Dunnington v. Magee

152 So. 2d 391, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1556
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 29, 1963
DocketNo. 5804
StatusPublished

This text of 152 So. 2d 391 (Dunnington v. Magee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dunnington v. Magee, 152 So. 2d 391, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1556 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

LANDRY, Judge.

In this action plaintiff, Breed T. Dunning-ton, seeks recovery of a portion of the purchase price paid defendant, Dr. Doyle C. Magee, for timber on certain lands owned by defendant and situated in Tangipahoa Parish. In substance, plaintiff contends that, upon the adverse claim of a third party, he, plaintiff, was evicted from and unable to cut the timber situated upon a certain 3.62 acre strip of land represented, pointed out and designated by defendant as comprising part of a 20 acre tract included and expressly described in the act of sale. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of defendant’s erroneous designation of the eastern boundary of the tract in question, plaintiff was compelled to pay the adverse claimant the sum of $60.00 (subsequently increased by amendment of plaintiff’s petition to $84.00) for timber cut thereon and, in addition, plaintiff was thereby deprived of timber valued at the sum of $1,472.00.

Defendant excepted to plaintiff’s petition as stating no right and no cause of action which said exceptions, after trial, were referred to the merits. Defendant then answered asserting in effect what amounts to a general denial. With the issues thus drawn the matter proceeded to trial following which our learned brother below rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the aggregate of $1,532.00. From the aforesaid unfavorable judgment defendant has appealed.

In consideration of the price and sum of $15,150.00 cash, under date of September 24, 1957, defendant formally sold and transferred to plaintiff the timber standing on several tracts of land belonging to defendant including, inter alia, the following described property:

Twenty (20). acres of land, more or less, situated in the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter and the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 8 South, Range 6 East, and being bounded on the North by Gaylord Container Corporation, West by W. L. Harris, East by Dendinger, Inc., South by Salmer Brick and Lumber Company.

This entire controversy revolves around a dispute between the parties regarding the location of the eastern boundary of the hereinabove described 20 acre tract. Defendant maintains that, prior to the sale in question, he accompanied plaintiff upon an inspection tour of the various tracts included in the sale and pointed out the boundaries of each said tract. With respect to the 20 acre tract, defendant contends he advised plaintiff the eastern boundary thereof commenced at a galvanized iron pipe marker situated one and [393]*393one-half chains east of an old field line known as the “Gaylord Corner of the Gaylord 40” said “Gaylord Corner” being marked by a white painted marker. On the other hand, plaintiff contends defendant indicated that the eastern boundary of this particular tract lies one and one-half chains east of the galvanized iron marker or approximately three chains east of the Gay-lord Corner instead of one and one-half chains east of the Gaylord Corner as contended by defendant.

Predicated upon the well established rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written instrument, upon the trial of this cause in the court below, learned counsel for defendant objected to the introduction of any verbal or parol evidence by plaintiff to establish the eastern boundary of the 20 acre tract in dispute herein. In this respect, counsel for appellant maintains that the deed being clear and unambiguous concerning the boundaries of the tract in question, parol evidence was inadmissible to establish the boundaries of this particular tract. Our esteemed brother below referred defendant’s said objections to the merits and considered the hereinafter discussed parol testimony subject to defendant’s said objection.

The record reveals that property lines in the general vicinity of the aforesaid 20 acre tract have for some time been in disagreement, there having been some attempts by former owners to reconcile differences of opinion regarding the exact location of boundaries. With regard to the particular 20 acre tract involved in this litigation, it appears that the true eastern boundary thereof lies at one of three possible locations. First, there is the “Old Field Line” marked by the white painted marker and known as the aforesaid “Gay-lord Corner” which O. C. Plollister, Surveyor, asserts to be the true boundary between defendant’s said property and that of Mr. and Mrs. Weldon Poole abutting same on the east, the Pooles being the successors in title to Dendinger, Inc. Secondly, approximately one and one-half chains east of the “Gaylord Corner” is to be found the line marked by the aforementioned galvanized iron pipe. This line is considered the true boundary by defendant and one Lowell Cummings, Surveyor, the latter having made a survey of the general area some years prior to institution of the present suit. Finally, there exists a third and unmarked line situated approximately one and one-half chains east of the iron pipe marker relied upon by defendant. As hereinbefore shown, plaintiff maintains that it is this last line which defendant represented to be the correct eastern boundary of the tract in question. It is undisputed that the area encompassed between the Gaylord Corner and the iron pipe relied upon by defendant as designating the boundary, comprises 1.7 acres while the area lying between the iron pipe and the line asserted by plaintiff to lie one and one-half chains to the east thereof contains 1.92 acres of land.

Appellee testified unequivocally that during the negotiations which led to the ultimate sale, defendant accompanied plaintiff upon a tour of the various tracts of land for the express purpose of personally designating and indicating the lines of the properties. According to plaintiff, defendant specifically indicated the eastern line of the 20 acre tract as being one and one-half chains east of the galvanized iron pipe marker or three chains east of the Gaylord Corner. Plaintiff then obtained the services of a forester, Murray Brashears, to cruise the timber on the tracts which plaintiff intended to purchase. According to plaintiff, Brashears was instructed to obtain the property descriptions from defendant, cruise the timber falling within the lines designated by Dr. Magee and inform plaintiff of the results thereof. Predicated upon Brashears’ estimates of timber situated upon. the tracts involved in the sale, the contract price of $15,150.00 was determined and fixed as the compensation to be paid by plaintiff. After the agreement was consummated and plaintiff had begun l'og-[394]*394ging operations, plaintiff was informed by a Mr. Freshwater, a forester representing Mr. and Mrs. Weldon Poole, that plaintiff was encroaching and trespassing on the Poole’s property situated to the east of the 20 acre tract owned by defendant. Upon being advised of a possible trespass upon the Poole land, plaintiff immediately ceased operations pending a survey of the line by the Pooles. Subsequently, plaintiff was presented a survey by O. C. Hollister, Surveyor, indicating the true line to be the Gaylord Corner situated 3 chains to the west of the line which plaintiff maintains had been represented by defendant to be the boundary between the Magee and Poole lands. Plaintiff thereupon discontinued operations in the disputed area and paid the Pooles the sum of $84.00 for timber cut and ¡removed from the 3.62 acre strip lying east of the Gaylord Corner. According to plaintiff, Dr. Magee was advised of the adverse claim asserted by the Pooles. Ma-gee’s immediate response was that he owned the property to the point represented to plaintiff.

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Related

Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co.
52 So. 2d 847 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1951)
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25 So. 2d 444 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1946)

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Bluebook (online)
152 So. 2d 391, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dunnington-v-magee-lactapp-1963.