Duplechin v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd.

237 So. 3d 1196
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 7, 2018
Docket17–748
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 237 So. 3d 1196 (Duplechin v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duplechin v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 237 So. 3d 1196 (La. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

AMY, Judge.

The claimant school teacher reported a worsening of her underlying respiratory condition after alleged exposure to mold in her middle school classroom. The employer denied her claim. After the claimant filed a disputed claim form and the parties submitted the matter on briefs and exhibits, the workers' compensation judge denied benefits upon a finding that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof as to causation. The claimant appeals, questioning the denial of benefits and seeking an award of benefits, penalties and attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The record in this workers' compensation matter indicates that the claimant, Amy Duplechin, began employment as a teacher with the St. Landry Parish School Board in 2000. During her employment, Ms. Duplechin suffered from respiratory symptoms which resulted in periodic absences from her work. These absences included a month-long period of extended sick leave in 2001,1 a 2005 semester-long medical sabbatical,2 and another semester-long medical sabbatical in 2011. In the physician's statement accompanying this latter sabbatical, Dr. Jose Santiago, indicated a February 9, 2011 diagnosis of sarcoidosis. The School Board subsequently granted the claimant an extended sick leave from January 14, 2013, through February 25, 2013. Dr. Santiago again noted sarcoidosis as the claimant's diagnosis. By February 28, 2013, however, Dr. Santiago indicated that the claimant was "ready to return" to "her full duties[.]"

The claimant alleges that the present matter arose when she returned to prepare *1198her classroom for the fall 2013 semester on July 31, 2013. She explained in her deposition that, upon moving a shelf in the classroom, she discovered black mold on the back of the shelf and a type of "mushroom growth all along the side of [the] air conditioner unit." Notes submitted into evidence by the School Board indicate that both the claimant and custodial staff cleaned the visible condition. The notations further reveal that the claimant was moved to a different classroom and was provided with an air filtration device.3 By the end of August 2013 however, the air filtration device was removed.

The claimant explained in the deposition entered into evidence that she last worked on October 1, 2013 "[b]ecause of [her] sarcoidosis and the effects that it has on [her] body." Additionally, in the claim form instituting this matter, she alleged that she "discovered the mold in the classroom and as a result of working in the mold infested classroom has developed an aggravation of her condition of lung sarcoidosis." By the proceeding, the claimant suggested that the School Board "failed to timely pay indemnity benefits and failed to timely authorize/pay medical benefits." In turn, she sought payment of penalties and attorney fees due to a failure to reasonably controvert her claim.

The parties submitted the matter to the workers' compensation judge on briefs and exhibits. After consideration, the workers' compensation judge determined "that the law and evidence favors the defendant for the reasons assigned in open court."

The claimant appeals, asserting that:

[1.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN did not prove a causal connection between her current physical condition and exposure to mold.
[2.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN is not entitled to indemnity or medical benefits.
[3.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN is not entitled to indemnity or medical benefits.[4 ]
[4.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN is not entitled to ... penalties or attorney's fees.

Discussion

With regard to the type of claim for occupational disease advanced in this case, La.R.S. 23:1031.1 provides that:

*1199A. Every employee who is disabled because of the contraction of an occupational disease as herein defined, or the dependent of an employee whose death is caused by an occupational disease, as herein defined, shall be entitled to the compensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said employee received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
B. An occupational disease means only that disease or illness which is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such disease. Occupational disease shall include injuries due to work-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis of any type, mental illness, and heart-related or perivascular disease are specifically excluded from the classification of an occupational disease for the purpose of this Section.

Noting that the above-provision includes broad and expansive wording in its definition of a compensable occupational disease, the supreme court has explained that, by definition, "an occupational disease is one in which there is a demonstrated causal link between the particular disease or illness and the occupation." Arrant v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc. , 13-2878, p. 21 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d 296, 309. Notwithstanding any arguments regarding a link between the disease and the occupation that could exist in this case, the issue of causation of the claimant's alleged disability was the primary focus of the workers' compensation ruling.

Causation

By her first two assignments of error, the claimant globally addresses certain factual findings expressed in the workers' compensation judge's oral reasons for ruling. In particular, the claimant challenges the workers' compensation judge's rejection of her contention that her pre-existing condition of sarcoidosis was exacerbated by her exposure to mold in the classroom which, in turn, caused the resulting disability. She suggests that the factual determination was manifestly erroneous, pointing to medical records from Dr. Santiago in the preceding months that purportedly reveal no significant complaints. She further suggests that her contemporaneous reporting to him of an increase in complaints-as she asserts were demonstrated in records from that office beginning on August 1, 2013-support a finding of a causal connection between her exposure and the ensuing disability. She suggests that this increase in her reported symptoms undermined the trial court's factual determination that:

While the Court finds that it is possible that her sarcoidosis was exacerbated by the mold present in the classroom, the Court finds that Ms. Duplechin has not proven that that exacerbation was what has caused her disability. Her condition was not dormant prior to this alleged exposure.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
237 So. 3d 1196, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duplechin-v-st-landry-parish-sch-bd-lactapp-2018.