Dunkle v. Carmack

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 4, 2022
Docket8:22-cv-02497
StatusUnknown

This text of Dunkle v. Carmack (Dunkle v. Carmack) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dunkle v. Carmack, (M.D. Fla. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM DUNKLE, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 8:22-cv-2497-WFJ-TGW N. CARMACK, et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________________/

ORDER Mr. Dunkle, a Florida pre-trial detainee, initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint (Doc. 1). He alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to advise him of his Miranda rights before questioning him and obtaining a statement from him.1 As relief, Mr. Dunkle requests all “incriminating evidence” in his criminal case suppressed, the criminal charges dismissed, and monetary compensation for violation of his Miranda rights (Id., p. 5). The Court has undertaken a preliminary screening of the complaint in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). After doing so, the Court determines the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Mr. Dunkle’s allegation that Defendants violated Miranda procedures is not a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095 (2022);Jones v. Cannon, 174

1 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that officers must provide a “Miranda warning” to a criminal suspect in custody prior to interrogating the suspect.

1 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[Flailing to follow Miranda procedures triggers the prophylactic protection of the exclusion of evidence, but does not violate any substantive Fifth Amendment right such that a cause of action for money damages under § 1983 is created.”). And to the extent Mr. Dunkle challenges his criminal proceedings, he must raise his claims in a habeas corpus petition, not a civil rights complaint. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973))); Maps v. Miami Dade State Attorney, 693 F. App’x 784, 786- 87 (11th Cir. 2017) (“It is well established that an inmate in state custody ‘cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement’ and instead must seek federal habeas corpus or appropriate state court relief.”) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005)). Thus, the complaint is subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Accordingly, the complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Clerk must close this case. ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on November 4, 2022. me, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SA: sfc Copy to: Christopher William Dunkle, pro se

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Related

Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Wilkinson v. Dotson
544 U.S. 74 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Michael A. Maps v. Miami Dade Staff Attorney
693 F. App'x 784 (Eleventh Circuit, 2017)
Vega v. Tekoh
597 U.S. 134 (Supreme Court, 2022)
Swedish Hospital Corp. v. Shalala
1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Circuit, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
Dunkle v. Carmack, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dunkle-v-carmack-flmd-2022.