Duncan v. Atlantic, M. & O. R.

88 F. 840, 4 Hughes 125, 1880 U.S. App. LEXIS 2829

This text of 88 F. 840 (Duncan v. Atlantic, M. & O. R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duncan v. Atlantic, M. & O. R., 88 F. 840, 4 Hughes 125, 1880 U.S. App. LEXIS 2829 (circtedva 1880).

Opinion

BOND, Circuit Judge.

This bill of review has been filed after a lapse of two entire terms of the court since the entry of the decree sought to be reviewed, and is therefore too late, under rule 88 in equity. But even if this were not so, the bill could not be entertained. The state having appealed, it has no right to file a bill of review. If the errors set forth in the bill offered are apparent on the record, they have been so apparent ever since the final decree which is appealed from was filed. It is these errors the state asks the supreme court to correct. If the reasons for the bill are that new facts have come to the knowledge of parties since the filing of the final decree, then its offer is (oo late. The final decree takes effect from the time of its record, and not from the appointment of the officer to execute it. In reference to the petition of the defendant company, there is no cloud on the title such as is now set up, which has not heretofore been determined to be no obstacle, so far as the parties in this suit are concerned, to the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged premises. And, as for the reasons set forth that the road is more prosperous than heretofore, we think they ought to have no weight with the court, and afford no sufficient ground to postpone the sale ordered. It would, after all the success which has attended the management of the receivers, take nearly 10 years of such success continued to pay the already overdue interest of this mortgage debt. The defendant company offers no guaranty that such prosperity will continue. It proposes to go further, in debt, and to incumber the [842]*842complainants’ security further to pay a present obligation. The complainants’ debt is ascertained. They are entitled to execution therefor, and it was never heard to prevent such execution that the mortgagor, having been unfortunate in business, had now great hope of more success hereafter, to realize which the mortgagee ought to wait for him.

It appeared, however, that the master had omitted to serve written notice on the attorney general of the state of Virginia, and on the board of public works of the state, at least 90 days before the sale, as directed by the foreclosure decree; and, in order to afford opportunity for the giving of these notices, the court entered an order directing the master to. adjourn the sale until February 10, 1881. On the 8th day of February, two days before the time designated for the sale, the defendant company, by its counsel Benjamin F. Butler, renewed its motion for a postponement. After argument, the court rendered its decision in the following terms:

BOND, Circuit Judge. This is a motion on the part of the mortgagor to postpone the sale ordered by the decree in this case filed May 9, 1879. The case has been pending in this court for nearly five years, and has regularly proceeded with no prospect of any other result than the one it is about to reach. The mortgagor has allowed the time for redemption to pass, and alleges in argument that it has been too poor to do so ever since the bill was filed. The motion before us is not made upon any proof or showing that the finances of the mortgagor have at all improved, nor that it has been promised the certain aid of any capitalist to enable it to redeem. It merely alleges that it believes that, if the court would make certain provisions in the order opening the present decree and postponing the sale, the company would be able to redeem. The facts upon which that belief is founded are not given, and the court can look at it in no other light than as the ordinary lingering hope of a debtor that his financial condition will somehow improve. The mortgagor, to be sure, offers to put in the registry of the court the sum of $100,090 to be security for costs and loss of interest caused by the postponement of the sale; but it does not offer to pay now the defaulted interest, nor to allow the $100,000 as a penalty for not redeeming, as it says it expects to do. Under these circumstances, the court does not think that it would be equitable to open its decree, and make the complainants risk the rise and fall of the present inflated market and the ¿ccumulation of interest, and the risk of loss of business and consequent diminished receipts of the road, but thinks the company has had abundant time to make its arrangement to redeem had it any prospects of doing so. The fact that the charters of . Lynchburg and Petersburg do not allow those cities to borrow money, being large stockholders, to aid in redemption, and that the state legislature is not in session, does not alter the matter. It is too remote to prophesy what those corporations would do were they assembled; and certainly to postpone the complainants from the foreclosure of their mortgage on such a remote contingency or expectation would be most inequitable, especially as [843]*843the security for the remuneration for loss by delay, should there be such loss, is, as we have said, so inadequate.

The complainants applied for a decree of sale at the October term, 1877. The court did not grant the decree till May, 1879, although the complainants made persistent and very frequent applications throughout the whole period of delay. After the decree, the court did not order a sale till July, 1880, complainants meantime pressing continually for such order. During the whole of this delay, no effort was made by defendant company to redeem its property. It is too late, two days before the sale, to ask for its postponement, without a-tender of the debt, or what is equivalent to a tender. During the whole of this delay, the court felt it was taking great responsibility; but, fortunately, the revival of business and the admirable conduct of the receivers have prevented any loss from this delay; and we do not, upon so indefinite a proposition as is now made, at this stage, propose to continue such risk. The defendant company must take its chances at sale along with all other bidders in open market.

The cause was then heard on a motion by the defendant company to modify the terms of the decree of sale, so as to reduce the amount of cash to be paid by the purchasers to the sum required to pay the interest then due, and the costs of the sale.

HUGHES, District Judge.

The decree already passed states what is to be sold, and the method of sale, and determines the rights of the parties; and after so long a time since its filing and the advertisement of the sale provided by it, and on the eve of the sale, the court will not alter it, no objection to it having been made heretofore by any party to the suit. If there is any difficulty created by its terms in the bidding, and it can be shown after the sale that bidders were hindered by any obscurity or harshness of its terms, the party suffering from that defect can come into court, and object to the ratification of the sale on that ground. If the decree as it now stands results in a sale for an inadequate price, when the court comes to consider the master’s report of sale, then will be proper time for reaching the objection now urged. In general, we think we have no power to amend the decree in any particular after so long a time has passed since it was pronounced.

The sale was therefore had, on February 10, 1881, and the road and property was bought in for a syndicate whose members subsequently organized the Norfolk & Western Railroad Company. The sum realized was |8,605,000, over and above certain prior mortgages subject to which the sale was made. The decree confirming the sale was as follows:

Decree Confirming Salé.

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Bluebook (online)
88 F. 840, 4 Hughes 125, 1880 U.S. App. LEXIS 2829, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duncan-v-atlantic-m-o-r-circtedva-1880.