Duplessy v. Duplessy

102 So. 3d 209, 12 La.App. 5 Cir. 69, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 924, 2012 WL 2476441
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 28, 2012
DocketNo. 12-CA-69
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 102 So. 3d 209 (Duplessy v. Duplessy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duplessy v. Duplessy, 102 So. 3d 209, 12 La.App. 5 Cir. 69, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 924, 2012 WL 2476441 (La. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD, Judge.

^Defendant, Fulton Duplessy, Jr., appeals the trial court’s May 17, 2011 judgment awarding sole custody of the minor child, Jake Duplessy, to plaintiff, Clifford Duplessy. For the following reasons, we affirm the award of sole custody to Clifford, and we remand for the trial court to determine if Fulton is entitled to visitation.

[211]*211 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involving a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent arises from a unique set of facts and circumstances. Plaintiff, Clifford Duplessy, was one or two years old when his mother, Linda, married defendant, Fulton Duples-sy. Clifford refers to Fulton as his stepfather, though the testimony revealed that Fulton adopted Clifford when he was a child.

The minor child at issue, Jake Duplessy, was born on July 22, 1996. According to Clifford, when Jake was three months old, he received a call from his cousin, who is Jake’s biological father, indicating that he could not care for Jake [¡¡because he was being arrested. He asked Clifford to take care of the child. Clifford testified that he and his wife at the time, Sharon Duplessy, agreed to take Jake into their home and care for him. They originally believed that they would be caring for Jake for 30 to 90 days, but he ended up living with them for at least the first four years of his life.

In approximately 2001, Linda and Fulton legally adopted Jake. According to Clifford, he asked his mother to adopt Jake because he was in legal trouble, and he was also going through an acrimonious divorce. He maintains that he continued to provide for Jake and has acted as his father for most of his life. It is undisputed that Jake refers to Clifford as “Dad” and Fulton as “Pawpaw.” He has always referred to Linda as “Mawmaw.”

In his brief on appeal, Clifford contends that Jake lived with him from 1996 until July 2009, except for a period of time in 2006. Fulton disputes this and contends that Jake lived with him and Linda from the time he was adopted until Linda filed for divorce in May 2007. When Linda filed for divorce, Fulton asserts that Clifford moved in with Linda and Jake. Linda became sick and eventually passed away in May 2009. Jake lived with Clifford after Linda’s death until July 2009 when Fulton picked Jake up from his last day of summer school and refused to return him to Clifford’s home. According to Fulton, he allowed Jake to live with Clifford while he finished summer school, because Linda asked him to do so prior to her death. He indicated that he always intended for Jake to live with him when summer school was completed.

On July 15, 2009, Clifford filed a Petition for Custody against Fulton in the 24th Judicial District Court, seeking sole custody of Jake. The matter came before the court for trial on April 8 and 20, 2011. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court granted the parties additional time to submit memoranda. Thereafter, on May 17, |42011, the trial judge rendered a judgment awarding sole custody of Jake to Clifford, finding that awarding sole custody to Fulton would result in substantial harm to the minor child and that sole custody to Clifford was in the child’s best interest. Fulton appeals this judgment.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, Fulton asserts that the trial court committed manifest error when it qualified Terri Campes-ta as an expert in clinical psychology, and marriage, child, and family counseling. He argues that Ms. Campesta does not possess the knowledge required in evaluating a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent, because she did not use the appropriate standard when conducting her custody evaluation. Ms. Campesta testified that she used the “best interest of the child” standard in her evaluation, rather than the “substantial harm” standard which is used when there is a custody issue between a parent and a non-parent.

[212]*212A trial judge is vested with wide discretion in determining the competence of an expert witness. McFall v. Armstrong, 10-1041, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/13/11), 75 So.3d 30, 37. The competence of an expert witness is a question of fact to be determined within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id. Rulings on the qualifications of expert witnesses will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. Jefferson v. Jefferson, 06-301, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/31/06), 946 So.2d 191, 195.

LSA-C.E. art. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and provides as follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

iJn the present case, Ms. Campes-ta testified that she has a masters degree in clinical psychology, with an emphasis on marriage, family, and child counseling. She also stated that she is a licensed professional counselor and a licensed marriage and family therapist. She further noted that she has previously testified as an expert and that the trial court appointed her as an expert in this case.

The record before us shows that Ms. Campesta was qualified and properly accepted as an expert in clinical psychology, and marriage, child, and family counseling. Although Ms. Campesta did not use the “substantial harm” standard while evaluating the custody issues, it is the trial court that has the duty to apply the appropriate standard and make a determination of custody. Further, the best interest of the child is certainly relevant to the ultimate custody decision, even though the trial court must also find that substantial harm would result if custody is awarded to the parent.

Ms. Campesta interviewed several witnesses and provided a thorough evaluation to the trial court in which she recommended that Fulton and Clifford share joint custody of Jake. The trial judge was entitled to consider Ms. Campesta’s observations and evaluation and to give them the weight he deemed appropriate when determining the custody issue. Considering the testimony and evidence, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to qualify Ms. Campesta as an expert, and this assignment of error is without merit.

In his second assignment of error, Fulton argues that the trial court committed manifest error when it failed to recognize his constitutional rights as a parent and when it inaccurately applied Louisiana law for determining custody between a parent and a non-parent. He asserts that, as Jake’s father, he is constitutionally allowed to make decisions regarding his son’s upbringing, |f,including whether Jake goes to a doctor or dentist, whether Jake attends church, and whether Jake plays sports or participates in activities.

LSA-C.C. art. 133 provides:

If an award of joint custody or of sole custody to either parent would result in substantial harm to the child, the court shall award custody to another person with whom the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment, or otherwise to any other person able to provide an adequate and stable environment.

In a conflict between a parent and a non-parent, the parent enjoys the paramount right to custody of a child and may be deprived of such right only for compelling reasons. Whitman v. Williams, 08-1133, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir.

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Bluebook (online)
102 So. 3d 209, 12 La.App. 5 Cir. 69, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 924, 2012 WL 2476441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duplessy-v-duplessy-lactapp-2012.