Durant v. Corbin

94 F. 382, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3066
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Washington·Decided May 22, 1899·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

HANFORD, District Judge.

This is a suit in equity, brought under section 2326, Rev. St. U. S., in support of the complainant’s adverse claim, filed in the United States land office at Spokane, against the application of the defendant for a patent for Sheep Creek placer claim. The complainant claims, by purchase from the locators thereof, the Lost Axe and Clifford mining claims, each containing 20 acres, which are within the boundaries of Sheep Creek placer claim, containing 160 acres, located by a company of eight persons, seven of whom have executed deeds conveying their rights to the defendant.' In their pleadings each party claims priority in point of time in the making of their respective locations, both being made on the same date, to wit, February 20, 1896. There is, however, such preponderance of the evidence in favor of the defendant on this point that counsel for the complainant upon the hearing [383] practically conceded that the location of the Sheep Creek placer claim was prior in point of time to the locations of the Lost Axe and Clifford. The complainant, however, contests the validity of the Sheep Creek location on the ground that the same was not made bona fide by all of the eight persons named, and charges that all of them except R. A. Hutchinson, who has not given a deed of his interest to the defendant, were either employés of the defendant, and acting for him in locating said claim, or they were friends of the defendant, who had nothing whatever to do with making said locations, and that the defendant simply used their names as locators, in the expectation that they would afterwards convey whatever colorable rights might he acquired in their names to him without consideration. The evidence fully sustains the contention of the complainant that the location of Sheep Creek placer claim was merely a scheme on the part of the defendant to acquire title to the ground by using the names of his employés and friends as locators. I have no difficulty in finding this to be the case from the testimony of the defendant himself, who-frankly admits that he arranged for and directed the location of said claim, and that his purpose was to be sure of having the ground located in the names of his friends, with whom he could deal on terms satisfactory to himself; and he also admits that he has paid no consideration for the conveyances which the locators have made to him. The evidence shows, however, that he did pay some of the locators who went upon the ground for doing so. The defendant claims that the location of the Sheep Creek placer claim*:in the manner in which it was made is authorized by section 2330, Rev. St. U. S., which reads as follows:

“Sec. 2330. Legal subdivisions of forty acres may be subdivided into ten-acre tracts; and two or more parsons, or associations of persons, having contiguous claims of any size, although such claims may be less than ten acres each, may make joint entry thereof; but no location of a placer-claim made after the ninth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy, shall exceed one hundred and sixty acres for any one person or association of persons, which location shall conform to 1he United States surveys; and nothing- in this section contained shall defeat or impair any bona-fide pre-emption or homestead claim upon agricultural lands or authorize the sale of the improvements of any bona-fide settler to any purchaser.”

It was necessary to use the names of eight persons, because section 2330 provides that no location of a placer claim shall include more than 20 acres for each individual claimant, and it was considered necessary to secure the largest area allowed to an association by section 2330, in order to secure the water rights necessary, as the defendant claims, to profitably work the ground. The advantage of securing a large area is obvious, and no doubt selfishness would dictate the claiming of a much larger tract than 160 acres if the utmost limit of the law would permit it. But the policy of the government in disposing of the mineral lands, as well as other portions of the public domain, is- to make a general distribution among as large a number as possible of those who wish to acquire such land for their own use, rather than to favor a few individuals, who might wish to acquire princely fortunes by securing large tracts of such land; and it is contrary to this policy, and to the provisions of sections 2330 [384] and 2331, for one person to cover more tiran 20 acres of placer ground by one location by the device of using the names of his employés and friends as locators. Gird v. Oil Co., 60 Fed. 545.

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Durant v. Corbin, 94 F. 382, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3066 (circtdwa 1899).

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