Duncan v. Duncan

72 S.E. 742, 69 W. Va. 626, 1911 W. Va. LEXIS 152
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 31, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 72 S.E. 742 (Duncan v. Duncan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duncan v. Duncan, 72 S.E. 742, 69 W. Va. 626, 1911 W. Va. LEXIS 152 (W. Va. 1911).

Opinion

Milleu, Judge:

In a suit for divorce a mema eb thoro, brought by plaintiff, the husband, against defendant, the wife, on the ground of desertion; jand on her answer and cross-bill seeking a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, for alleged adultery of plaintiff, the opinion and decree below was that plaintiff had not clearly proven his allegations, and should take nothing, and that his bill be dismissed; and that the allegations of defendant’s answer and cross-bill had not been clearly proven, and that she should take nothing thereby, and that her said cross-bill be also dismissed.

Plaintiff has appealed, and defendant has assigned cross-error in this court. The record is voluminous, and includes the depositions of numerous witnesses. There is no conflict in the evidence as to the fact of desertion by defendant. Hot only is it distinctly charged in the bill, and admitted in the answer, but it is fully proven by numerous witnesses, including the father and mother of defendant, with whom she and plaintiff resided from the date of their marriage in November, 1895, until August, 1906, when she deserted him, with the declared purpose never to again return as his wife. She first went to Clarksburg, where her brother resided, the plaintiff following her on the same train as far as Grafton, in an effort to induce her to return. This she declined to do. Plaintiff sent his mother-in-law to Clarksburg, there, to try and induce her daughter to return, and before she died, pending this suit, she testified on behalf of plaintiff, that with pleadings and tears she had endeavored, without avail, to get her daughter to go back home to her husband. Defendant did, however, that same evening, follow' her mother back to Wheeling, going directly to the home of her aunt, Mrs. Taylor, and the following evening, in company with a Mrs. Bxannen, left for Reno, Nevada. Learning of her [628]*628departure, plaintiff, at his own expense, sent his sister-in-law, the wife of defendant’s brother, who resided at Clarksburg, out to Keno, to again try to induce his 'wife to return to him. This effort also resulted in failure. Later, in November following, plaintiff wrote defendant, at Keno, urging her to return, proposing any fair terms, and inquiring on what terms she would be willing to come back to him. To tins letter she replied, December 6, 1906, in a very characteristic way, that she would return on the following conditions, namely, that he would furnish and maintain for her a home in town; that she should have the privilege of going and coming, when, where, and with whomsoever she pleased, with right to entertain whomsoever she desired, and that her actions were not to be criticised, or questioned either by him or by any one else; that her rulings regarding Dorothy, the little daughter, should be supreme; that the relationship of husband and wife should not exist, except in name only ; that she should have her own room, and that there should he no trespassing therein, unless invited, and that she should be clothed and furnished with spending money consistent with her station in life; and after chicling him for alleged disrespect, she adds: “For Dorothy’s salce, I am willing to make what I consider a sacrifice and return under conditions above named, provided you forward me five hundred dollars, ($500.00) with which to pay indebtedness and expenses to Wheeling.”

Plaintiff did not accept this proposition. In January, 1907, however, defendant returned to Wheeling. Plaintiff first learned of her retorn by telephone message from his father-in-law, Mr. John Mendel, received at his place of business, saying that Mrs. Duncan had returned, and had gone to the school house, and taken Dorothy from school. On going out on the street he met Mrs. Duncan with the little girl, in company with a Miss Beall, coming down the street. He crossed the street and greeted her, took hold of the little girl’s hand, and accompanied both to the house of Mrs. Taylor, the aunt, where he remained until evening. He says that after sending the child out of the room, he again tried to persuade Mrs. Duncan to return to his home, and again inquired of her as to- the conditions on which she would he willing to go hack and live with him. Her answer ■was, that he had her only terms in the letter she had written him from Keno. He told her that he could not accept those [629]*629terms. After leaving her he procured his mother-in-Law to go and see defendant, and to try to induce her to return, but she did not succeed. Mrs. Duncan remained obdurate. Later he sent his father-in-law, and the chief of police after the little girl, who got and took her to his home. Afterwards he brought this suit.

We think these and other facts proven, clearly establish desertion. If not, it would be difficult to make out a case of that kind.

But the rights of the parties then must be determined on the truth or falsity of defendant’s charges of adultery, as showing good cause for desertion; and as grounds for the affirmative relief 'she seeks against plaintiff. She charges: First, that some time prior to August 26, 1906, and particularly about three months prior thereto, she received information of the misconduct and misdoings of plaintiff,. but of which she had never heard the full particulars and details, until on August 24, 1906, when in her presence, he was accused thereof by Ida Brannen; that some three or four years prior to that time she had received information from her mother that plaintiff 'was then suffering with a venereal disease, which he could not have contracted, except by adulterous conduct, her mother, as she alleges, then giving her, what seemed to be conclusive proof thereof, but of which she was not then satisfied; that some three months prior to August 26, 1906, she had learned that said charges were true, and that he was then not only suffering from that disease himself, but had communicated it to her, and from which she had suffered for a long time without knowing the cause, and had required the treatment of a physician; second, on information received prior and subsequent to said date, she charges that plaintiff, after his marriage, had been guilty of adultery with Florence Dilworth, and other women unknown to defendant, and that during the same period he had frequented houses of prostitution, and had conducted himself in grossly immoral and indecent manner on many occasions.

These are all the specific charges made by defendant in her answer; but without amendment of her pleadings she undertook to prove by Stella Fendt, a common prostitute, that in 1903, plaintiff had on several occasions been guilty of adultery with her while she was employed in plaintiff’s laundry; and by Sue [630]*630Ingham, another prostitute, and proprietress of a house of ill fame, she proved that since the institution of this suit plaintiff, on two different occasions, had been guilty of adultery 'with her. Her evidence was objected to, because relating to alleged transactions occurring subsequent to the suit. However, she fixes the time after she had been confined in a hospital with typhoid fever, and had returned home. She was almost positive that the first time was in April, 1908; later she swears it was in April. The next time she fixes about a month later, in May. The Fendt girl, who had been employed in another laundry before she was employed by plaintiff, says, that the first instance with her was at night, in plaintiff's laundry; the next time at an assignation house in Wheeling, to which plaintiff took her.

An effort was also made to convict plaintiff of improper relations with other female employees. This was a signal failure, for want of proof.

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Bluebook (online)
72 S.E. 742, 69 W. Va. 626, 1911 W. Va. LEXIS 152, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duncan-v-duncan-wva-1911.