Duncan v. Manager, Department of Safety

356 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 2003 WL 24012052
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedMay 8, 2003
DocketCIV.A. 99-M-1299
StatusPublished

This text of 356 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (Duncan v. Manager, Department of Safety) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duncan v. Manager, Department of Safety, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 2003 WL 24012052 (D. Colo. 2003).

Opinion

ORDERS ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MATSCH, District Judge.

Cynthia Duncan began her employment with the Denver Police Department (“DPD”) in 1979. Her first assignment after graduating from the Denver Police Academy was in District 4 where she Served until 1984 when she transferred to District 1. In 1988, she became a detective and! was assigned to the Crimes Against Property Department within the Detective Bureau. She transferred to the Crimes Against Persons Department in' 'a career development move in 1991 where she served until July, 1995, when she moved to the Internal Affairs Bureau. Ms. Duncan was promoted to Sergeant. Following normal practice, that promotion required that she be reassigned to street duties and she went back to District 4.

On April 14, 1998,- Ms. Duncan filed a charge of- sex discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In that charge, she made the following allegations:

I. PERSONAL HARM: During the course of my employment as a Police Officer, I have been subjected to sexual harassment, retaliation and different terms and conditions of employment.
II. RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: Despite my complaints to my superiors and the Department of Internal Affairs, no effective action has been taken.

III.DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT: I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my gender, female, and in retaliation for my having complained of discrimination, inasmuch as:

a. My co-workers circulated sexual gossip about me and made sex innuendos about my having affairs with several superiors.
b. An anonymous letter with sexual references about me was sent to the home of one of my co-workers, with threats of sending one to my house, stating that receipt of the letter will cause my husband to kill me.
c. I was placed under surveillance by one of my co-workers.
d. My supervisor told me that I would have to submit a picture of my bruised buttocks, if I wanted to file a complaint of physical assault against my co-worker.
e. Derogatory names were used by one of my supervisors in refer female anatomy.
f. One of my supervisors has a history of using derogatory comments about women, as does one of my peers.
g. Other female officers are also harassed.
h. The harassment is pervasive and department-wide and represents - a continuing pattern of harassment.

Ms. Duncan was transferred to the DPD Training Academy in August, 1999, and in December, 1999, she was transferred to Traffic Operations in the Photo Radar Unit. Ms. Duncan went on medical leave in June, 2000, 1 and filed the complaint in this *1129 lawsuit on July 8, 1999. Ms. Duncan was given a disability retirement in the summer of 2000.

The defendants filed motions for summary judgment which have been fully briefed with the submission of deposition testimony and exhibits. Oral argument was heard. There are many disputes concerning the facts. Accordingly, all of the proposed evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff without making credibility determinations on disputed testimony.

The City contends that the Title YII claims should be dismissed because they are barred by the time limitation requiring that the administrative charges must be filed no later than 300 days following discriminatory or retaliatory conduct. Accordingly, it is argued that the court should consider only conduct occurring on or after June 18, 1997. Both defendants argue that the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Additionally, both defendants contend that the plaintiffs proffered evidence is not sufficient for a reasonable jury to find liability against either of them for gender discrimination based on a hostile work environment or for retaliation for complaints because the complained of conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive to affect Ms. Duncan’s terms and conditions of employment and because no causal connection has been shown between her complaints and any subsequent adverse employment action.

The time limitations under Title VII must be considered under the continuing violation doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).

In that case, the Court recognized a difference between discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts and a hostile work environment claim, holding that because a hostile work environment requires proof of repeated discriminatory conduct, the claim is not necessarily barred by the statutory time limitations. More specifically, the court held that:

A charge alleging a hostile work environment claim, however, will not be time barred‘so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls within the time period.

Id. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061.

In applying that ruling, this court must analyze the proposed evidence to determine whether the plaintiff. can establish the essential elements of a hostile work environment claim as developed by the opinions deciding Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998).

As Justice Thomas wrote in Morgan, the statutory language of Title VII prohibits discriminatory. employment. practices and a hostile sexual work environment becomes a discriminatory practice as a result of “the. cumulative [ejffect of individual acts.” Morgan at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. In Harris, the Court repeated, the operative language from Meritor that Title VII is violated when the workplace is permeated with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to'alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an *1130 abusive working environment.” Harris at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute of limitations defense and the viability of the plaintiffs Title VII claim in this case depend upon a detailed factual analysis. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Gross v. Bwrggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir.1995) is helpful as guidance.

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Related

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
477 U.S. 57 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
524 U.S. 742 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
524 U.S. 775 (Supreme Court, 1998)
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
536 U.S. 101 (Supreme Court, 2002)

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356 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 2003 WL 24012052, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duncan-v-manager-department-of-safety-cod-2003.