Duncan v. State

258 S.W. 182, 96 Tex. Crim. 433, 1924 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 77
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 30, 1924
DocketNo. 8002.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 258 S.W. 182 (Duncan v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duncan v. State, 258 S.W. 182, 96 Tex. Crim. 433, 1924 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 77 (Tex. 1924).

Opinion

LATTIMORE, Judge.

Appellant was convicted in the Criminal District Court of Tarrant County of rape, and his punishment fixed at eleven years in the penitentiary.

The conviction was for statutory rape of a girl thirteen years old who lived in Port Worth. On the night of December 8, 1922, she went with her sixteen year old brother to a party at the home of T. M. Mirike, seven or eight miles west of the city, and there met appellant and Curley Owens,' both of whom had gone out to the affair in a Hup roadster. When the party broke up prosecutrix went back to town with the two boys in their car. Her story is that when they reached her home in the southern part of Port Worth her brother had not gotten there and they drove some two blocks south, Owens *434 driving, then stopped the ear and assaulted her. She says that both boys got out and that appellant caught hold of her and pulled her down on the seat under the steering wheel and in this position while appellant held her hands and placed one of his hands over her mouth, Owens put one of her feet on the back of the seat and one on the floo of the car and had intercourse with her. She swore that he unfastened and took off her bloomers, got on top of her and put his private parts into hers, penetrating her several inches. She said she could not kick nor halloo. When Owens got through, she said he got off and out of the car and went around to where appellant was and took hold of her hands and held her while appellant had intercourse with her. She also swore that this was her first experience of this nature and that it hurt her. She said they all then got into the car and appellant cranked it and they drove her back to her home. About two minutes after she got there her brother came and the two went in the house together. She said nothing to her brother about what had taken place, nor to her mother who was awake and talked to them. The mother swore that the next morning she went into the room where prosecutrix slept, turned the cover off the girl and observed the absence of her bloomers, which witness said the girl always slept in. This fact was contradicted by prosecutrix who swore that she never slept in her bloomers. Any way the bloomers were gone and the mother asked prosecutrix where the bloomers were and she replied “they are somewhere”. This alleged rape was on Friday night. On Sunday following the mother was informed for the first time that prosecutrix had not come home with her brother. She says she then whipped prosecutrix and afterward examined her clothing and found some small spots of blood on the rear part of the underskirt. She questioned prosecutrix as to the conduct of the boys with whom she came home but got no satisfaction. Thursday she took prosecutrix to the office of Dr. Lowry, who also testified. He said that he declined to examine the girl because she told him the young men did nothing to her. The mother again took the girl on Saturday to where she was examined by three physicians. These three doctors all testified that she had been penetrated at some time and that they found her unusually well developed; that her private parts were large enough to permit intercourse without any trouble or apparent pain. Each of these gentlemen testified on cross-examination in substance as did Dr. Braswell when he said: “The fact of her development and condition would be at least an indication of frequent intercourse.”

Appellant testified and denied intercourse with prosecutrix but said that when they reached her home her brother had not come and she said her mother might whip her if she went in without her brother, and that she suggested that they drive around until he came. Appellant testified that they drove around the block several times *435 and then prosecutrix said, "You have to work and I will get out and wait on the porch for him.” That Owens asked her for her telephone number, which she gave him and that they then took their departure. He said that Owens later called the girl over the telephone in his hearing and had a conversation with her. Prosecutrix also testified that she gave Owens her telephone number and that he later called her up and talked to her. Appellant further testified that he saw nothing out of the way about the girl and that they treated her with absolute courtesy and propriety. On Monday after the alleged rape appellant said he learned from a man named Ross that the girl was charging them with raping her.. They were arrested on the Saturday following this Monday. A number of wit-, nesses testified, to the good reputation of appellant. The fact"was in testimony that there were are lights at the street crossings at or about the block where the alleged rape took place; also that there were residences near by.

Complaint is made of the refusal of a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. Affidavits were appended to the motion and when same was presented evidence was heard by the learned trial judge. Lavada Moser swore that she was present when Owens was tried immediately following the trial of appellant, and that she heard the assistant district attorney in his closing argument in the Owens case refer to the missing bloomers and to the supposed fact that one of the defendants had them. She said that she was at the party at Mr. Mirike’s and when she heard this argument she said to a lady sitting near her, "O, I know where these bloomers are/ they are at Mr. Mirike’s house”; that information of her statement reached appellant’s attorneys and they obtained her affidavit. In same she further stated that at the Mirike home on the occasion of the party a number of girls, among whom was prosecutrix, put on boys’ pants. That with her bloomers on prosecutrix could not get into the pants selected for her and that she pulled her bloomers off, and affiant observed that when she donned her own clothes later, prosecutrix did not put back on her bloomers. Affidavits were obtained and also evidence heard from Mrs. Mirike and her two daughters to the effect that the morning following the party they found in their home a pair of bloomers which belonged to no one residing there;, that no one claimed them and they were altered and worn by the fourteen year old daughter of the Mirikes. The State traversed the allegations of appellant’s motion for new trial, and on the hearing thereof the bloomers at the Mirike home were produced and prosecutrix and her mother affirmed that they did not belong to prosecutrix and, therefore, were not the ones worn by her on the night in question.

We think the record sufficiently shows the evidence to be newly discovered. In addition to the refusal of his motion for new trial, *436 appellant has a hill of exceptions complaining of the refusal of testimony from Essie Lee Mirike to the effect that on Sunday following the alleged rape she saw prosecutrix and had a conversation with her in which the latter told her that the conduct of appellant and Owens to her the night they brought her home, was perfectly lovely.

In Hamilton v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 374, appears the following language used by this court:

“Of course, in every case, whether the party is of the age of consent or not, it would be a strong circumstance of corroboration if it be shown that the party made outcry at the time, or that recently thereafter she made report of the matter. ’ ’

Mr. Branch, on page 1002 of his Annotated P. C., states on the authority of Ramsey v. State, 63 S. W.

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Massey v. State
447 S.W.2d 161 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1969)
McFarland v. State
196 S.W.2d 829 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1946)
Hale v. State
51 S.W.2d 611 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1932)
Lusty v. State
261 S.W. 775 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1924)

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Bluebook (online)
258 S.W. 182, 96 Tex. Crim. 433, 1924 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duncan-v-state-texcrimapp-1924.