78, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3576
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedApril 1, 1895
DocketNo. 401
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 6 App. D.C. 78 (Durham v. Seymour) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Durham v. Seymour, 6 App. D.C. 78, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3576 (D.C. Cir. 1895).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the Court:

[87]*87The first question for consideration is the error assigned upon the action of the court below in confining complainant to the three claims finally presented for the action of the Commissioner of Patents, and in the consequent refusal to consider the nine additional claims of which notice had been given before the hearing. The contention of complainant is, substantially, that he is not bound or concluded by his action in presenting but three of his claims for adjudication in the Patent Office, because this is a new and independent proceeding in equity, to be conducted according to the ordinary procedure in the courts thereof, and hence that he is now entitled to claim every and anything that might be disclosed by the specifications of his application or any part thereof. In this view we cannot concur.

The right to file the bill is conferred by Section 4915 R. S. by these words: “ Whenever a patent on application is refused, either by the Commissioner of Patents or by the Supreme Court (now Court of Appeals) of the District of Columbia upon appeal from the Commissioner, the applicant may have remedy by bill in equity; and the court having cognizance thereof, on notice to adverse parties and other due proceedings had, may adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention, as specified in his claim, or for parts thereof as the facts in the case may appear.”

In Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 62, it was said that the proceeding authorized by the foregoing section was not a technical appeal like that given in section 4911, and could be heard upon all competent evidence introduced therein. This is all that was actually decided in the case specially relied on by appellant, Ex parte Squire, 5 Ban. & Ar. 133. In Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432, 439, it was said that although the proceeding is not a technical appeal from the Patent Office, Yet the proceeding is, in fact and necessarily, a part of the application for the patent;” and it was consequently held that a delay of more than two years in filing the bill, after the last action upon the application had [88]*88in the Patent Office, was fatal under the provisions of section 4894.

The reasoning in support of the appellant’s contention is founded largely in the assumption that a person may file his application, describing his supposed invention in general terms and making any general claim or claims, and that thereupon it becomes the duty of the authorities of the Patent Office to discover just what the applicant’s invention really is, in its fullest scope and effect, and award him a patent therefor. Whatever may have been the policy of the early statutes in this regard, the assumption is clearly opposed to that declared in the revision of the patent laws in the act of 1870, the effect of which was to impose upon the applicant the duty of ascertaining, pointing out and claiming what he supposed his invention to be. Section 4888 R. S., which governs the application, expressly adds to the language of the former act, that “ he shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.”

The purpose of this change in the statute is well stated by Judge Dallas, as follows : “ The practice of the profession and the opinions of the judges, to which I have adverted, had suggested that the embarrassments attendant upon the efforts of the courts to construe vague and indefinite patents might, without doing injury to patentees, be much alleviated by denying protection for anything, though original, new and useful, which was not also distinctly claimed. In brief, it was prescribed that the claim must be taken as defining precisely what the invention covered by the patent is, and hence the true question is not what the patentee might have claimed, but what he has claimed, the latter, not the former, being- made the measure of his right. The rules for determining what is claimed in any case are few and simple, and are not peculiar to the patent law except as respects the doctrine of liberality in construction in favor of pioneer inventors. * * * It is sufficient to say that if the language of a claim has a plain and distinct meaning, [89]*89that meaning must prevail. That which is to be ascertained is, of course, the intent of the claimants, not, however, that intent as elsewhere or in some other manner disclosed, but as expressed in the claim itself.” Durand v. Green, 67 O. G. 814.

The law imposes upon the applicant the duty of looking after his own interest. The Commissioner and his subordinates are charged with the protection of the interests of the public, while treating the applicant with fairness and liberality. This seems to be the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 354, where Mr. Justice Bradley said: “ It was probably supposed that the patentee would never err in claiming too little. Those who have any experience in business at the Patent Office know the fact that the constant struggle between the office and the applicants for patents has reference to the claims. The patentee seeks the broadest claim he can get. The office, in behalf of the public, is obliged to resist this constant pressure.”

When the appellant filed his application and specifications he made his claims thereon. These he changed from time to time during the many years spent in trying to obtain a patent, amending his application also to meet the objections of the examiners. He was under no obligation to conform to these objections or to abate any part of his claim. He had his election to stand by his specifications and claims, and to demand a decision thereon as presented, with the right to appeal therefrom, if adverse, to the court, directly as provided in section 4911, and indirectly through bill in equity under section 4915; or to amend his application, alter his specifications, and abandon any part or parts of his claims based thereon. It is a rule of general application, though not without its exceptions, that one who has two separate and distinct remedies is barred of his pursuit of one by his election to pursue the other.

If, after all these amendments, he had overcome the objections made by the examiner and received a patent on the [90]*90three claims finally relied on, the patent would have covered them, and nothing more. Roemer v. Peddie, 132 U. S. 313, 317. “The claim of a specific device or combination and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed. It is a declaration that that which is not claimed is either not the patentee’s invention, or, if his, he dedicates it to the public.” Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 352. See also Miller v. Eagle Co., 151 U. S. 186, 202; Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U. S. 286, 296.

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Bluebook (online)
6 App. D.C. 78, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3576, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/durham-v-seymour-cadc-1895.