Dunkan Thomas Boyce v. State
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
§
DUNKAN THOMAS BOYCE, No. 08-13-00321-CR §
Appellant, Appeal from §
v. 366th District Court §
THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Colin County, Texas §
Appellee. (TC # 366-81420-2012)
§
OPINION
This appeal arises from a guilty plea in an attempted murder case.1 The issues focus only on the Bill of Costs, an Order to Withdraw Funds from Appellant’s prison account, and restitution to his victim. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and reform in part and dismiss in part.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Appellant entered a guilty plea on August 28, 2013 to a charge of attempted murder. He did so without a plea bargain and elected to have the trial court determine his sentence. At the plea hearing, the court took testimony and heard argument germane to both an appropriate prison
1 This case was transferred to us from our sister court in Dallas pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013). We follow the precedents of the Dallas Court of Appeals in deciding this matter. See TEX.R.APP.P. 41.3.
sentence, and the amount of restitution for the victim. The trial judge orally pronounced a sentence of twenty years’ confinement, but did not order any restitution.
The Judgment of Conviction, signed on August 29, 2013, sentenced Appellant to twenty years’ confinement, assessed court costs of $304.50, and also ordered him to pay restitution of $23,883. The Collin County District Clerk prepared a Bill of Costs dated September 6, 2013, which itemized various fees and costs. The Bill of Costs totals $3,504.50. Included on the Bill of Costs is a line item of $3,200 for “Attorney Fees.” The balance of the Bill of Costs consists of other various line item fees which total $304.50.
On September 9, 2013, the trial judge signed an Order to Withdraw Funds, which authorized a schedule for deductions from Appellant’s prison account until the total sum of $3,504.50 was repaid. The order claims on its face that it “does not include attorney fees assessed if any.” [sic]. But it is apparent from examining the Bill of Costs that the difference between the court costs in the judgment ($304.50) and the amount on the Order to Withdraw Funds ($3,504.50) is exactly the amount of the attorney’s fees billed by Appellant’s court appointed attorney. Appellant was assigned defense counsel at the trial court level under a claim of indigency which has not been challenged by the State. There were no subsequent hearings to determine if his indigency status had changed during the course of the proceedings below, and he has court appointed counsel on appeal.
Appellant brings two issues for review. In Issue One, he contends that the Bill of Costs and Order to Withdraw Funds erroneously contains the amount of attorney’s fees incurred by his court appointed trial counsel. In Issue Two he contends that because the trial judge did not order restitution when the sentence was pronounced, it was improper to later add restitution to the Judgment of Conviction.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Appellant challenges the Bill of Costs and Order Withdrawing Funds prepared and signed several weeks after the trial court pronounced sentence. They both appear to include a $3,200 charge for the attorney’s fee expended in Appellant’s defense.
Both Appellant and the State agree with most of the basic legal propositions which govern this issue. They agree that an indigent defendant cannot be taxed the cost of his or her court appointed lawyer unless the trial court finds that the defendant has the financial resources to repay those costs, in whole or part. See Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010); TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.05(g)(West Supp. 2014)(allowing taxing of fees as costs, but only upon a showing the defendant has the financial resources to offset the costs in whole or part). They agree that a “defendant who is determined by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless a material change in the defendant's financial circumstances occurs.” TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.04(p); Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). And they agree that Appellant was initially found to be indigent and was appointed counsel, and that there has been no finding of any material change in his financial condition. Nor does the State refute that the record shows that while the Judgment of Conviction taxes $304.50 in court costs, the Clerk’s Bill of Costs, and the Order to Withdraw Funds, has added $3,200, the exact amount of the attorney’s fees in the case. Where the parties differ is what to do about this state of affairs.
Appellant asks us to reform the Bill of Costs and the Order to Withdraw Funds to delete the amount of attorney’s fees. The State responds that Appellant is obliged to file a motion with the trial court to correct any errors in the Bill of Costs. The State further argues that we are without jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the Order to Withdraw Funds, citing Lewis v. State,
No. 05-12-00844-CR, 2014 WL 31690 at *7 (Tex.App.--Dallas Jan. 6, 2014, pet. ref’d)(mem. op., not designated for publication).
In this transferred appeal, we are of course bound by the precedents of the Dallas Court of Appeals. TEX.R.APP.P. 41.3. In Lewis, the Dallas Court was faced with a challenge to a trial court’s Order Withdrawing Funds from the defendant’s prison account. Id at *7. The order had been entered pursuant to TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 501.014 (West 2012) which authorizes a prison administrator to withdraw funds from a prisoner’s account, to among other things, pay restitution amounts and court costs. Noting that the Order to Withdraw is akin to a garnishment, and is a civil matter, the Lewis court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the Order to Withdraw under the notice of appeal which had been filed. Id. “The withdrawal order is not a criminal matter; it stems from a civil proceeding that is separate and independent from the judgment that assessed appellant's conviction and sentence.” Id. citing Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 317- 19 (Tex. 2009) and In re Johnson, 280 S.W.3d 866, 873-74 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008).
Lewis is consistent with other decisions from the Dallas Court and we are obliged to follow it. Villa v. State, No. 05-10-00584-CR, 2011 WL 6848392, at *14 (Tex.App.--Dallas Dec. 30, 2011, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication); Roberts v. State, No. 05-10- 00632-CR, 2011 WL 6225229, at *6 (Tex.App.--Dallas Dec. 15, 2011, pet. ref’d)(mem. op., not designated for publication). But that does not end our inquiry. Lewis, Villa, and Roberts all dealt with challenges to a trial court’s Order to Withdraw Funds, which the Texas Supreme Court has likened to a civil turnover order or garnishment. Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 317-19. We understand Appellant’s position in this case to challenge not only that Order, but also the Bill of Cost issued by the District Clerk. While we dismiss the appeal with respect to the Order to Withdraw Funds, we view the attack on the Bill of Costs differently.
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