Dunlop v. STOVE, FURNACE & ALLIED APPL. WKRS., ETC.

411 F. Supp. 801, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 12, 1976
Docket75-388C(A)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 411 F. Supp. 801 (Dunlop v. STOVE, FURNACE & ALLIED APPL. WKRS., ETC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dunlop v. STOVE, FURNACE & ALLIED APPL. WKRS., ETC., 411 F. Supp. 801, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619 (E.D. Mo. 1976).

Opinion

411 F.Supp. 801 (1976)

John T. DUNLOP, Secretary of Labor, U. S. Department of Labor, Plaintiff,
v.
STOVE, FURNACE & ALLIED APPLIANCE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Defendant.

No. 75-388C(A).

United States District Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D.

February 12, 1976.

*802 Joseph B. Moore, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff.

Harold Gruenberg, St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HARPER, Senior District Judge.

This action was brought by plaintiff, the Secretary of Labor, against the defendant, Stove, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as the Union), for alleged violations of section 401(g) of Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g). Plaintiff seeks to have the election of all officers of the defendant elected July 19, 1974, except the Fourth Vice-President, declared null and void. Plaintiff further seeks to have a new election conducted for all offices, except that of the Fourth Vice-President, under the supervision of the plaintiff. This Court has jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 482(b).

Count VIII of plaintiff's complaint alleges that plaintiff conducted an investigation of a Union member's complaint which resulted in a finding of probable cause to believe that a violation of Title IV of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 481 et seq.) had occurred and had not been remedied at the time of the institution of this action.

Count IX alleges that the Union violated Section 401(g) of the Act in its election, in that moneys received by defendant by way of dues, assessment, or similar levy, were used to promote the candidacy of certain persons in the election.

Count X alleges that the violation may have affected the outcome of all offices of the Union by its election of July 19, 1974, except that of the Fourth Vice-President.

This cause was submitted to the Court by both parties on the Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits filed by the parties on August 28, 1975 (which Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits is attached to this Memorandum, marked Exhibit A to the Court's Memorandum, and made a part hereof), Exhibits 1 through 9, and Defendant's Exhibit A filed on August 27, 1975. The exhibits were offered as joint exhibits of both parties.

The plaintiff's principal contention is that the defendant violated section 401(g) of the Act when it applied moneys which it received by way of dues, assessment, or similar levy, to the publication of its "Officers' Reports" book which the plaintiff alleges promoted the candidacies of certain persons in the defendant's officer election on July 19, 1974.[1] Section 401(g) of the Act provides:

"No moneys received by any labor organization by way of dues, assessment, or similar levy, and no moneys of an employer shall be contributed or applied to promote the candidacy of any person in an election subject to the provisions of this subchapter. Such moneys of a labor organization may be utilized for notices, factual statements of issues not involving candidates, and other expenses necessary for the holding of an election."

In its proposed conclusions of law, the defendant conceded that it had committed only a "technical" violation of Section 401(g) of the Act:

"2. Defendant's payment from its general funds for the report of its retiring *803 president containing his recommendations for named individuals to specific offices in Defendant constituted a technical violation of Section 401(g) of the LMRDA."

Further evidence of defendant's concession is seen in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Stipulation of uncontested facts (Court's Exhibit A to Memorandum). However, in its post trial briefs, the defendant denies that it has committed any violations of the Act. The defendant argues that none of those recommended in the "Officers' Reports" book (with the single exception of a Mr. Pierson), had officially announced their candidacy at the time the delegates received their books on the first day of the convention. However, it makes no difference if the recommended candidates had not been officially nominated as of the time of the recommendation. Brennan v. Sindicato Empleados de Equipo Pesado, Construccion Y Ramas Anexas de Puerto Rico, Inc., 370 F.Supp. 872 (D.Puerto Rico 1974). The defendant further states that the recommendations of the Union's president of candidates within the "Officers' Reports" book constituted a proper exercise of his right to express his view upon candidates in the Union election under the provisions of Section 101(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). That section states:

"Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions, and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings * * *."

While it is true that the Union's president may be entitled to express his views upon candidates at the Union's election, it is also true that "every member" of the Union has that same right. Here, it was uniquely within the authority of the Union president to extend an invitation to all other Union delegates to exercise this right at the convention. However, no such invitation was ever extended. Therefore, the unilateral conduct of the defendant, in circumstances such as these, constitutes a violation of Section 401(g) of the Act because the Union failed to extend an equivalent offer to other delegates or candidates. Ibid.

The plaintiff is not entitled to an order for a supervised election unless it can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Union's violation "may have affected the outcome" of the election of July 19, 1974. Section 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c).

However, the Supreme Court has held that once a violation of Section 401 has been proven, the existence of that violation establishes a prima facie case that the defendant's violation "may have affected the outcome" of the election. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 88 S.Ct. 1743, 20 L.Ed.2d 763 (1968). Here, the defendant has, by its own admission, committed a violation of Section 401(g) of the Act. Therefore, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the defendant to present sufficient evidence that the violation did not affect the outcome of the election. Id. at 508-509, 88 S.Ct. at 1752-1753, 20 L.Ed.2d at 775.

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411 F. Supp. 801, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dunlop-v-stove-furnace-allied-appl-wkrs-etc-moed-1976.