Durante v. Belknap, NH

2004 DNH 113

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: July 28, 2004
• Docket: CV-03-333-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Durante v . Belknap, NH CV-03-333-SM 07/28/04 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Count Durante, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 03-333-SM Opinion N o . 2004 DNH 113 County of Belknap, New Hampshire, Defendant

O R D E R

Plaintiff, Count Durante, brings this two-count complaint

against Belknap County, seeking damages for injuries he says he

sustained when he fell while trying to enter the Belknap County

Superior Courthouse. In count one of his complaint, Durante

alleges that the County was negligent insofar as it failed to

provide a safe passageway for the public to enter the courthouse.

In count two, he claims the County failed to make the courthouse

readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities,

in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq (the “ADA”).

Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the County moves for judgment on the pleadings with regard to count two of Durante’s complaint, asserting that his

ADA claim is time barred. The court disagrees and, for the

reasons discussed below, the County’s motion is denied.

Discussion

Durante is visually impaired, and walks with the assistance

of a guide dog, Patches. According to the complaint, on August

2 9 , 2000, Durante, guided by Patches, approached the court’s

designated entrance along a walkway maintained by the County.

While proceeding along that walkway, he “hit a low branch on a

tree with his nose, face and eyes, and was rendered unconscious.”

Complaint at 1 . Durante says he sustained injuries to his nose

and eyes. Approximately two years and 10 months later, Durante

filed this suit against the County.

According to the County, Durante’s claim is time barred. In

support of that position, it asserts that because Title II of the

ADA provides no specific limitations period, the court must apply

the most analogous state statute of limitations. To that general

statement of the applicable law, all can agree. See, e.g.,

Wilson v . Garcia, 471 U.S. 2 6 1 , 266-67 (1985). Next, the County

2 asserts that the most analogous state limitations period is not

the three-year period provided by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (“RSA”)

508:4, but rather the far shorter 180-day period prescribed by

New Hampshire’s Law Against Discrimination, RSA 354-A:21 III.

The County’s argument falls short for at least two reasons.

First, this court has previously held that claims brought under

the ADA are governed by the three-year limitations period

prescribed by RSA 508:4. See Trovato v . City of Manchester, 992

F. Supp. 493, 499 (D.N.H. 1997) (holding that plaintiff’s claims

under Title II of the ADA are governed by “the three year

limitations period set forth in New Hampshire’s personal injury

statute.”); Doukas v . Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp.

1197, 1200 (D.N.H. 1995) (“The court finds that a claim for

discrimination brought under the ADA is best characterized as a

claim for personal injury. Accordingly, the most ‘appropriate’

or ‘analogous’ statute of limitations is [the three-year period

prescribed by RSA 508:4] that applies to personal injury

actions.”) (citations omitted).

3 Second, even if the court were to accept the County’s

argument and apply the limitations period prescribed by New

Hampshire’s Law Against Discrimination, the outcome would be no

different. Effective June 1 6 , 2000, the New Hampshire

legislature established a three-year limitations period for all

civil suits alleging violations of the Law Against Discrimination

(provided the plaintiff has complied with the administrative

filing requirement established by that statute). See RSA 354-

A:21-a (“Any party alleging to be aggrieved by any practice made

unlawful under this chapter may, . . . not later than 3 years

after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, bring a civil

action for damages.”) (emphasis supplied). See generally Munroe

v . Compaq Computer Corp., 229 F. Supp. 2d 5 2 , 66-67 (D.N.H. 2002)

(Muirhead, M.J.) (discussing the recent amendments to RSA 354-A

which, among other things, create a private right of action for

plaintiffs asserting violations of that statute and establish a

three-year limitations period).

The 180-day limitations period the County seeks to have the

court “borrow” in this case applies exclusively to administrative

complaints filed with the state commission on human rights. See

4 RSA 354-A:21. It does not apply to civil suits alleging

violations of the Law Against Discrimination. As noted above,

RSA 354-A:21-a provides that such suits are governed by a three-

year limitations period.

Conclusion

After sustaining injuries from his fall at the Belknap

County Superior Courthouse, Durante had three years within which

to file suit against the County under the ADA. He did s o .

Accordingly, the County’s motion for partial judgment on the

pleadings (document n o . 9 ) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

July 2 8 , 2004

cc: Philip A . Brouillard, Esq. Debra W . Ford, Esq.