Duraso v. GeoVera Advantage Insurance Co

District Court, W.D. Louisiana·Decided September 28, 2022·No. 2:21-cv-01561·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

JEREMY DURASO CASE NO. 2:21-CV-01561

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

GEOVERA ADVANTAGE INSURANCE MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY CO ET AL

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [doc. 36] filed by plaintiff and seeking adjudication of his claims of bad faith against defendant GeoVera Specialty Insurance Company (“GeoVera”). GeoVera opposes the motion. Doc. 39. I. BACKGROUND

This suit arises from damage inflicted by Hurricane Laura, which made landfall in Southwest Louisiana on August 27, 2020. The storm allegedly caused significant damage to the home of Jeremy Duraso in Sulphur, Louisiana. Doc. 1. At all relevant times this home was insured under a policy issued by GeoVera which provides in relevant part the following types of coverage: Coverage Type Limit of Liability Coverage A (Dwelling) $200,000.00 Coverage B (Other Structures) $20,000.00 Coverage C (Personal Property) $100,000.00 Coverage D (Loss of Use) $40,000.00

Doc. 1, att. 5. Plaintiff alleges that his home remains unrepaired due to GeoVera’s failure to properly adjust the claim and timely tender the full amounts for repair of property and

replacement of damaged or lost contents. Doc. 36, att. 2, p. 1. He also maintains that GeoVera representatives misrepresented pertinent facts and policy provisions, resulting in underpayment of his claim. Id. at 4–6. He filed suit in this court against GeoVera on March 18, 2021, raising claims of breach of insurance contract and bad faith. Doc. 1. The case proceeded through the streamlined settlement process outlined in the court’s Case Management Order for first-party insurance claims arising from Hurricanes

Laura and Delta, but did not resolve. It is now set for jury trial before the undersigned on November 7, 2022. Doc. 21. The undersigned previously denied a motion for summary judgment filed by GeoVera, where it asserted that plaintiff had voided the policy due to certain material misrepresentations about preexisting damage to his home. Docs. 32, 33. Plaintiff now brings this motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to his bad faith claims and that he is entitled to an award of statutory penalties and attorney fees as outlined in Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 22:1892 and 1973. Doc. 36. GeoVera opposes the motion. Doc. 39. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party is initially responsible for identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by pointing out “the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Malacara

v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit “significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249 (citations omitted). A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v.

Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). III. LAW & APPLICATION

A. Governing Law Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction applies the substantive law of the forum state. Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 687 (5th Cir. 1991). Louisiana law provides that an insurance policy is a contract and that its provisions are construed using the general rules of contract interpretation in the Louisiana Civil Code. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Superior Labor Svcs., Inc.,

179 F.Supp.3d 656, 675 (E.D. La. 2016). The words of the policy are given their generally prevailing meaning and “interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.” Coleman v. Sch. Bd. of Richland Par., 418 F.3d 511, 516–17 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 2047, 2050). Ambiguities in the policy must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Id. The court resolves an ambiguity by asking “how a reasonable insurance policy purchaser would

construe the clause at the time the insurance contract was entered.” Id. Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1892 makes an insurer liable for penalties and attorney fees in certain circumstances based on its bad faith handling of a claim. To prevail under this statute, the insured must show that (1) the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss; (2) the insurer failed to tender payment within 30 days of receiving this proof; and (3)

the insurer’s failure to pay is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” Guillory v. Lee, 16 So.3d 1104, 1126 (La. 2009). Similarly, Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1973(B)(5) provides for an award of penalties when an insurer fails to pay within 60 days and that failure is “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” Under the first factor, proof of loss, Louisiana courts set no strict requirement as to

form and instead only require that the insurer “obtain[] sufficient information to act on the claim.” Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729, 739 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sevier v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 497 So.2d 1380, 1384 (La. 1986)). On the third, compliance with the statute means that the insurer “must pay any undisputed amount over which reasonable minds could not differ.” Dupree v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 51 So. 3d 673, 698 (La. 2010). The insurer does not act arbitrarily or capriciously, however, if it “has a

reasonable basis to defend the claim and acts in good-faith reliance on that defense.” Reed v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co., 857 So. 2d 1012, 1021 (La. 2003). B.

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