Dupont v. Dubois

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedJuly 16, 1998
Docket97-1167
StatusUnpublished

This text of Dupont v. Dubois (Dupont v. Dubois) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dupont v. Dubois, (1st Cir. 1998).

Opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 97-1167

MICHAEL KEVIN DUPONT, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LARRY E. DUBOIS, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 97-1786

LARRY E. DUBOIS, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 97-2134

LARRY EDWARD DUBOIS, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.

Michael Kevin Dupont on brief pro se. Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and David J. Rentsch, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for appellee.

July 15, 1998

Per Curiam. In these consolidated appeals, Michael Kevin DuPont appeals from the denial of preliminary injunction motions he filed in two civil rights cases. Having limited our consideration to issues squarely presented to the district court and properly preserved for appellate consideration, we affirm for the following reasons. First, the appellate brief largely reasserts arguments which were rejected by this court in a prior appeal. See DuPont v. Dubois, 99 F.3d 1128, 1996 WL 649340 (1st Cir. 1996) (unpublished per curiam). We have found nothing in it which would cause us to revisit the conclusions reached in that appeal. Second, in appeal No. 97-2134, the district judge denied preliminary injunctive relief without prejudice, apparently for procedural reasons (the motions had been filed before the complaint had been screened under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and before the defendants had been served). On appeal, DuPont has made no attempt to explain how the court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion or legal error, thereby waiving his claims as to this appeal. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Puerto Rico, 906 F.2d 25, 40 (1stCir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990) (an issue not adequately raised in the appellate brief is waived) (citation omitted). Finally, the motions filed by DuPont, which were summarily denied by the district court in appeal Nos. 97-1786 and 97-1167, were conclusory and failed to show an entitlement to injunctive relief. "[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may be granted only by a clear demonstration by a plaintiff of the merits of such a request." See 13 Moore's Fed. Prac. 65.20, at 65-29 (3d ed. 1998) (footnotes omitted). Under the circumstances, the district judge did not abuse his discretion or commit legal error in summarily denying the motions. See Narragansett Indian Tribev. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Unless a mistake of law or an abuse of discretion is made manifest, we will not disturb the [denial of a preliminary injunction motion.]") (quotation marks and citation omitted). Affirmed.

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Related

Dupont v. DuBois
99 F.3d 1128 (First Circuit, 1996)
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Paul E. Guilbert
934 F.2d 4 (First Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Dupont v. Dubois, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dupont-v-dubois-ca1-1998.