Duncan v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.

144 So. 180
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 10, 1932
DocketNo. 4366.
StatusPublished

This text of 144 So. 180 (Duncan v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duncan v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 144 So. 180 (La. Ct. App. 1932).

Opinion

PALMER, J.

Plaintiffs bring tbis suit to recover damages in the sum of $560 for the loss by fire of a barn, certain tools and implements, certain outhouses, certain pecan trees, and other trees and timber upon the lands owned by them. They allege in effect that the employees of the defendant company set fire to the grass, rubbish, and undergrowth on its right of way, and negligently permitted it to spread to the lands and premises of plaintiffs and burn said improvements, which they value at the sum sued for.

Defendant joins issue by entering a general denial to each and all of plaintiffs’ allegations. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs for the amount sued for, from which judgment defendant has appealed.

Opinion.

The railroad of the defendant company at the place where this fire occurred runs almost duo north and south, and is paralleled on the west side by a concrete highway. The location of the fire was some three or four miles north of the town of Grand Cane. Just opposite the place where the fire originated on the east side of the railroad track is situated the property of plaintiffs. The fire began shortly after 1 o’clock in the afternoon of October 12, 1931, and, after getting beyond the control of the section crew and other assistance they received from the surrounding neighbors, it spread to the property of plaintiffs and destroyed two barns, about a half mile of fence, six pecan trees, a chinaberry tree, and a red oak tree situated in the yard of plaintiffs, together with certain tools and implements, all of which plaintiffs testified was well forth the sum of $560. Defendant has not seriously questioned the value of the improvements so destroyed.

Plaintiffs rest their claim upon the direct charge that the fire in question was set out by defendant’s section crew in an effort to burn off the right of way, and that defendant was thereby grossly negligent in permitting it to spread from the right of way to the property of plaintiffs and destroy it. The direct proof of plaintiffs to the effect that defendant’s section crew set out the fire on its right of way is limited to a colored woman living on a plantation near the point of the origin of the fire. She testified that she lives on the west side of the railroad and on the opposite side to plaintiffs’ property; that her home is about a quarter or half a mile from the railroad. She says that the fire began about 1 or 2 o’clock in the afternoon, at which time she was at her house with her three little children; that, when she first saw it, the section men were setting fire on the side of the railroad next to the highway, that is, the west side. She testified that, before the fire was set out, she saw the section men coming from down towards town, meaning from the direction of Grand Cane, and that they were traveling on a hand car, which, after stopping, they lifted off the track, and that they left the hand car behind, walked up the track, and started the fire.

On cross-examination, she says she did not see but one member of the section crew setting the fire, that he appeared to be using a torch, and that this was on the west side of the track. She said that all the section crew came together on the hand car to the place where she saw this one man starting the fire right after he alighted from the hand car. She further testified that, at-the time she saw this man setting out the fire, he also had a pine top which she “reckoned” he used to keep the fire from getting away from him.

Frank Strother, working in the maintenance department of the highway, first saw the fire from the place of his work, about a quarter of a mile north from where the fire started. He says the fire began just a little after 1 o’clock; that at the time he first saw it he was on the west side of the railroad and on the opposite side from plaintiffs’ place. He says the fire had just .started when he first saw it; that he had a clear view; that it was about ten or fifteen minutes after he first saw the fire before he saw any one around it, at which time it had made some headway; and that he saw a negro run up on the west side of the railroad and go down between the tracks. He says the section foreman asked him to help fight the fire, saying, “Will you come and help me? I’m about to. lose the house,” or “It looks like I’ll lose the house.”

H. H. Prothro, another employee of the highway commission, was working with the witness Strother at the time, and saw about the same thing that Strother testified he saw. He said the fire was burning on both sides of the railroad track. He also stated that he did not see any one at the fire when he first observed it, but that a few moments later the section crew appeared. He also testified that the section foreman asked him to assist in fighting the fire, saying, “Will you come and help me? I’m about to lose the house.”

Plaintiffs further established the fact that defendant’s section crew, a few days previous, had burned the rubbish on the right of way just north of the place where this fire in question originated. It was also admitted by the section crew that the next portion of the right of way to be burned was the place where this fire started.

The section foreman, J. T. Goldman, and his crew of colored laborers — at least four of them — all denied that they had any connee *182 tion with starting the Are in question. They testified that they were engaged in cutting the rubbish upon the right of way, and that on Friday before this fire on the Monday following they cut the right of way some distance below the place of this fire; that they did not work on Saturday, and, upon resuming work on Monday morning, continued to cut the rubbish toward Grand Oane until noon, at which time they had keached the home of Monroe Mosely, which is situated about three-fourths of a mile south, or in the Grand Oane direction, from the place of the origin of the fire; that at this point they ate their lunch and at 1 o’clock returned to their labor; that about ten or fifteen minutes after resuming labor they discovered some smoke or fire to their north, got upon their hand car, went up to the fire, and began the work of trying to extinguish it, and that they were not at the point where the fire originated at any time during Monday morning. They were corroborated as to the place where they worked and where they ate dinner by the testimony of Monroe Mosely and Adale Lee Mosely.

Mrs. Drew Stanley, whose home is situated between the point of the origin of the fire and Monroe Mosely’s place, where the section crew ate dinner, also corroborates the section foreman and the section crew as to where the crew worked that morning; that at about 11 o’clock that morning the section crew was in front of her house performing their work of cutting the weeds on the right of way. She further testified that, while she was washing her dishes after lunch, she saw the section crew on the hand car going north.

The members of the section crew testified that, as they reached the place of the fire, one of the crew, Romeo Gilliard, went immediately to the west of the railroad track to get some tops with which to fight the fire; and that, after securing the tops, he, came back, crossed the track and began fighting the fire, at which time it had already burned alongside the pavement. They denied that Gilliard had any torch, as the Williams woman testified, and stated that he only had the tops with which to fight the fire.

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Bluebook (online)
144 So. 180, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duncan-v-texas-p-ry-co-lactapp-1932.