Duran-Serrano v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 21-990
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERASMO DURAN-SERRANO, No. 21-990 Agency No. Petitioner, A213-079-190 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 20, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: BYBEE, LEE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Erasmo Duran-Serrano, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal of an immigration

judge’s (IJ) decision denying his claims for cancellation of removal, asylum,

withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review the IJ and BIA’s factual findings and “primarily factual mixed question[s]”

“for substantial evidence.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir.

2025). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1. Cancellation of removal. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial

of cancellation of removal because Duran-Serrano’s removal would not “result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his qualifying U.S.-citizen family

members. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The largely financial and social harms

alleged by Duran-Serrano are not “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that

would be expected when a close family member leaves the country.” Gonzalez-

Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Asylum. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that

Duran-Serrano did not establish a nexus between his membership in a particular

social group and his alleged persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). “To meet this

nexus requirement, an applicant must show that the protected ground was at least

one central reason the applicant” was or would be persecuted. Aden v. Wilkinson,

989 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Duran-Serrano’s allegations about persecution against members of his family

lack a common thread or motivation outside of isolated incidents of random crime.

Criminal activity does not merit asylum protection when no motivating nexus to the

2 21-990 particular social group is established. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1010, 1015–

16 (9th Cir. 2010).

3. CAT. The BIA correctly held that Duran-Serrano did not prove his claim

for protection under the Convention Against Torture. To receive CAT protection,

“an applicant must show ‘it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured

if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23

F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)).

Duran-Serrano does not claim he was ever targeted for or suffered any torture

before coming to the United States. Rather, he bases his argument on the current

country conditions in Mexico that are alone insufficient for CAT protection. See

Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2020); Delgado-Ortiz v.

Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“generalized evidence of violence and

crime in Mexico . . . is insufficient to meet [the more likely than not] standard.”).

He also alleges that the incidents involving his family members indicate a

likelihood that he himself will be targeted for violence or criminality. But again,

isolated and sporadic incidents with no throughline do not satisfy the high bar of it

being more likely than not that Duran-Serrano will be tortured if returned to Mexico.

Plancarte Sauceda, 23 F.4th at 834.

3 21-990 4. Motion to suppress. Duran-Serrano’s motion to suppress Form I-213

describing his arrest and alienage was properly denied as untimely, moot, and

insufficient on the merits.

Subject to good-cause exceptions, immigration judges can set and enforce

filing deadlines. Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 763 (9th Cir. 2023).

Duran-Serrano’s motion to suppress was filed three weeks after the appropriate

deadline set by the IJ and is therefore untimely. Further, Duran-Serrano introduced

the contested evidence himself. His motion to suppress was thus mooted by his own

action.

In any event, his claim fails on the merits. The exclusionary rule only applies

in immigration proceedings “when the agency violates a regulation promulgated for

the benefit of petitioners and that violation prejudices the petitioner’s protected

interests [or] when the agency egregiously violates a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

rights.” B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 841 (9th Cir. 2022). Neither situation applies

here. Duran-Serrano was arrested during a traffic stop soon after he exited an

address being surveilled by immigration officers in search of a previously removed

alien who he resembles. When stopped, Duran-Serrano identified himself with a

Mexican Consular Identification Card and admitted to lacking appropriate

immigration documents. Duran-Serrano’s arrest was supported by “individualized

reasonable suspicion” and was not the result of mere racial profiling. Perez Cruz v.

4 21-990 Barr, 926 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2019). There was no Fourth Amendment

violation, let alone an egregious violation meriting suppression. See Martinez-

Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). The IJ and BIA properly

denied Duran-Serrano’s suppression claim.

5. Voluntary departure. Duran-Serrano waived his request for voluntary

departure. The BIA “may apply a procedural default rule” to arguments waived or

forfeited. Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1296–97 (9th Cir. 2019). “It is a well-

known axiom of administrative law that if a petitioner wishes to preserve an issue

for appeal, he must first raise it in the proper administrative forum.” Barron v.

Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Duran-Serrano

waived any request for voluntary departure when he acknowledged through counsel

that he would be ineligible if he contested the removal charge and the IJ sustained

the charge, both of which occurred. Further, Duran-Serrano failed to raise his

request for voluntary departure at his removal hearings.

6. Jurisdiction. Duran-Serrano argues that the IJ lacked jurisdiction because

the initial notice to appear did not state a time or place of a hearing. But a defective

initial notice does not defeat jurisdiction or justify reopening so long as the

noncitizen was later given a written notice “that includes the new time or place of

the proceedings and the consequences of failing . . . to attend such proceedings.”

5 21-990 Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447, 461 (2024) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Duran-Serrano received such notices and attended his hearings with

counsel.

PETITION DENIED.

6 21-990